US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1424

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NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR

Identifier: 03KATHMANDU1424
Wikileaks: View 03KATHMANDU1424 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2003-07-30 10:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINR PTER ASEC PINS NP Maoist Insurgency
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA, SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PTER, ASEC, PINS, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR 
 
REF: SECSTATE 219519 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1 (C) On July 30, DCM Robert Boggs met with Padma Ratna 
Tuladhar, one of two Maoist facilitators to peace 
negotiations with the Nepal Government (GON).  Post could not 
meet with Babarum Bhattarai as suggested reftel since all of 
the Maoist leadership reportedly has moved to India.  RSO and 
PolOff also attended the meeting, which was held in a secure 
area within the Embassy guard house. 
 
2. (C) The DCM opened the meeting by emphasizing that the 
message to be conveyed had come directly from Washington and 
that the U.S. Government takes very seriously the looming 
break in the cease-fire.  He urged the Maoists to return to 
the negotiating table as the only means to resolving the 
conflict.  The DCM expressed concern over Maoist 
anti-American rhetoric and refuted Maoist claims that the 
U.S. has "hundreds of military advisors" in the country 
unduly influencing the Government of Nepal in the peace 
process. "It is simply not true," he said.  The DCM stressed 
that any act of violence towards Americans or American 
interests in Nepal by the Maoists would have serious and 
unavoidable consequences.  He mentioned that the Maoists had 
been put on the U.S. terrorist watch list as a result of the 
killings of two Embassy security personnel as well as for 
other actions taken against U.S. interests.  The DCM warned 
Tuladhar that if the Maoists were to continue to act against 
U.S. interests in Nepal, they could be re-designated onto 
other terrorist lists, which would lead to the imposition of 
sanctions and other serious repercussions for the Maoist 
organization. 
 
3. (C) Tuladhar did not respond directly to these points and 
suggested disingenuously that he did not have direct access 
to Bhattarai.  The DCM replied that the Embassy was aware 
that Tuladhar is a member of the Maoist organization despite 
his role as facilitator and expected him to deliver this 
message immediately.  Tuladhar then agreed to convey the 
message as soon as possible to the Maoist leadership, which 
he confirmed is now based in India.  He then asked whether 
the USG would send someone to meet with Babarum Bhattarai in 
India, "perhaps in New Delhi or Calcutta," if the Maoist 
leader agreed to such a meeting. 
 
4. (C) Tuladhar attempted to suggest that the Maoists were, 
in fact, fighting for democracy.  Citing U.S. criticism of 
human rights abuses by the Government of Nepal during the 
1990-1991 period of democratization and agitation and support 
for Nepal's democratic forces, Tuladhar seemed to suggest 
that the U.S. should support the Maoist cause.  He added that 
the Maoist leadership's perception was that the USG did not 
desire peace and was influencing the GON to pursue a military 
strategy.  The DCM refuted these points, explaining that U.S. 
policy has been and continues to be supportive of the peace 
process.  The DCM added that the U.S. believes that only a 
negotiated settlement, not a military solution, will resolve 
this conflict.  However, the U.S. could not support the 
Maoists because they have not shown themselves to be a 
positive, democratic force that supports human rights and the 
rule of law. 
 
5. (C) Biographic Note.  Tuladhar is a putative human rights 
activist and an independent communist leader.  He was elected 
to the House of Representatives as an independent candidate 
supported by the CPN (UML) in the 1991 general election. 
Tuladhar is an ambitious political player and reportedly 
would seek a cabinet-level position within a 
Maoist-influenced government.  End Biographic Note. 
 
6. (C) Comment.  Tuladhar is a slippery interlocutor. 
Although the tone of the demarche was stern, Tuladhar 
appeared totally unruffled.  Despite his protestations to the 
contrary, Post considers Tuladhar an influential and 
well-connected spokesman of the Maoists.  Tuladhar has proven 
to be an effective channel of communication to the Maoists in 
the past, although on this occasion he did not write down a 
single note during the demarche.  Embassy will pursue other 
third party interlocutors to convey reftel points.  End 
Comment. 
MALINOWSKI 

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