US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA1908

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001908 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, KDEM, PREL, PINR, PHUM, ASEC, GT 
SUBJECT: FRG PROTEST AFTERMATH: GUATEMALA MORE FRAGMENTED 
THAN EVER 
 
Classified By: A/DCM David Lindwall for reason 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Unexpected legal setbacks to the registration 
of former General Rios Montt's presidential candidacy have 
led to profound frustration among FRG leaders.  They view 
Rios Montt as the only FRG candidate who has a chance of 
winning the elections, and the biggest draw for voters to 
support their congressional slate.  The possibility that 
legal appeals could derail Rios Montt's candidacy led the FRG 
to use violent street protests July 24-25 to send the signal 
that they are prepared to raise the stakes in order to ensure 
that Rios Montt can run.  Most of the opposition, which with 
civil society has formed a "Civic Front for Democracy in 
Guatemala," is equally determined to keep him out of the 
race, although some might be willing to accept a new 
Constitutional Court decision if its magistrates were 
selected in a transparent manner.  Both sides are insisting 
that international mediation favor their all-or-nothing 
positions.  Contacts in the opposition and the police believe 
violence will escalate following the next ruling of the 
Supreme Court (expected in the next ten days), which is not 
expected to favor Rios Montt.  OAS Election Observation 
Mission chief Paniagua arrived in Guatemala on July 25. In a 
meeting with the Ambassador on July 27, he seemed to have a 
good grasp of the immediate crisis and, while cautious, he 
did not rule out a de facto mediation role.  It will not be 
an easy task.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Violent street protests on July 24-25 organized by the 
FRG have raised the stakes significantly in the confrontation 
between the ruling party and practically all organized 
sectors of Guatemalan society, and have planted the flag that 
the FRG is prepared to use violence to keep their candidate 
from being disqualified in the upcoming elections.  The 
highly orchestrated protests were sparked by the FRG's 
frustration over setbacks in their legal fight to register 
former General Efrain Rios Montt as their presidential 
candidate.  The FRG viewed the decision by the Supreme Court 
to hear an appeal to the Constitutional Court's decision that 
Rios Montt could run not only as illegal (note: some of our 
viscerally anti-FRG contacts agree that the Supreme Court's 
challenge was at a minimum unprecedented, and probably 
unconstitutional. End note), but also signaled that the 
opposition could manipulate the courts to keep Rios Montt 
out.  Having been deprived of the legal recourses they 
thought they had secured through painstakingly packing the 
Constitutional Court, the FRG leadership chose to fall back 
on violence and intimidation.  Spray-painting epitaphs 
against the rich and bringing the violence for the first time 
to wealthy neighborhoods, the FRG has shown that they are 
prepared to add class conflict to their unsteady mix of 
populism. 
 
3. (C) Foreign Minister Gutierrez told the Ambassador that 
the protests were organized by the FRG (despite Rios Montt's 
public denials), and that the General had assured President 
Portillo that they would be peaceful.  Gutierrez said that 
Portillo and Minister of Government Reyes Calderon were 
determined to keep order, but that sympathy by many police 
officers with the FRG and orders for the police not to 
provoke violence had led the police to not confront the 
protesters.  He speculated that the images of chaos in the 
streets of the capital carried by the media would scare most 
Guatemalans and in the end work against the FRG in the 
upcoming elections.  He argued, however, that the fight 
between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court was a 
standoff, and opined that the only solution at this point is 
political, not juridical.  Gutierrez suggested that only the 
Ambassador, Archbishop Quezada and OAS Electoral Observation 
Mission (EOM) head Paniagua have the credibility to mediate 
an agreement between the parties which could resolve the 
tension without further violence. 
 
4. (C) GOG Ambassador to the U.S. Antonio Arenales and FRG 
Congresswoman (and daughter of the FRG Presidential 
candidate) Zury Rios told us separately on July 25 that the 
only solution to the crisis is electoral, i.e. the opposition 
needs to withdraw its appeals before the Supreme Court, Rios 
Montt must be allowed to run for President, and let the 
people decide.  Both said that the party faithful "would not 
sit back with their arms crossed" if the courts do not allow 
Rios Montt to run.  Both told us that on that point there is 
no space for compromise.  Zury Rios said that her father is 
the only candidate who can secure votes for their 
congressional candidates, and that for Rios Montt to be 
excluded from the elections would mean the "extinction of the 
party."  She said "the party faithful" would never give up 
Rios Montt's candidacy, and Ambassador Arenales said that the 
FRG would "do what ever it takes" to ensure Rios Montt could 
run.  Both echoed Foreign Minister Gutierrez's call for the 
Ambassador to be a mediator, but it was clear their 
interpretation was for us to pressure the opposition to allow 
Rios Montt to become a candidate and have the matter resolved 
once and for all at the ballot box. 
5. (C) The Supreme Court must resolve the appeals to Rios 
Montt's registration as a candidate by August 6.  The FRG and 
the opposition expect the Court to uphold the appeals and 
deny Rios Montt's candidacy.  The FRG would then appeal the 
case again to the Constitutional Court, where the FRG has 
more influence, but has no ironclad guarantee of winning. 
Even if the Constitutional Court did reaffirm its decision to 
allow Rios Montt to run, new appeals (not contemplated in the 
Constitution, but accepted by the Supreme Court as they did 
the last ones) could be filed, effectively tying up his 
candidacy beyond the September 9 deadline for filing.  Chief 
of Police Manchame told us that any further legal setback for 
the FRG would likely lead to more violence, and that the 
police is inadequately prepared to contain it.  Opposition 
leaders have also told us that they view the July 24-25 
violence as only a foretaste by the FRG of greater violence 
to come. 
 
6. (C) Meanwhile, the political opposition, civil society and 
the private sector have been further galvanized by the events 
of July 24-25 into a "Civic Front for Democracy in Guatemala" 
against the FRG (Note: A similar "National Assembly" was 
formed by many of the same groups and individuals in May, 
1993, in opposition to the Serrano "auto-golpe." End note). 
Sensing the possibility that the legal process can be used to 
keep Rios Montt from becoming a candidate, there is a growing 
determination to press on.  Civil Society reps told the 
Ambassador that they had already engaged the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (which issued a statement 
condemning the violence), and are seeking support for an OAS 
Permanent Council session to invoke the democratic charter. 
The opposition believes that the FRG's violent actions 
greatly undermined any benefit of the doubt the international 
community was prepared to extend to the ruling party, and the 
opposition hopes to parlay the revulsion at the violent 
protests into greater international opposition to Rios 
Montt's candidacy.  Similarly, the FRG recognizes that the 
violence of July 24-25 may have burned a bridge with the 
international community, and Zury Rios told us the FRG 
believes the USG has cast its lot in with GANA candidate 
Oscar Berger. 
 
7. (C) OAS Election Observation Mission (EOM) head Valentin 
Paniagua arrived in Guatemala on July 25 for a visit 
scheduled to last through August 4.  Foreign Minister 
Gutierrez told the Ambassador he had asked Paniagua to come 
straight from the airport to the MFA in order to engage him 
immediately in seeking a solution to this latest crisis.  By 
the time the Ambassador and A/DCM met with Paniagua on July 
27, he had (through facilitators) met with three top FRG 
leaders (but not Rios Montt), and seemed to have a good grasp 
of the psychological dynamics and legal architecture of the 
candidate registration crisis.  He was clearly unenthusiastic 
about playing a formal mediation role, but did not rule a de 
facto one out. 
 
8. (C) Comment: The FRG is desperate, and, rather than 
recognizing that its authoritarian style has deepened the 
confrontation, believes its electoral ambitions are being 
frustrated by a greedy private sector, a scheming political 
opposition and an unforgiving international community. 
Isolated and "misunderstood," the FRG has little to lose by 
pushing the limits of electoral campaign conduct.  It is not 
clear how the courts will ultimately rule in the General's 
case or what other legal strategies the FRG may be 
contemplating, but it appears certain that tensions will grow 
as a compromise is not expected in the short term.  Letting 
both sides stare into the abyss a little longer may be 
necessary to induce a modicum of flexibility on both sides. 
HAMILTON