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| Identifier: | 03BRASILIA2364 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03BRASILIA2364 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brasilia |
| Created: | 2003-07-28 10:26:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ETRD BR Fee Trade Agreement of America |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002364 SIPDIS USTR FOR SCRONIN, KLEZNY DEPT FOR E:ALARSON; WHA:CSTRUBLE, SPINKHAM; EB:BMANOGUE NSC FOR JOANNA WALLACE USDA FOR JBPENN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD, BR, Fee Trade Agreement of America (FTAA) SUBJECT: BRAZIL: NO PUBLIC SIGN OF RETREAT FROM FTAA PROPOSAL REF: BRASILIA 2231 1. (SBU) Summary. Following the FTAA Trade Negotiating Committee meeting in San Salvador July 8-11, during which Mercosul unveiled Brazil's 3-track proposal for restructuring negotiations to unenthusiastic Vice-Ministers, public debate in Brazil over the FTAA has been unusually quiet. Itamaraty officials have generally declined comment. In responding to questions after the swearing-in ceremony of Ambassador Luiz Macedo Soares as Under Secretary for South America on July 21, Foreign Minister Amorim stated that the GOB's intention is to continue pushing the proposal, but signaled a possible opening for compromise on the specifics. Comments by Amorim on the same occasion regarding the desirability of more commitment to the pursuit of current GOB policies among, at least, the top diplomatic echelon of the Ministry, prompted a public rebuke by former Foreign Minister Lafer. End Summary. BACKGROUND - THE PUBLIC UNVEILING 2. (SBU) On the eve of the FTAA Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) meeting in San Salvador July 8-11, Foreign Minister Amorim wrote an op-ed in which he publicly unveiled Brazil's Mercosul proposal to transform the FTAA by establishing three paths or "tracks" for considering various elements of the current negotiation, including moving some elements to the WTO (see reftel). Amorim argued that a new approach was needed because within the FTAA, Brazil was "encountering a negotiating context that is complex from the standpoint of Brazilian interests," and that the FTAA project as currently envisioned goes far beyond the meaning of "free trade" in its strict sense since it includes rules for services, investment, government procurement, and intellectual property rights, which have a "direct effect on the regulatory powers of the countries concerned." He depicted the proposal as one that would create an "FTAA that is possible" by balancing Brazil's (offensive) interests with compromises on its ability to design and execute policies for social, environmental, technological and other types of development. STANDING FIRM 3. (SBU) Following the less than enthusiastic response the proposal received from Vice-Ministers attending the TNC meeting, public discussion in Brazil of the FTAA and the proposal has been unusually quiet. One press source claimed that he was trying to write an article about the FTAA proposal, but was unable to find Itamaraty officials willing to be interviewed. However, answering questions after the swearing-in ceremony of Ambassador Luiz Macedo Soares as Under Secretary for South America (and FTAA lead negotiator) on July 21, Minister Amorim stated that the GOB's intention is to continue pushing the 3-track proposal. Amorim said the GOB's position had not changed "by so much as a dot." He went on to claim that the current format of the negotiations among the 34 FTAA countries "does not suit the United States just as it does not suit us." The article reported that according to a government source, the U.S. negotiators at the TNC meeting had maintained complete silence, which prompted Amorim to comment that "silence gives consent." COMPROMISE ON THE DETAILS? 4. (SBU) Amorim sought to distance himself somewhat from the specifics of the proposal by stating that he does not plan to involve himself in a debate over "formalities." According to press reports, he said that Brazil might even accept "agreements on investments and other systemic topics (in the FTAA path) provided they do not go beyond the WTO's current guidelines." Amorim also again stated a preference for a focus within the FTAA on a market access agreement between the United States and Mercosul. 5. (SBU) In late June, the Lula administration came under sharp criticism from anti-FTAA forces for supposedly providing unwarranted impetus to the negotiations by re-committing to their conclusion by January 2005 as part of the U.S.-Brazil presidential summit. Now, Itamaraty is facing criticism from the opposite direction. Press has suggested that some ministries fear Itamaraty may have imparted a "less palatable" tone to the proposal during the TNC meeting, leading to a lack of support. According to press reports, the National Confederation of Industries (CNI), which advises the GOB on trade policy through coordination of the Brazilian Business Coalition, also has noted concern that the current 3-track proposal is considerably less ambitious for achieving integration than the present FTAA scope. However, this concern is coupled with an acknowledgment by CNI that different economic and political circumstances in Brazil warrant some change to the FTAA. 6. (SBU) Note. In describing the tit-for-tat approach of "moving" elements for negotiation from the FTAA to the WTO, Brazilian officials, industry representatives and press continue to erroneously characterize USG and GOB motives as each taking "sensitive" issues to the WTO. No differentiation is made between the "sensitive" nature of investment or intellectual property rights for Brazil, and the structural difficulty of negotiating domestic support in a regional forum because of domestic agricultural support programs being global versus country specific, with two of the three major users of such programs (EU and Japan) not located within the hemisphere. End Note. IDEOLOGICAL LITMUS TEST 7. (SBU) Minister Amorim stirred up a separate debate this week when he, as one journalist characterized, "broke with the maxim that a diplomat is an official of the State, and therefore, will be above the ideological directives of the (Presidential) Planalto Palace and everyday political games." As part of his official address during Macedo Soares swearing-in, Amorim said that in making appointments, two things should be considered: professional competence and the person's "natural affinity with the orientation of the Government, the President of the Republic, and the Minister." He went on to say that the professional (diplomatic) corps ought to be "enthusiastically engaged" with certain political lines and "orientations" and claimed that Macedo Soares fulfilled these requirements. His comments drew a swift rebuke from former Foreign Minister Lafer in the form of an op-ed in which Lafer insisted that a diplomat's duty is simply to serve Brazil. HRINAK
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