US embassy cable - 03HARARE1594

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MDC OFFICIAL OFFERS MIXED ASSESSMENT ON CHURCHES' INITIATIVE, SEEKS APPROACH TO MILITARY

Identifier: 03HARARE1594
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE1594 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-08-08 10:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

081010Z Aug 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIAL OFFERS MIXED ASSESSMENT ON CHURCHES' 
INITIATIVE, SEEKS APPROACH TO MILITARY 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1571 (B) HARARE 1532 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER WIN DAYTON; REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Gandhi Mudzingwa, MDC's Director of 
Presidential Affairs, on August 7 told poloff that mixed 
signals from ZANU-PF underscored the uncertainty surrounding 
the ongoing bishops' attempt to jump start talks.  He 
reported that a ZANU-PF source had approached him about 
derailing the effort but that Mugabe's attitude on the talks 
remained unclear.  Emphasizing the potential importance of 
the military in any resolution of Zimbabwe's political 
impasse, he signalled that the MDC would embark on a discreet 
effort to engage key military figures.  He urged the USG to 
engage moderate ZANU-PF elements and to maintain pressure on 
South Africa to push Mugabe to the table.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Mudzingwa opened by expressing dismay over ZANU-PF's 
failure to demonstrate clear commitment to the process 
undertaken by the bishops (ref B), which he attributed to a 
clash of "personal interests" among key insiders.  A nephew 
of Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa called Mudzingwa 
on August 6 to urge that the bishops' initiative be 
terminated, noting that Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa 
and Information Minister Jonathan Moyo had convinced the 
party that the bishops were not impartial.  Mudzingwa 
observed that Mnangagwa, who remains Mugabe's favored 
successor, was not involved in any of the intra-party 
initiatives to communicate with the MDC and was likely to be 
an obstacle to all such initiatives.  Others posturing in the 
run-up to potential negotiations, such as Chinamasa and 
Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira, were seeking to 
discredit each others' efforts in an effort maximize each's 
own influence.  He concluded that most accepted the need for 
dialogue and change but ego clashes and mutual suspicion 
thwarted their ability to pursue an obvious shared interest 
in meaningful engagement. 
 
3.  (C) Tempering his pessimism, Mudzingwa opined that Mugabe 
himself may yet be open to the bishops' process 
notwithstanding the squabbling and lack of consensus among 
his subordinates.  Mugabe repeatedly had made clear through 
public signals and private communications that he wanted to 
step down; if he believed that the bishops's process could 
produce the conditions he required to step down, the 
initiative could still bear fruit.  Mudzingwa detected signs 
that Mugabe remained open to some kind of constructive 
engagement with the MDC.  ZANU-PF public characterizations of 
the MDC were becoming more restrained.  The cabinet (read: 
Mugabe) reportedly had required Local Government Minister 
Chombo to suspend his effort to have the MDC-dominated Harare 
City Council dismissed.  The country's downward economic 
spiral, buttressed by international pressure, had convinced 
most ZANU-PF members from top to bottom that significant 
change was necessary.  Prominent members' posturing, while 
disruptive, evidenced their conviction that change would come 
and that they wanted to shape it.  Nonetheless, the talks, if 
undertaken, were unlikely to go anywhere without the thorny 
issue of Mugabe's succession within ZANU-PF first being 
resolved. 
 
4.  (C) Mudzingwa confided that the MDC had no contingency 
plans to pursue in the event that efforts to get ZANU-PF to 
the table failed.  The MDC had yet to become very proficient 
at planning, something at which ZANU-PF always had excelled, 
he conceded.  The MDC remained highly vulnerable on the 
breadth of their leadership.  Although the MDC had wide 
popular support, Mudzingwa asserted, it lacked anybody beyond 
Morgan Tsvangirai who had the stature to command a national 
following.  Like ZANU-PF, the MDC had no clear succession 
mechanism. 
 
5.  (C) Characterizing the military as Mugabe's "final 
reliable pillar of support", Mudzingwa emphasized its 
potential importance in any political solution to the 
country's crisis.  The MDC had yet to establish rapport with 
any key military leaders, even though many were deeply 
dissatisfied with the current situation and supported change. 
 Mudzingwa said he intended discreetly to reach out to some, 
more to reassure them about the MDC's posture toward the 
military than to seek their support.  He urged the USG 
quietly to get the military to understand the need for 
national political dialogue and to reassure key officials 
about potential MDC governance.  He said he intended to seek 
similar engagement by South African officials but thought the 
USG might offer "more muscle". 
 
6.  (C) In closing, Mudzingwa conveyed gratitude for the many 
facets of USG support for potential change in Zimbabwe.  He 
urged the USG to maintain pressure on South Africa to push 
Mugabe to the table.  The USG should "recognize" the bishops 
effort discreetly, being careful not to so in a way that 
might give ZANU-PF elements more fodder with which to 
discredit them.  Finally, Mudzingwa advised the USG to engage 
with moderate ZANU-PF elements such as Shamuyarira and 
Chairman John Nkomo, and those with strong ties to the 
business community, such as Matumwa Mawere and Saviour 
Kasukawire. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  The bishops' initiative continues to 
proceed on shaky ground.  The timing and substance of 
ZANU-PF's overdue contribution to the talks' agenda may be a 
significant indicator of Mugabe's interest, the decisive 
factor in whether talks begin.  Regarding its interest in 
reassuring the military, the MDC does not appear to have a 
policy for dealing with top military figures; an MDC approach 
to the military could alarm ZANU-PF elements and further 
disrupt nascent progress toward talks.  Bishop Evangelical 
Fellowship of Zimbabwe President Trevor Manhanga's meeting 
with the Charge on August 8 is reported septel. 
WHITEHEAD 

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