US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI3565

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/13 
TAGS: KISL, PREL, PHUM, TC 
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE 
 
REF: A) STATE 205815        D) ABU DHABI 2715 
 
     B) 02 ABU DHABI 3436   E) 02 ABU DHABI 5813 
     C) 02 ABU DHABI 2548   F) ABU DHABI 2107 
 
1.  (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
2.  (U) This message has been coordinated with 
AmConsul Dubai. 
 
3.  (S/NF) SUMMARY:  There is little sign of an active 
political Islamic movement in the UAE, primarily as a 
result of the UAEG's support and promotion of a 
moderate practice of Islam and the underdeveloped 
political structure of the UAE (no political parties 
or political opposition).  There are a number of 
groups here with a religious agenda, the vast majority 
of which follow a moderate practice of Islam in line 
with UAEG policy.  The UAEG has used both carrots, 
e.g., religious education, and sticks, e.g., 
preemptive steps to check those it perceives to be 
under Islamist influence.  The small number of Islamic 
groups here do not appear to engage in activities that 
meet the definition of political Islam.  The several 
organizations with an Islamist bent thus far have not 
collided with that policy, in part as a result of 
their active monitoring by the UAEG.  Given the 
situation on the ground here, we believe that a 
continued low-profile approach which reinforces the 
moderation espoused by the UAEG will best serve both 
our short-term and long-term interests.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UAEG Promotes Moderate Practice of Islam 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) The UAEG espouses and supports in practice a 
moderate interpretation of Islam (Ref B), the official 
religion of the UAE.  Virtually all of the country's 
citizens (less than 20 percent of the total 
population) are Muslims, with approximately 85 percent 
followers of Sunni Islam and the remaining 15 percent 
followers of Shi'a Islam.  We estimate that 
approximately 55 percent of the expatriate population 
are Muslim.  Expatriates are predominantly from South 
and Southeast Asia, but there are also a substantial 
number of expatriate Arabs. 
 
5.  (U) The UAEG promotes the moderate practice of 
Islam in a number of different ways.  The Ministry of 
Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Awqaf operates as the 
central federal regulatory authority for Muslim imams 
and mosques and distributes weekly guidance on 
religious sermons to mosques and imams, both Sunni and 
Shi'a.  Emirate-level Departments of Islamic Affairs 
also provide oversight over mosques and imams.  The 
Government ensures that clergy do not deviate 
frequently or significantly from approved topics in 
their sermons and monitors all sermons for political 
content.  In June 2003, the UAEG initiated a public 
religious education campaign to promote a better 
understanding of Islam, including a one-year training 
course for 166 imams (Ref D). 
 
UAEG Efforts to Thwart Islamic Extremism 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) After 9/11, the UAE senior leadership launched 
a comprehensive top-down internal security review to 
assess the impact of extremist thought and elements on 
UAE society.  The UAEG closely scrutinized the 
activities of the UAE's mosques, schools, academic 
institutions, charities and NGOs. The UAEG also 
rounded up about 160 people suspected of ties to 
extremist groups for questioning.  As part of this 
review, the UAEG passed comprehensive anti-money 
laundering legislation, initiated tighter controls on 
funds transferred into and out of the country, 
assessed the country's charities and NGOs, and took 
steps to eliminate cash fundraising at mosques and 
channel all charitable giving through government- 
regulated relief organizations.  (Ref C) 
 
7.  (S/NF) In an effort to reduce the influence of 
Islamists in the educational and judicial systems, in 
2002 the UAEG either transferred or early retired 
around 60-70 educators and government officials 
thought to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Although they were much more moderate than Islamists 
elsewhere in the Gulf and in Egypt and were not/not 
considered extremist in their views, some of those 
sidelined are well known for their conservative 
philosophy.  The UAEG has demonstrated zero tolerance 
for the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, whose ultimate 
goal it believes to be regime change and total 
imposition of Shari'a law.  (Ref E)  The small number 
of "Islamist" intellectuals in the UAE have been 
sidelined.  The UAEG continues to monitor those groups 
and individuals deemed to be Islamist and/or 
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.  (Ref F) 
8.  (C) Although Islamic studies are mandatory in all 
public schools (UAEG-supported schools for primarily 
citizen children) and in private schools for Muslim 
children, the UAEG has worked to ensure that the study 
of Islam is not overemphasized in the educational 
systems.  There is high-level concern about extremist 
influence on school curricula.  After 9/11, the UAEG 
ramped up its revision of the K-12 public school 
curriculum and is gradually replacing the large number 
of expatriate Arab public school teachers with Emirati 
nationals, over whom the UAEG has better control. 
(Ref C) 
 
Political Islam -- Slim to No Presence in the UAE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9.  (U) The Government has been generally successful 
in achieving its goal of a tolerant society.  While 
citizens regard the country as a Muslim nation that 
should respect Muslim sensibilities, and the majority 
of them are observant Muslims, society as a whole 
places a high value on respect for others and on 
Islamic traditions of tolerance.  Citizens 
occasionally express concern regarding the influence 
on Emirati society by the country's foreign majority. 
However, in general, citizens are familiar with 
foreign societies, believe that they can best balance 
foreign influence by supporting and strengthening 
indigenous cultural traditions, and do not advocate 
for legislation or government based on Islamic 
principles. 
 
10.  (U) There are no elected institutions, no 
political parties in the UAE and no political 
opposition to the UAEG.  There is also a clear absence 
of widespread pressure for opening up the system here. 
(Refs B, C)  There is an acknowledged Salafi (highly 
conservative and Wahhabi-influenced) presence in the 
UAE, although there is as yet no identifiable Islamist 
political movement in the UAE.  (Ref B) 
 
11.  (C) As a Muslim country, the UAE hosts a number 
of NGOs in the UAE that have religious components as 
well as social, educational, cultural and charitable 
ones.  NGOs here are funded in whole or part by the 
UAEG, an effective mechanism of control, and do not 
generally receive funding from foreign sources. 
Foreign funding, if received, is closely scrutinized 
by the authorities.  If/when these groups express 
anti-American sentiment, it is almost invariably on 
grounds of U.S. foreign policy rather than religious 
grounds. 
 
12.  (C/NF) Most groups with religious components may 
sponsor Quranic instruction courses and religious 
workshops and lectures on Islam and require/encourage 
their members to maintain and uphold Islamic 
traditions and values.  Examples: 
 
--Dar Al-Bir Society (org. 1979), Dubai 
--Women's Union Association (org. 1973), Sharjah 
--Umm Al-Quwain Woman's Society (org. 1974), UAQ 
--Fujairah Welfare Association (org. 1987), Fujairah 
--Nahda Woman's Association (org. 1979), Ras Al- 
Khaimah 
 
Available information indicates that these groups 
support a moderate view of Islam in line with UAEG 
policy, have domestic agendas, and do not advocate an 
Islamic government based on Shari'a law.  Based on 
available information, we believe that these groups 
would engage in a democratic/pluralistic process and 
do/would respect the rights of others as well as the 
principle of alternance of government.  Accordingly, 
these groups would fall into category D as described 
in Ref A para. 4. 
 
13.  (C/NF) Several NGOs are public proponents of 
Islamic legislation or governance based on Islamic 
principles.  Available information indicates that 
these groups practice a moderate interpretation of 
Islam in line with UAEG policy and would be willing to 
engage in a democratic, pluralistic process.  We do 
not have information to conclude that these groups 
would not respect the rights of non-Islamists, 
secularists and/or minorities.  Accordingly, these 
groups would fall into category D as described in Ref 
A para. 4: 
 
--Reform Society (org. 1994), Dubai 
--Jurists Association (org. 1980), Sharjah 
--Umm Al-Moumineen Women's Association (org. 1974), 
Ajman 
--Social Guidance Association (org. 1981), Ajman 
 
14.  (C/NF) We have little information on the 
following two groups; however, they publicly 
acknowledge one of their aims as working against 
influences that have a negative impact on their 
society.  We have no information to suggest that these 
two organizations are anti-democratic and anti- 
pluralistic.  Based on their public acknowledgements, 
however, it appears that, if in the unlikely event 
they obtained full political power, they might not 
respect the rights of non-Islamists, secularists, 
and/or minorities.  Accordingly, these groups would 
fall into category C as described in Ref A para. 4: 
 
--Al Muntada Al Islami (org. 1996), Sharjah 
--Irshad and Tawjih (org. 1983), Ras Al-Khaimah 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
15. (C/NF) Under the leadership of President Zayed, 
the UAE has practiced a policy of tolerance and 
moderation.  Our regular engagement with the NGO 
community -- in a low-key manner and not in an overtly 
political context -- confirms that the UAEG has 
largely been successful in this regard.  The UAEG has 
taken affirmative and preemptive action, without USG 
prompting, to ensure that Islamic extremism does not 
take root in their country.  We expect that the UAEG's 
zero-tolerance policy, applied in a thus far 
relatively non-repressive manner, will do much to 
prevent political Islam from raising its head here. 
As discussed in Ref C, our behind-the-scenes 
partnership with the Emiratis has worked in both 
sides' favor, and we believe that in the UAE, a 
continued low-profile, positive reinforcement approach 
will serve our short-term as well as long-term 
interests in this regard. 
 
WAHBA