US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1462

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA AND S/CT 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CASC, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  THE MAOISTS' JULY 31 STATEMENT AND POST 
ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1431 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
1.  (U) The Maoists' July 31 public release, accepting the 
government's invitation to a third round of peace talks, is 
provided at paragraph 2.  Post's assessment is available at 
paragraph 3. 
 
July 31 Maoist Statement 
========================= 
 
2.  (U) Begin text: 
 
Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) 
Central Committee 
 
Press Statement 
 
According to the vast nationalism of the Nepalese community 
and the necessity and desire of the great Nepalese people, we 
would like to involve ourselves with full responsibility in 
the peace talks process with the old state power towards a 
progressive political solution in order to resolve the civil 
war.  But throughout the two rounds of formal peace talks 
held during the six month long cease-fire, the old state 
power has not demonstrated its seriousness towards the 
progressive political solution, and it is observed that the 
entire talks process and the developing desire of the people 
has been misused through the collection of regressive 
strength.  The possibility for the talks to succeed, the 
steps taken by our party towards a progressive political 
solution, and the country's hope and faith have become a joke 
and a situation of confusion.  In the latest situation, our 
party's talk team in its exchange of a series of letters has 
kept its faith to the struggle.  It is well known to all that 
during this exchange, our party has presented a minimum of 
fundamental demands for a new round of talks and set 31 July 
2003 as a deadline to fulfill our proposal.  The reply given 
by the ruling state power, even though a conducive 
environment has not been made, the principle commitments were 
expressed; mainly the commitment to discus the political 
subject matter, initiate the release of our three central 
leaders, and publicize the situation of the missing is 
positively accepted and respecting the desire and appeal of 
civil society, intellectuals and various political parties, 
our party has decided and given indication to our talk team 
to sit for the third round of peace talks to move the 
forward.  With our decision, we hope that the old state power 
will give concrete practical commitment. 
 
We would like to give emphasis on the political subject 
during this round of talks rather than technical subjects. 
In this particular situation of the country and in order to 
make the launch of the political solution easy, we believe 
the participation of the representation of the agitating 
political parties is compulsory.  For such representation, we 
appeal to the political parties and also urge the ruling 
power to make arrangements for this.  It is necessary to 
seriously reason that the actual solution to the problem is 
not possible without a progressive political solution. 
 
31 July 2003 
 
Prachanda 
Chairman 
NCP (Maoist) 
Central Committee 
 
End text. 
 
Post Assessment 
================ 
 
3.  (C) The fully translated statement, unavailable for 
reftel, leaves much to be desired in terms of a Maoist 
commitment to peace.  The invitation to the political parties 
to participate in the negotiations represents a restructuring 
of their political agenda.  The Maoists had deferred party 
participation to a roundtable conference, which they 
envisioned would include representatives from all sectors of 
society, followed by a constituent assembly.  This sudden 
diversion from their oft-repeated plan indicates a shift in 
the Maoist assessment of the political situation.  If the 
government agrees to include the political parties, who have 
ignored the peace talks in favor of partisan bickering and 
one-upmanship in hopes of being appointed to head an interim 
government, this could risk introducing an unruly and 
possibly uncertain element to the talks.  It is unlikely that 
the parties will abandon their shortsighted behavior and act 
for the good of the country; more likely, the parties' 
inclusion could engender new combinations of shifting 
alliances at the negotiating table, adding confusion to the 
talks.  In the final analysis, the Maoists' acceptance of a 
third round of peace talks has raised the hopes of the 
Nepalese, while government contacts fear this will delay the 
inevitable return to violence by only weeks or, at the most, 
months. 
MALINOWSKI