US embassy cable - 03HARARE1511

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER AND PDAS SNYDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2008 
TAGS: EAID, KDEM, PGOV, PHUM, ZI 
SUBJECT: FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR MASS ACTION IN ZIMBABWE 
 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY THE R.E. Whitehead DUE TO 1.5 (b) 
 
 1. (C) Summary:  Experience gained from last June's &Final 
Push8 attempt at mass action has altered the strategic 
vision for those promoting and organizing non-violent protest 
in Zimbabwe.  An accurate assessment of the situation and 
temperament of the Zimbabwean population points away from a 
&Serbian style8 mass uprising that aims at the immediate 
downfall of the ZANU (PF) regime.  More realistically, civil 
society and the MDC have concluded that they must plan for a 
longer-term struggle that engages and empowers the population 
to undertake a lower intensity but sustained campaign of 
peaceful protest, defiance, and non-cooperation to 
demonstrate the regime,s lack of popular support and thereby 
encourage negotiations and democratic reforms.  As in the 
cases of organized political resistance movements in other 
countries, a successful mass action campaign in Zimbabwe will 
require long-term strategic planning, widespread grassroots 
training in non-violent action, and a phased approach of 
low-risk, confidence building actions leading gradually to 
larger and stronger acts of political defiance.  A hasty 
campaign of mass action risks failure and is not the best 
course of action at this time.  End Summary. 
 
 2. (SBU) Non-violent resistance has been embraced by most 
proponents of democratic reform in Zimbabwe as the best 
strategy for influencing the course of a political transition 
and for preparing Zimbabweans to defend themselves against 
future state oppression.  The opposition party, trade unions, 
and civil society organizations have over the last six months 
employed many mass action tactics, including marches, 
strikes, and a street art campaign.  Except for the MDC and 
ZCTU-called strikes that were widely observed across the 
country, the mass actions to date have been relatively small, 
localized, and focused on selective political issues, such as 
the protests organized around the international cricket 
matches in Bulawayo, the Mother,s Day march organized by 
Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), and the religious services 
for victims of human rights held by Archbishop Pius Ncube. 
cc). 
 
3. (SBU )  The MDC-led &Final Push8 campaign in June, 2003 
attempted unsuccessfully to escalate this nascent but growing 
pattern of selective resistance to a mass movement of popular 
political defiance that would challenge the authority of the 
GOZ.  The nationwide strike, the passive aspect of the mass 
action, was an overwhelming success with as much as 90% of 
businesses closed in major urban areas during the course of 
the week.  However, the disappointing turnout for the planned 
street marches illustrated definitively that the population 
was not yet prepared to suddenly undertake high-risk activist 
behavior in defiance of the regime.  Subsequent analyses of 
the &Final Push8 by the MDC and civil society observers 
concluded that more groundwork would be required for such 
ambitious action to succeed.  Experience in other countries 
has conclusively shown that political defiance against a 
violent regime requires careful planning and preparation. 
First and foremost, prospective participants must understand 
what is expected of them; they must have enough successful 
experience with non-violent mass action that fear is lessened 
or controlled; and they must have well-trained, disciplined 
street-level organizations and leadership to guide them. 
These pre-requisites for successful mass protest are all in 
the early stages of development in Zimbabwe. 
 
4. (C) Zimbabwe does not have a history of non-violent 
political mobilization or widespread civic participation and 
organization.  The few times that specific grievances have 
resulted in spontaneous street action, such as the July 1960 
protests against the Whitehead government or the 1998 food 
riots, the population has been violently suppressed.  Many 
older Zimbabweans also too clearly remember the brutal 
methods which both the UDI Government and liberation forces 
used against those whose political allegiance was suspect. 
Political violence over the last three years has reaffirmed 
the ruthlessness of the government in the minds of the 
people.  Such liberal use of force has created a climate of 
fear and powerlessness among all sectors of society that must 
be overcome before a successful nation-wide resistance 
campaign can be effectively launched.  As a major 
complicating factor, the organizational structures of society 
do not reach very deep.  Even the unions have historically 
neglected to organize and empower their members at the level 
of the shop floor.  The Rhodesian government and the Zanu 
(PF) regime both discouraged independent social groupings and 
institutions.  Civil society organizations in general are 
consequently relatively new, weak, and focused on advocacy 
rather than activism.  Thus, people at the grassroots have 
very little experience of and very little institutional 
support for organizing collective action. 
 
5. (C) Bridging the gap between fear and action will require 
a civic education campaign designed specifically to spread 
the idea of non-violent action and to impart skills of 
community organizing.  Several civic groups as well as the 
MDC expect to focus their efforts on this critical training 
process over the coming months in hopes of producing a core 
of disciplined and committed non-violent activists and 
community organizations capable of defending their political 
space and constitutional rights.  In recognition of the need 
for very basic capacity building, the goals of such training 
have been broadened from narrow partisan organizing to 
general community empowerment.  In addition to a focus on 
strengthening geographical communities, it is also envisioned 
that existing organizations, such as student groups, local 
church groups, and unions will be targeted for more systemic 
training and organizational strengthening.  In keeping with 
this new strategic focus, public calls for mass action will 
most likely decline in the near term although small, limited 
actions will continue.  Low-risk, community-based activities 
such as street-art and graffiti messages, "resistance" music 
creation and dissemination,  community "clean-up" campaigns, 
community meetings and small, localized marches are planned. 
Organizers hope that through such activities, communities 
will become more comfortable engaging the authorities and 
gain experience in organizing themselves for political 
actions and exercising their political rights. 
 
6. (C)   Coordination between the civics and the opposition 
party will likely impact the speed at which this plan for 
broad civic education and grassroots organizing can occur. 
Over the last few months, informal links have developed 
between the MDC mass action committee and civil society 
groups working on mass action strategies.  Although there is 
some lingering mutual suspicion of one another's motives and 
disagreement over strategic focus and tactical approach, i.e. 
short-term vs. long-term objectives and top-down vs. 
bottom-up organizing, information sharing about activities 
and objectives has increased.  Because the MDC suspects that 
civil society is organizing another political party and civil 
society believes that the MDC is only interested in co-opting 
them for partisan objectives and hijacking their scarce 
resources, it has been difficult for them to forge close 
links.   After the "Final Push," civil society mass action 
organizers, who disagreed with such a quick escalation of 
mass action but supported the effort against their own better 
judgement, indicated that they will not support any similar 
actions in the near future.  However, MDC's own experience 
with the "Final Push" finally convinced them of the need to 
move more slowly and deliberately.  Thus, MDC and civil 
society are now moving along separate but parallel tracks 
that can be mutually supportive as long as 
information-sharing continues. 
 
7. Comment:  (C) Once the concept of non-violent strategies 
and community defense is grasped by a critical mass of 
people, time and experience will still be needed to increase 
the capacity and confidence of communities to act.  As in 
other effective non-violent political struggles, a strategy 
of selective resistance comprising small, local actions must 
cumulatively grow into a resistance movement that encompasses 
more and more areas of society.  The USG should support this 
more patient course of social transformation in Zimbabwe. 
While it may not be the immediate solution to the current 
political impasse in the country, it can gradually bring 
greater pressure to bear on the regime, channel discontent in 
positive directions and promote future democratic 
development.  On the other hand basing U.S. expectations for 
change in Zimbabwe on a sweeping, organized or spontaneous 
near-term campaign of non-violent mass action is a dubious 
strategy. 
 
 
 
SULLIVAN