US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4851

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, NEA AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PTER, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKISH TROOPS FOR IRAQ: GOT NEEDS TO SHOW 
PUBLIC/PARLIAMENT BROAD COOPERATION 
 
 (U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert Deutsch. 
Reasons:  1.5 (B and D). 
 
 
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Summary 
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1. (S) In separate meetings July 30 with MFA Deputy U/S Baki 
Ilkin and PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, Charge was told that 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister want a Turkish troop 
deployment to Iraq, but must take to Parliament any decision 
to deploy troops to Iraq.  In an effort to get to yes while 
limiting political risk of another long public debate, the 
GOT hopes to bring the issue to Parliament when the time is 
suitable for a speedy discussion of the motion, which will 
require creating an environment in which the Turkish public 
and Parliament see that the troop deployment as one piece of 
a much broader US-Turkey partnership to stabilize Iraq, 
including significant political, reconstruction and 
anti-PKK/KADEK activity.  Both Ilkin and Davutoglu called FM 
Gul's Washington trip successful and noted Gul had briefed 
the cabinet on his return concerning a possible Turkish troop 
deployment.  Davutoglu noted that unlike the divisive cabinet 
discussions before the war, this briefing was well-received 
and did not elicit any negative discussion.  Ilkin said that 
the TGS would want a green light from the GOT, which they did 
not have,  before considering even preliminary 
military-to-military talks.  He noted that trying to rush a 
Turkish decision on the troop deployment would be 
counter-productive.  Ilkin also complained about a Turkish 
press story that, following the passage of the reintegration 
law, the US planned to send top PKK/KADEK operatives to 
Scandinavian countries.  He said failure to refute such 
misinformation and demonstrate real cooperation against the 
PKK/KADEK could color the troop deployment debate.  He added 
that the GOT was keen for elements of cooperation to begin 
asap.  End Summary. 
 
 
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GOT To Take To TGNA When Broad Partnership More Evident 
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2. (S) In separate July 30 meetings with the Charge, MFA 
Deputy Undersecretary Ilkin and PM Advisor Prof. Ahmet 
Davutoglu used similar points concerning the need for the GOT 
to bring the matter of a possible Turkish troop deployment to 
Iraq before the Parliament.  They said it would be critical, 
in gaining Parliamentary approval and public support, for the 
deployment to be viewed by Turks as only one part of a much 
broader partnership with the US in the restoration of Iraqi 
stability, the development of the Iraqi political system, and 
in Davutoglu's words, the normalization of everyday life for 
the people of Iraq.  It was with this in mind that the Turks 
had submitted to the US their list of non-military 
assisstance proposals, the response to which, they said, was 
generally positively received by the Turkish side.  Davutoglu 
went further and said the response would be helpful in 
demonstrating that the Turkish contribution would not be only 
or predominantly military.  Ilkin said that as the public saw 
that Turkey was working with the US to build a new Iraq 
economically and politically, domestic support for a Turkish 
troop deployment would increase.  If the military deployment 
was seen as Turkey's sole or primary contribution, it would 
be hard to get through Parliament.  Overall, he said, "we are 
on course.  The FM is aware of the urgency.  The AK Party and 
the cabinet both need to discuss the matter in detail...What 
we need now is a political decision."  Davutoglu said that 
the FM Gul had briefed the cabinet on a possible Turkish 
deployment when he returned from Washington, that unlike 
before the war, the cabinet was not divided or negative in 
response, but that at this point, the matter was only at the 
stage of being discussed in principle by the cabinet. 
 
 
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Positive Steps By US on PKK/KADEK Will Help Move Troop Issue 
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3. (S) Davutoglu said that the GOT did not want to risk a 
repeat of what happened on March 1, and therefore had crafted 
a different approach.  Rather than concentrate on northern 
Iraq, Turkey now views the country as a whole and underscores 
that the US and Turkey share deep common interests in the 
territorial integrity and stability of Iraq.  In northern 
Iraq, he said, the key was the future of the PKK/KADEK.  The 
GOT would not be able to explain to the Turkish public why 
its troops were in Baghdad and the west if the PKK/KADEK 
problem remained in the north.  Positive steps by the US on 
PKK/KADEK issues in the coming days and weeks would help, he 
said.  Davutoglu also repeated the Turkish request that 
Iraq's Governing Council invite Turkey to send troops, as 
this would create the impression that the Iraqi people were, 
in part, the demandeur and would allow the GOT to argue that 
Iraqis want the Turkish military contribution. 
 
 
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TGS Will Wait For GOT OK To Hold Mil-Mil Talks 
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4. (S) When Charge asked Ilkin if the GOT had considered 
entering military-to-military talks on an exploratory basis, 
noting that CENTCOM was ready for such discussions, Ilkin 
replied that the TGS needs a green light from the GOT, which 
it did not now have, before starting such talks.  Ilkin 
added, "I would wait until I got a signal from the GOT...my 
advice is please, do not rush this.  The last time you rushed 
us and it was counterproductive.  We couldn't deliver.  There 
should be a GOT consensus one way or the other first." 
 
 
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Rumor of Asylum in Norway Has Turks Concerned 
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5. (S) Ilkin raised a story that ran in the July 30 edition 
of Hurriyet newspaper, that would be taken up again in a CNN 
Turk TV interview the night of July 31, claiming that there 
was a secret plan for 100 of the top leaders would be sent to 
Scandinavia as political asylum seekers.  Ilkin asked that 
the Embassy refute this story, as the GOT would be questioned 
about it.  As long as some were able to create a public 
portrayal of the US as soft on the PKK/KADEK, there would be 
a negative impact on the possible troop deployment.  He said 
it would be easier for the GOT to get public support if the 
process toward troop deployment started with successful 
cooperation on PKK/KADEK. 
 
 
6. (S) Charge noted that the State Department had made a 
public statement welcoming the passage of the reintegration 
law, that U/S Grossman had been interviewed on the subject by 
CNN Turk and had said that the US would cooperate with Turkey 
to eliminate the PKK/KADEK.  We would need to work together 
with Turkey on information operations in northern Iraq to 
inform people of the new law and to have a full information 
exchange on PKK/KADEK to move operations to the next step. 
Ilkin said that the GOT was told that as soon as the law was 
enacted there would be discussions between the MFA and the 
State Dept.  He was eager for those discussions to be 
arranged.  Davutoglu also stressed that the PKK/KADEK 
operatives were to Turkey like al Qaeda was to the US, and 
that the GOT wanted them turned over to Turkey.  He called 
the State Department statement on the new reintegration law 
"very positive."  Charge stressed that the GOT had a 
commitment from the USG that we would cooperate with Turkey 
to eliminate the PKK/KADEK. 
 
 
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Political Environment Today 
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7. (C) Pro-deployment voices are greatly outnumbered in 
Turkey, particularly in the aftermath of March 1 and the 
increase in anti-US sentiment in Turkey since the war.  The 
already inhospitable atmosphere took a turn for the worse 
after the July 4 Sulaymaniyah incident and a massive anti-US 
media campaign.  Turkish press commentary now portrays a 
damaged US-Turkey relationship heading toward another crisis 
over the possible Turkish deployment with both sides making 
the same mistakes: alleged USG insensitivity to the political 
difficulties involved; and on the Turkish side, an 
exaggerated view of Turkey's strategic importance, leading to 
inflated expectations of USG "concessions" for Turkey's 
support.  Two of the negative influences from March 1, 
President Sezer, who stressed "international legitimacy," and 
Parliamentary speaker Arinc, who emphasized the public's 
negative sentiment, have already raised their voices.  In 
short, the picture is of a Turkey about to overplay its hand 
again.  MFA spokesman Dirioz told us privately that the huge 
pro-establishment Dogan media empire has decided to support a 
possible Turkish deployment.  Dogan's track record, however, 
suggests it will continue to play both sides of the divide. 
While the last few days demonstrate the GOT is trying to mold 
the public discussion in a more positive direction, the 
pressure of domestic issues and sentiment will make it 
difficult. 
 
 
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Comment 
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8. (C) Althought the PM, FM, MFA officials and the TGS Chief 
have privately expressed their intention to find a way for 
Turkey to participate in the stabilization force in Iraq, we 
are not yet seeing leadership from the elected politicians, 
bureaucrats or military leaders necessary to shape public 
opinion and outflank the vocal opponents.  We expect that the 
GOT will use the upcoming two-month legislative recess to 
assess the Iraq stabilization process including the PKK/KADEK 
issue, the developments in Iraq's political and economic 
reconstruction, as well as Turkey's ability to participate. 
(Note: The Parliament could return in extraordinary session 
if circumstances warrant.  End note.)  The AK government will 
also want to see whether TGS Chief Ozkok, with whom Erdogan 
has a modus vivendi, can promote into key leadership posts in 
August more like-minded generals.  In short, while the ball 
is in Turkey's court, we can help get them to yes on a troop 
contribution by creating a broader sense of commitment to the 
partnership they seek in non-military sectors and on the 
PKK/KADEK issue as a matter of priority. 
DEUTSCH