US embassy cable - 03AMMAN4827

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 004827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2013 
TAGS: KISL, PREL, PHUM, XF, XA, XG 
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM IN JORDAN: OPPOSITION MOSTLY FROM 
WITHIN THE SYSTEM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 205815 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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BACKGROUND: ISLAM JORDANIAN STYLE 
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1. (C) Political Islam is a mostly moderate force in 
Jordanian society.  By far, the most important Islamic 
organization in Jordan is the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
then its political arm, the Islamic Action Front. 
There are no other Islamic groups in the country that 
match the MB/IAF in influence and size.  However, by 
and large, political and social associations in Jordan 
are mostly tribal-based rather than religion-based, 
and as the recent Parliamentary elections showed, 
tribal affiliations remain the most influential factor 
in Jordanian politics.  There are several Islamic-run 
charities in Jordan, but unlike Islamic charities in 
other parts of the region, these charities do not 
provide services for many in the population.  There 
is a small minority of al-Qa'ida-influenced extremists 
in Jordan, but the GOJ has and continues to take a 
very aggressive tack in dealing with Islamic extremism. 
 
2. (C) Answers below are keyed to Reftel paras: 
 
4) Post has provided below a thumbnail sketch of the 
following influential organizations/individuals active 
in Political Islam in Jordan: 
 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)--The Jordan branch of the MB 
originally began in 1945 as an offshoot of the 
Egyptian MB, but it has never evolved into a violent 
or subversive group.  The MB has a history of 
cooperation with the GOJ and enjoyed a special 
status under King Hussein's reign.  The King allowed 
the MB to categorize itself as an Islamic society 
during a time when political parties where banned in 
Jordan, and as such, the MB was able to develop its 
organizational structure and influence while other 
political movements were forced underground.  During 
the last 40 years, the MB has promoted its 
political beliefs via its control over professional 
associations, and through its social activities, 
relatively modest welfare programs and media efforts. 
Elements of the GOJ responsible for monitoring 
religious extremists are concerned that the ultimate 
aims of the MB are more radical than the 
organization's stated policy and that there may be 
links between MB members and more extremist 
organizations.  The current leadership of the MB, 
headed by East Banker Abdul Majid Thneibat, is 
dominated by moderates, however there is a movement 
within the organization towards a more radical public 
line. 
 
Islamic Action Front (IAF)-- The IAF was established 
as the political party representing the MB in 1992. 
MB leaders created the IAF because they did not 
want to jeopardize the MB's special status as a 
social society.  The IAF is the only functioning 
political party in Jordan.  With several thousand 
members and an effective campaign machinery, the 
IAF won 17 seats out of 110 in the recent 
elections and will likely be able to attract 
several other sympathetic Parliamentarians to form 
the largest (but still minority) political bloc in 
Parliament.  Its current leader is a moderate East 
Banker, IAF Secretary General Hamza Mansour. 
Although Mansour has made numerous provocative and 
inciteful public statements, within the organization 
he has called for cooperation with the government, 
participation in the elections, and contacts 
with foreign embassies (including the U.S.) 
 
Islamic Centrist Party--Roughly 120 IAF members who 
promoted a more pluralistic and liberal agenda broke 
away from the IAF in 2001 to form their own party, the 
Islamic Centrist Party.  The party's platform includes 
promoting the role of women in society, tolerance 
and economic reform.  However, so far the party's 
popular support has been limited and it won no seats 
in the recent Parliamentary elections.  The party 
is run by Secretary General Atef Btoush. 
 
Islamic Center Society--Probably the largest and most 
established charity run by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Islamic Center Society runs a number of health 
clinics, secondary schools, and at least two 
hospitals and underwrites these services for the poor. 
 
Takfir wa Hijra (Mohammad Shalabi)--A radical 
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Takfir 
wa Hijra (aka Takfiris) follow an extreme 
fundamentalist version of Islam.  The GOJ has 
labeled a group of Ma'an-based extremists, 
led by Mohammad Shalibi, aka Abu Sayyaf, as 
Takfiris, although Shalibi denied any 
connection to the Takfiris in a public interview 
in November 2002.  The GOJ moved against the group 
in November 2002 in the city of Ma'an.  The crackdown 
resulted in the deaths of several GOJ security 
officials and Shalabi followers, but Shalabi's 
current whereabouts are unknown. 
 
4a)  Parties/groups that advocate and seek a violent 
overthrow of existing regimes, and express overt 
hostility to political and religious pluralism, and 
to secular and minority groups:  Shalabi and his 
followers, loosely termed Takfir wa Hijra by the 
GOJ, would fall under this category.  Also in this 
category, are an unknown number of local-based 
extremists who are associated with al-Qa'ida or 
followers of al-Qa'ida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. 
Several of Zarqawi's associates were arrested in December 
2002 for the assassination of US diplomat Laurence 
Foley and are currently on trial for his 
murder. 
 
4b)  Parties/groups who are anti-democratic and 
anti-pluralistic, and who seek the overthrow of 
existing regimes though not necessarily by violence: 
Hizb al-Tahrir, an organization that professes to 
advocate non-violent Islamic revolution, has an 
unknown number of followers in Jordan. 
 
4c)  Parties/groups that are willing to engage in a 
democratic, pluralistic process but who, if given 
full power, would not respect the rights of 
non-Islamists, secularists, and/or minorities: 
Some members of the Islamic Action Front and Muslim 
Brotherhood would probably fit this category.  The IAF 
if given full power would likely support some laws 
that would infringe upon the rights of others, 
including the banning of alcohol, gender segregation in 
schools, and mandatory use of the hejab for women. 
 
4d)  Parties/groups who engage in a democratic, 
pluralistic process and who do/would respect the 
rights of others as well as the principle of alternance 
of government:  The IAF/MB mostly fit into this 
category as they have historically worked with other 
parties/minority groups within the political system. 
They have also cooperated with the GOJ--to the extent 
of circumscribing their own activities when the GOJ 
has established parameters for their activities. 
 
5)  Post would not advocate assistance programs to 
IAF or MB members.  Public statements attributed to 
the MB have at times appeared to favor terrorist acts 
against Israel and/or resistance to the US in Iraq. 
 
6a)  How are effective groups organized?  What makes 
them effective?  What lessons could secular groups in 
the same countries learn from the Islamists? 
 
--  The MB is the most effective Islamic group in 
Jordan, while the IAF is the most effective political 
party in Jordan.  Their effectiveness is based on 
broad grassroots appeal, commitment to a set of 
common causes, and strong organizational and financial 
support from its members.  The IAF has been 
effective in using the media to promote its message, 
principally through the publication of "Al Sabeel", 
Jordan's highest circulation weekly newspaper. 
 
What part of the population or potential electorate 
could/do listed groups control individually and 
collectively? 
 
--  The MB and IAF's appeal is broad and attracts both 
East Bank and West Bank constituents.  Prior to changes 
in the electoral law, the MB was able to garner 
about 27 percent (22 of 80) of the Parliamentary seats 
in the 1989 elections.  In the June 2003 elections, 
the IAF won a total of 17 seats (out of 110), 
despite expectations that the group would win at 
least 20-22 seats.  A pollster from the Center for 
Strategic Studies at Jordan University recently told us 
that, based on unreleased polling data, he believes the 
MB/IAF receives the support of about 15 percent of the 
population.  MB influence in the professional associations 
is much more dominant.  MB members usually dominate 
poorly-attended elections and thereby control the 
leadership in the most important associations, including 
the engineering and medical associations. 
 
Do listed groups pursue a largely domestic or 
internationalist agenda?  Do they receive funding or 
other support from foreign governments or groups? 
 
--  The MB/IAF pursue a mostly domestic agenda with 
one exception: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Almost 
since its inception, the MB has pursued an anti-Israeli 
agenda and rallied opposition to the Jordan-Israeli peace 
treaty.  The MB and the IAF are leaders of anti-normalization 
campaigns in Jordan.  Post knows of no foreign government 
funding or support to the MB or IAF.  The GOJ monitors 
the MB and IAF closely and would likely block any such 
support from foreign sources.  We would point out that 
most Jordanians view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
as a domestic--and not international--issue. 
 
Do these groups view the shari'ah as the immutable 
seventh-century version or as an elastic body of guidance 
able to evolve to fit contemporary circumstances? 
 
--  While public statements are steeped in shari'ah, 
in practicality, the MB and IAF in Parliament, and when 
in government in the early 1990s, have a more 
pragmatic approach to Islamic issues, particularly 
with implementation of shari'ah-mandated criminal 
punishments. 
 
Do host nations have any prominent Islamic "modernizers"? 
If so, are they associated with listed groups? 
Antagonistic toward the groups? 
 
--  The MB and IAF are comparatively moderate entities 
in the context of the spectrum of regional Islamic 
political movements.  Both organizations are controlled 
by the East Bank leaders, who traditionally have had close 
ties to the regime. 
 
What role, if any, do listed groups play in intra-Islamic 
debates? 
 
--  MB members are often invited and have attended regional 
Islamic meetings, some of which have involved more radical 
Islamists.  Post does not know the extent to which MB 
members participate in the dialogue at these meetings. 
 
Do listed groups show any willingness to cooperate 
politically or practically with non-Islamic parties/groups? 
 
--  Both the IAF and Islamic Centrist Party have worked 
with non-Islamic blocs in Parliament to achieve common 
goals.  The IAF has had a pragmatic approach to 
working with non-Islamic parties, and even Christians 
on occasion.  The Islamic Centrist Party, before Parliament 
was dismissed in June 2001, called on some 30 other 
political parties--representing a broad political 
spectrum--to join it in creating a new Parliamentary 
bloc.  However, Parliament was dismissed before it 
could consolidate the new bloc. 
 
What is the attitude of listed groups toward the U.S.? 
With groups opposed to the U.S., is opposition grounded 
mainly in disagreement with U.S. policy or in anti- 
Westernism more generally? 
 
--  Post notes that disagreements with the IAF/MB date 
back to a couple of incidents, prior to the start of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada, involving revoked visas for senior 
IAF/MB leaders, who had previously enjoyed 5-year, multiple 
entry visas to the U.S.  Prior to the visas issue, the 
Embassy had regular--if not close--contact with leaders 
of the MB and IAF.  The start of the al-Aqsa Intifada led 
to the further disintegration of relations.  However, 
in July 2002, Hamza Mansour, the leader of the IAF, 
agreed to meet with R Special Coordinator Christopher 
Ross for which he endured some tough internal criticism. 
The IAF/MB have refused to meet with Embassy officials 
since July 2002, and both groups have declined invitations 
to Embassy events.  MB/IAF criticism is mostly limited 
to statements against U.S. support for Israel, perceived 
U.S. efforts to "normalize" Jordanian-Israeli relations, 
alleged lack of U.S. support for Palestine, and U.S. 
policy in Iraq. 
GNEHM