US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB1722

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 001722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
THE HAGUE FOR JOHNSON/KAYE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KAWC, PGOV, UK, HR, ICTY, War Crimes 
SUBJECT: CROATIA USING "UNCOMFORTABLE" BACK-CHANNEL TO 
CONVINCE GOTOVINA TO SURRENDER 
 
REF: ZAGREB 1579 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM Patrick S. Moon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The Croatian government is using an unusual 
back-channel in an attempt to create conditions in which 
PIFWC Ante Gotovina would surrender for transfer to ICTY. 
The GoC's urgency and unorthodox approach is derived from the 
UK's refusal to ratify Croatia's Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU unless Croatia 
demonstrates its commitment to cooperate with ICTY.  Unless 
the SAA is ratified soon, Croatia will miss a key deadline in 
its application for EU membership.  ICTY is showing some 
flexibility in its approach to the Gotovina case, but the 
likelihood that this particular effort will bring about 
Gotovina's surrender is uncertain.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) UK Ambassador in Croatia Nicholas Jarrold has kept us 
closely informed of an unusual GoC back-channel effort to 
broker the surrender of ICTY PIFWC Ante Gotovina.  The key 
players in the effort are: 
 
- Zeljko Bagic, one of President Mesic's top National 
Security Advisors (Mesic has been seeking a way for Gotovina 
to "tell his side of the story" before giving himself up - 
ref); 
 
- Ivo Pukanic, editor of the sensationalist newsweekly 
"Nacional," which on June 10 ran Gotovina's first interview 
after two years in hiding (in the interview, Gotovina said he 
recognized the authority of the ICTY, widely interpreted as a 
signal he was ready to talk about surrendering); 
 
- Thomas Osorio, ICTY representative in Zagreb; and 
 
- UK Ambassador Nicholas Jarrold, a hesitant participant, but 
evidently selected by the GoC because the UK is the EU 
country Croatia needs most to convince that they are serious 
about transferring Gotovina to the Hague. 
 
3.  (C) On July 30, Pukanic approached Amb. Jarrold (at the 
urging of Bagic) and said that Gotovina offered to make 
himself available in Zagreb for an interview with ICTY 
representatives.  Gotovina was prepared to agree to fly to 
The Hague and surrender five days later.  Pukanic said that 
Gotovina is seeking a scenario which would retain his "honor 
as a Croatian general."  Amb. Jarrold rejected this scheme 
and held firm: Gotovina must go to The Hague -- no detours. 
Nonetheless, Jarrold said that he saw no problem with 
Gotovina making himself "available" to the ICTY. 
 
4.  (C) Amb. Jarrold instructed his DCM to brief local ICTY 
representative Osorio, who apparently consulted with The 
Hague and came back with a proposal for Gotovina: Osorio and 
several of his investigators would meet Gotovina in Bosnia 
for a period of hours for an interview, giving Gotovina the 
opportunity to make the statement to investigators that he 
seeks.  SFOR would provide "security" for the meeting, and 
Gotovina would surrender to SFOR afterwards.  Having Gotovina 
surrender in Bosnia would also spare GOC officials all the 
angst related to having to send their "war hero" off to The 
Hague. 
 
5.  (C) Amb. Jarrold told us that he delivered this offer to 
Nacional editor Pukanic on July 31.  Pukanic responded that 
such a meeting was not possible since Gotovina was "5,000 to 
10,000" kilometers away.  Pukanic suggested a meeting in 
Mexico City.  Amb. Jarrold immediately rejected such an 
arrangement pointing out the obvious complications of 
involving Mexican and possibly American authorities. 
Jarrold also reported that UK contacts with del Ponte's staff 
in The Hague suggested that she might be backtracking from 
the offer Osorio made here.  He pointed to the difficulties 
in dealing with individuals on her staff and del Ponte's poor 
relations with other parts of the Tribunal. 
 
6.  (C) Amb. Jarrold said that his involvement has run its 
course, and he is ending his role, with which he was clearly 
uncomfortable.  Jarrold said EC officials told him that for 
Croatia to stay on their desired timeline in the EU 
application process, they need all the ratifications of 
Croatia's SAA by late December or early January.  The UK 
would require three months for the Parliament, government and 
Queen to act.  The Dutch are the other holdout, but The Hague 
needs only a week or so to act since the Dutch parliament has 
already approved the SAA; the government is holding the 
ratification pending sufficient GOC action on ICTY issues. 
 
 
7.  (C) Unlike the previous interactions with Gotovina, these 
talks have not yet surfaced in the press.  We will have to 
wait until early next week when the next issue of Nacional 
appears to see whether Pukanic will make public his latest 
intermediary services. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) The ball is again in Gotovina's court with the GOC 
watching anxiously and no doubt praying that Gotovina will 
take up the ICTY's offer.  While Gotovina's surrender is a 
necessary step for British ratification of the SAA, it will 
not likely be sufficient.  London will probably also want to 
see that the GOC acts appropriately when it receives new 
indictments, rumored for September.  The GOC has said it will 
be responsive and act quickly, but we -- like the British -- 
will want to see that they do so and not merely accept their 
word. 
FRANK 
 
 
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