US embassy cable - 98RIYADH4048

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 004048 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER, SA 
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA:  1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 202128;  (B) CAIRO 03962 
 
1.   THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS 
SET FORTH IN REFTEL. 
 
A.   DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY 
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1998, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION RELATING TO TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM 
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U. S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U. S. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL.  ALTHOUGH THE SAG REPORTEDLY HAS DETAINED AND 
INTERROGATED SAUDI CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, IT HAS 
NOT YET BEGUN PROSECUTION OR TAKEN ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION 
REGARDING ANY SUCH PERSONS.  THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST 
CASES OR ACTIONS THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1998. 
 
B.   DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
U. S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997.  CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL- 
SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 
1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK.  CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE 
UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBALLAH WERE 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT.  THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THAT THE USG DEPORT 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA TO QUESTION AND PERHAPS PROSECUTE HIM FOR 
HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING.  THE EXTRADITION 
CASE IS STILL PENDING FINAL DECISION WITH THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS).  THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT 
THE SAG HAS REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN 
EXTRADITE SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN 
LADIN.  BIN LADIN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 
1994, WAS INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U. S. FEDERAL GRAND 
JURY IN NEW YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U. S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL 
U. S. CITIZENS INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, 
TANZANIA ON AUGUST 7, 1998. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT SAUDI 
AUTHORITIES REQUESTED JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO EXTRADITE MUHAMMAD 
AL-MAQDISI, WHO IS SERVING A 15 YEAR SENTENCE IN JORDAN AND HAS 
BEEN LINKED TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF USAMA BIN LADIN. 
 
C.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S 
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS 
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA.  HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS NOT ENTERED INTO 
EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE 
UNITED STATES.  (NOTE:  EXTRADITION TREATIES EXIST WITH YEMEN AND 
EGYPT AND THE ARAB LEAGUE ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT (REFTEL B) HAS 
EXTRADITION ARTICLES.) 
 
D.   DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. 
THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A 
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, 
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND 
OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN 
UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY MAKING ATTEMPTS TO ERADICATE 
IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM.  THE CROWN 
PRINCE IN HIS OCTOBER WORLD TOUR MADE A POINT TO CONDEMN TERRORISM 
IN ALL ITS FORMS AND TO DENY THAT TERRORISM HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
ISLAM.  THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING 
AND HAS SHOWN INCREASED COOPERATION IN ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE USG IN 
ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING. 
 
E.   DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1998 BY 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMBING.  IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO 
STRENGTHEN SECURITY PROTECTION OF U. S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC 
PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST BOMBINGS OF U. S. 
EMBASSIES IN EAST AFRICA AND A THREAT AGAINST U. S. FACILITIES IN 
OCTOBER.  INTERNATIONALLY, AT THE TUNIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF 
ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR MINISTERS IN JANUARY, THE SAG JOINED IN THE 
UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION ACCORD WHICH 
HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR FOUR YEARS.  THE ACCORD AIMS TO 
ENHANCE INTER-ARAB COOPERATION REGARDING EXTRADITION OF CONVICTED 
TERRORISTS, IMPROVE INFORMATION EXCHANGES ABOUT TERRORISTS' 
WHEREABOUTS, FINANCES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS, AND STRENGTHEN CONTROLS 
ON TRAVEL AND INFILTRATION OF TERROR SUSPECTS THROUGH ARAB 
COUNTRIES.  THE ACCORD (SEE REFTEL B), SIGNED IN CAIRO ON APRIL 22, 
CONTAINS A PLEDGE NOT TO ORDER, FINANCE, OR COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, 
TO PREVENT TERRORIST CRIMES AND TO FIGHT AGAINST THEM.  THIS 
AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON 
SEPTEMBER 28.  AT THE 66TH SESSION OF THE GCC MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 
HELD IN RIYADH IN MARCH, THE GCC MINISTERS REJECTED "ALL FORMS OF 
VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM WHEREVER THEY COME FROM."  AT A DOHA MEETING 
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) MINISTERS, ALSO 
IN MARCH,  THE MEMBERS URGED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO CONDEMN TERRORISM 
IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, NOT TO PROVIDE SANCTUARY FOR TERRORISTS, AND 
TO HELP BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE.  THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR 
CALLED ON MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND U. N. MEMBER STATES TO REACH AN 
ANTI-TERRORISM ACCORD SIMILAR TO THE ONE SIGNED BY ARAB LEAGUE 
NATIONS IN APRIL.  FINALLY, AT THE UNGA 53RD SESSION IN SEPTEMBER, 
THE SAUDI ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTED ANY LINK BETWEEN THE 
RELIGION OF ISLAM AND TERRORISM, AND STATED THAT "THE KINGDOM 
REJECTS VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN ANY FORM OR SHAPE."  HE CALLED 
FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS THROUGH THE U. N. TO BRING ABOUT THE 
TERMINATION OF TERRORISM AND CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
TO FIGHT THE SHELTERING OF TERRORISTS. 
 
F.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING 
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS 
OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC 
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC 
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR 
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR 
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON 
TERRORISM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DOES NOT FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES.  ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE 
THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES 
OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT 
THIS IS ENFORCED CONSISTENTLY.  NONETHELESS, THERE CONTINUE TO BE 
ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
THE SAG CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM.  HOWEVER, SHEIKH AHMAD 
YASIN, THE FOUNDER OF HAMAS, VISITED SAUDI ARABIA FOR HAJJ AND 
MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND MET CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH IN APRIL. 
 
G.   HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT 
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN 
GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND 
SUDAN.) 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DID NOT MAKE ANY OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST 
REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE.  HOWEVER, THE SAG ALLOWED A LIBYAN 
AIRCRAFT CARRYING 105 HAJJ PILGRIMS TO LAND AT JEDDAH'S 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON MARCH 29 AND TO DEPART THE SAME DAY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UNSC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LIBYA. 
 
H.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1997, POSITIVE OR 
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, 
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
RESPONSE:  THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBING OF U. S. EMBASSIES IN DAR ES 
SALAAM AND NAIROBI FURTHER HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND CONCERN ABOUT 
ATTEMPTS THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN SAUDI ARABIA, FOLLOWING THE 1995 AND 
1996 ATTACKS AGAINST U. S. TARGETS.  ALL OF THESE ATTACKS MET WITH 
OFFICIAL CONDEMNATION, AND HAVE SPURRED GREATER COOPERATION AMONG 
SAUDI SECURITY ORGANS IN ADDRESSING INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES.  THE 
SAG HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED ITS DIALOGUE WITH GCC AND OTHER 
ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM.  THE SAUDI ANTI- 
TERRORISM STANCE WAS GIVEN A WORLD-WIDE STAGE DURING THE CROWN 
PRINCE'S MONTH-LONG VISIT TO EUROPE, THE U. S., AND ASIA.  THE 
SAUDI GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONCERNED WITH A CONTINUED TERRORIST 
PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF 
USAMA BIN LADIN, A TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER OF SAUDI 
ORIGIN, AND DOWNGRADED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT 
IN SEPTEMBER.  BIN LADIN WAS INDICTED IN NEW YORK IN NOVEMBER FOR 
PROMOTING TERRORISM. 
 
I.  DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH 
RESPECT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
SPECIFIC U.S. REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION AND 
EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS 
DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.  DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF 
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, 
INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE 
SPECIFIC REQUESTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG 
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG 
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED, 
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES.  THIS INTEREST AND 
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT 
1998.  THE USG AND SAG EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE 
REGION.  CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED.  FOLLOWING 
THE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG FURTHER 
INCREASED COOPERATION.  FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH VISITED SAUDI 
ARABIA TWICE IN 1996 TO COORDINATE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH SAUDI 
INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAIF.  THE FBI MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY 
STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U. S. EMBASSY.  WHILE 
COOPERATION THROUGHOUT 1998 ON THE KHOBAR TOWERS INVESTIGATION WAS 
STRONG, FOLLOWING THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS IN AUGUST IT WAS 
INCREASED FURTHER. 
 
J.   IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN 
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR 
INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: 
 
     (I)  THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, 
CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE ACT; AND 
 
     (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED 
STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE:  (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH 
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS.  IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL 
22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING THE 
OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995 AND THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31. 
THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLIER STAGES OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP DID NOT ALWAYS MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS. 
SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON MANY 
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONTINUE TO 
CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING 
INVESTIGATION. 
 
          (II) THE SAG HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE 
OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, AND EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS.  IT MADE 
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL 
KHARJ, WHERE MOST U. S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, 
AND A VERY LARGE RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, 
SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL.  THE SAG 
SPENT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPROVEMENTS.  THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL 
TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI 
ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U. S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES 
GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN.  USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE 
HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY 
OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
K.   IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U. S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE 
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS 
DIRECTED AT U. S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE 
CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST 
AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM.  THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE RAPID 
DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT OF 
PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE 
DETERRENTS. 
 
FOWLER