US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4834

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TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSES NSC REFORM PACKAGE

Identifier: 03ANKARA4834
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA4834 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-07-31 12:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

311219Z Jul 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSES NSC REFORM PACKAGE 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4804 
     B. ANKARA 4544 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Parliament late July 30 unanimously approved 
the AK Government's seventh EU-related reform package.  As 
noted in reftels, the most important -- and controversial -- 
aspects of the package concerned changes to the National 
Security Council (NSC).  Though limited in scope, the NSC 
reforms -- if enacted and implemented -- are a positive step 
toward increasing elected civilian authority in Turkey.  End 
summary. 
 
 
----------- 
The Package 
----------- 
 
 
2. (C) The law includes the following provisions: 1) the NSC 
SecGen will be assigned by the prime minister with the 
approval of the president, and will report to a Deputy P.M. 
rather than directly to the P.M. -- a move widely understood 
as diminishing the SecGen's political status; 2) the NSC 
shall meet every two months, or at the discretion of the 
prime minister or president; and 3) making the NSC agenda and 
procedures/guidelines less formally peremptory.  In addition 
to these changes, the package also contained reforms designed 
to ease restrictions on freedom of expression and expedite 
torture cases in the courts.  The final version does not, 
however, bring military spending under Parliamentary 
supervision, as AK had initially wanted.  Instead, the 
expenditures of all "public and private institutions" will be 
subject to review by the Court of Accounts (Sayistay).  The 
package pointedly notes that "the supervision of the assets 
of the Armed Forces will be made in line with the principle 
of secrecy as required by the national defense services," 
which in practice will severely limit civilian 
governmental/parliamentary oversight of the military. 
Moreover, the presidency will also remain exempt from 
Sayistay review. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Support from Both Sides of the Aisle 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
3. (U) During the debate on the floor, former Foreign 
Minister and AK deputy Yasar Yakis stressed that the latest 
reforms are "only one phase of harmonization with EU 
regulations" and that the GOT's efforts will continue. 
Justice Minister and Government Spokesman Cemil Cicek added 
that "Turkey has taken an important step on the way to 
joining the EU and toward more healthy democracy and more 
open society."  Although opposition CHP leader Baykal had 
expressed publicly some reservations about the need for 
further reform, all CHP deputies apparently endorsed the 
package.  M.P. and Deputy Group Chairman Ozyurek stated that 
his party supported the laws not to gain entry into the EU, 
but for the benefit of the Turkish people.  Retired 
Ambassador and CHP deputy Onur Oymen cautioned the GOT not to 
pursue, as part of the EU-related packages, reforms beyond 
the scope of what was required by the EU.  Oymen pointed out 
that holding NSC meetings every two months, for example, was 
not part of the Copenhagen criteria. 
 
 
---------------- 
Back-Stage Views 
---------------- 
 
 
4. (C) Privately to us just after the vote, comments by 
senior and other prominent AK M.P.s -- including party Vice 
Chairman Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat (Mersin), the ethnically 
Kurdish de facto Number Two in the Party organization and 
director of AK's outreach to the Kurds; Human Rights 
Commission member Ersonmez Yarbay (Ankara); Eyyup Sanay 
(Ankara), an AK founding member and Foreign Affairs 
Commission Spokesman; and Zulfukar Izol (Sanliurfa), scion of 
a leading Kurdish tribe -- ranged from modest pleasure to 
mild disappointment with what they regarded as a diluted 
final package.  Yarbay explained that the time simply was 
"not right" to push comprehensive steps to redress 
civilian-military relations; he noted that the Government is 
contemplating when/how to put on its agenda more wide-ranging 
measures, including the related issues of budgeting and 
corruption in the military.  In this regard, Istanbul AK M.P. 
Mehmet Denizolgun, whose family heads the wealthy and 
politically influential Suleymanci tarikat (nominally illegal 
sufi order), offered to us privately on July 31 that the 
upcoming meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAS) will 
be critical in determining whether moderate TGS Chief Ozkok 
can push aside the hard-liners in the senior ranks who have 
been resisting reform. 
 
 
5. (C) CHP M.P. Bulent Tanla, who is close to Party chief 
Deniz Baykal, sounded a more positive note.  The reforms are 
a very positive step that should be viewed favorably by the 
EU, he told us July 31.  However, Necdet Budak, a CHP M.P. 
from Edirne who is a strong supporter of Kemal Dervis's calls 
for intraparty reform, took a more cautious stance. 
Implementation will be "extremely important" in determining 
whether the laws will have any effect, he said.  "There is an 
entrenched system, and whether the changes will be accepted 
by that system remains to be seen." 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
6. (C) Though the reforms are limited in scope and received 
unanimity support in the Parliament, it is an open question 
whether President Sezer, who has 15 days to deliberate, will 
approve the law.  Sezer's track record is characterized by 
repeated efforts to obstruct and delay the AK reform program 
in the interest of the status quo; he vetoed AK's sixth EU 
package, dealing in part with reforms to stringent 
anti-terror laws, despite unanimous support from both sides 
of the aisle. 
 
 
7. (C) The NSC reforms -- if enacted and implemented -- are a 
positive step toward increasing elected civilian authority in 
Turkey, although AK did not get everything it wanted, 
particularly in the crucial area of military budget 
oversight.  Moreover, as reported reftels, Erdogan is trying 
to avoid confrontation with the TGS before the YAS, and is 
particularly interested in making it easier on Ozkok, who in 
recent weeks has been under considerable pressure from 
military hard-liners.  Such restraint can be laudable, given 
the potential for overreaction from Establishment circles. 
Nevertheless, it carries with it an inherent risk of 
undermining reform momentum and preserving hard-line equities 
in NSC-related and other matters. 
DEUTSCH 

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