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| Identifier: | 03KATHMANDU1424 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03KATHMANDU1424 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kathmandu |
| Created: | 2003-07-30 10:57:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PINR PTER ASEC PINS NP Maoist Insurgency |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001424 SIPDIS STATE FOR SA, SA/INS LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2013 TAGS: PREL, PINR, PTER, ASEC, PINS, NP, Maoist Insurgency SUBJECT: NEPAL: DELIVERING USG MESSAGE TO MAOIST FACILITATOR REF: SECSTATE 219519 Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 1 (C) On July 30, DCM Robert Boggs met with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, one of two Maoist facilitators to peace negotiations with the Nepal Government (GON). Post could not meet with Babarum Bhattarai as suggested reftel since all of the Maoist leadership reportedly has moved to India. RSO and PolOff also attended the meeting, which was held in a secure area within the Embassy guard house. 2. (C) The DCM opened the meeting by emphasizing that the message to be conveyed had come directly from Washington and that the U.S. Government takes very seriously the looming break in the cease-fire. He urged the Maoists to return to the negotiating table as the only means to resolving the conflict. The DCM expressed concern over Maoist anti-American rhetoric and refuted Maoist claims that the U.S. has "hundreds of military advisors" in the country unduly influencing the Government of Nepal in the peace process. "It is simply not true," he said. The DCM stressed that any act of violence towards Americans or American interests in Nepal by the Maoists would have serious and unavoidable consequences. He mentioned that the Maoists had been put on the U.S. terrorist watch list as a result of the killings of two Embassy security personnel as well as for other actions taken against U.S. interests. The DCM warned Tuladhar that if the Maoists were to continue to act against U.S. interests in Nepal, they could be re-designated onto other terrorist lists, which would lead to the imposition of sanctions and other serious repercussions for the Maoist organization. 3. (C) Tuladhar did not respond directly to these points and suggested disingenuously that he did not have direct access to Bhattarai. The DCM replied that the Embassy was aware that Tuladhar is a member of the Maoist organization despite his role as facilitator and expected him to deliver this message immediately. Tuladhar then agreed to convey the message as soon as possible to the Maoist leadership, which he confirmed is now based in India. He then asked whether the USG would send someone to meet with Babarum Bhattarai in India, "perhaps in New Delhi or Calcutta," if the Maoist leader agreed to such a meeting. 4. (C) Tuladhar attempted to suggest that the Maoists were, in fact, fighting for democracy. Citing U.S. criticism of human rights abuses by the Government of Nepal during the 1990-1991 period of democratization and agitation and support for Nepal's democratic forces, Tuladhar seemed to suggest that the U.S. should support the Maoist cause. He added that the Maoist leadership's perception was that the USG did not desire peace and was influencing the GON to pursue a military strategy. The DCM refuted these points, explaining that U.S. policy has been and continues to be supportive of the peace process. The DCM added that the U.S. believes that only a negotiated settlement, not a military solution, will resolve this conflict. However, the U.S. could not support the Maoists because they have not shown themselves to be a positive, democratic force that supports human rights and the rule of law. 5. (C) Biographic Note. Tuladhar is a putative human rights activist and an independent communist leader. He was elected to the House of Representatives as an independent candidate supported by the CPN (UML) in the 1991 general election. Tuladhar is an ambitious political player and reportedly would seek a cabinet-level position within a Maoist-influenced government. End Biographic Note. 6. (C) Comment. Tuladhar is a slippery interlocutor. Although the tone of the demarche was stern, Tuladhar appeared totally unruffled. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Post considers Tuladhar an influential and well-connected spokesman of the Maoists. Tuladhar has proven to be an effective channel of communication to the Maoists in the past, although on this occasion he did not write down a single note during the demarche. Embassy will pursue other third party interlocutors to convey reftel points. End Comment. MALINOWSKI
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