US embassy cable - 98PRETORIA15505

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SOUTH AFRICA'S LONG-TERM SADC APPROACH

Identifier: 98PRETORIA15505
Wikileaks: View 98PRETORIA15505 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Pretoria
Created: 1998-11-25 22:45:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SADC SF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
R 252245Z NOV 98
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2485
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 015505 
 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMMER, PARIS FOR WILLIAMS 
DEPT FOR AF, P, E 
 
E.O.  12958:  DECL:  11/23/03 
TAGS:  PREL, SADC, SF 
SUBJECT:  SOUTH AFRICA'S LONG-TERM SADC APPROACH 
 
REF:   STATE  136499 
 
(U)  CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS REED FENDRICK. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  IN A NOVEMBER 23 MEETING WITH DFA DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR FOR SADC POLITICAL AFFAIRS HORST BRAMMER, AND DFA DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR FOR REGIONAL COORDINATION COEN BEZUIDENHOUT, THE SAG 
OFFICIALS TOLD POLMIL OFFICER AND POLOFFICER THAT, WHILE SOUTH 
AFRICA SUPPORTED THE STRENGTHENING OF SADC AS AN INSTITUTION, IT 
HAD ADOPTED A LONG-TERM APPROACH TO THE ORGANIZATION'S REFORM. 
ACCORDING TO BRAMMER AND BEZUIDENHOUT, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SADC'S 
SECTORS HAD BEEN POSTPONED, AS HAD THE RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT 
BETWEEN THE CHAIR AND THE ORGAN ON POLITICS, SECURITY, AND DEFENSE. 
ALTHOUGH BOTH WERE HOPEFUL THAT SADC AS A WHOLE WOULD GROW STRONGER 
WITH TIME, THEY NOTED THAT CURRENT EVENTS, SUCH AS THE DROC 
CONFLICT AND LESOTHO, COUPLED WITH A RELUCTANCE OF MEMBER STATES TO 
COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A SADC OVERHAUL, HAVE PUT REFORM ON THE 
BACKBURNER UNTIL AT LEAST AFTER THE CHAIRMANSHIP TURNOVER IN 1999, 
FOR WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAS ALREADY BEGUN QUIETLY PROMOTING 
MOZAMBIQUE, THE CURRENT DEPUTY CHAIR.  BOTH BRAMMER AND 
BEZUIDENHOUT INDICATED THAT THE UPCOMING U.S.-SADC FORUM COULD BE 
A GOOD PLACE TO ADDRESS SOME OF THESE CONCERNS, AND WE STRESSED THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN INPUT ON POTENTIAL FORUM AGENDA ITEMS 
(REFTEL).  END SUMMARY. 
 
REFORM AND RESOLUTION SIDELINED...FOR THE MOMENT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (C)  STRESSING THAT PROSPECTS FOR SADC SECTORAL REFORM ARE 
CURRENTLY "NOT GOING ANYWHERE", BEZUIDENHOUT ADDED THAT THE EU HAD 
ACCORDINGLY BEEN QUITE DISAPPOINTED DURING THE RECENT EU-SADC 
CONSULTATIONS IN VIENNA, AND THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD 
ON THE EU-FUNDED REFORM PROPOSAL.  ACCORDING TO BRAMMER AND 
BEZUIDENHOUT, THE SECTORAL REFORM ISSUE HAD MET STRONG RESISTANCE 
MOST SIGNIFICANTLY FROM SMALLER SADC MEMBERS SUCH AS SWAZILAND, 
LESOTHO, AND MALAWI, WHO ARE WORRIED THAT ANY REFORM (AND 
"SURRENDER" OF CURRENT SECTORS) WOULD PERMANENTLY SIDELINE THEM 
WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION.  BRAMMER ALSO INDICATED THAT SOME OF THE 
"NORTHERN" SADC MEMBERS, SUCH AS ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, AND ANGOLA, WERE 
ALSO DETERMINED TO HOLD ON TO THEIR PORTFOLIOS.  ON A POSITIVE 
NOTE, HOWEVER, BRAMMER SAID THAT THE ECONOMICALLY STRONGER 
COUNTRIES, SUCH AS BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND EVEN TO SOME 
EXTENT ZIMBABWE, WERE MORE OR LESS ALIGNED WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON 
THIS ISSUE AND SAW THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERTAKING SOME SORT OF 
STRUCTURAL REFORM AKIN TO THAT RECOMMENDED IN THE PROPOSAL. 
 
3.  (C)  THAT SAID, BEZUIDENHOUT EMPHASIZED THAT BOTH THE CONFLICT 
IN THE DROC AND LESOTHO HAD DOMINATED THE EU-SADC CONSULTATIONS, AT 
THE EXPENSE OF INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS STRUCTURAL REFORM.  HE 
DID ADD, HOWEVER, THAT AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE NEXT MEETING HAD BEEN 
AGREED UPON, AND THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION 
WOULD BE INCLUDED. 
 
4.  (C)  BOTH BRAMMER AND BEZUIDENHOUT APPEARED RESIGNED TO THE 
FACT THAT RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE SADC CHAIR (PRESIDENT MANDELA) AND CHAIR OF THE ORGAN ON 
POLITICS, SECURITY, AND DEFENSE (PRESIDENT MUGABE) WOULD SIMPLY 
HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AT LEAST 1999, WHEN MANDELA'S CHAIRMANSHIP ENDS. 
MANDELA, THEY SAID, HAD DEFINITELY REACHED THIS CONCLUSION. 
BRAMMER SAID THAT THE MULTI-COUNTRY (MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE, AND 
NAMIBIA) REPORT ON THE ORGAN ISSUE HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY 
PRESENTED TO SADC (THE SAG HAD HOPED IT WOULD BE PRESENTED DURING 
THE MAURITIUS SUMMIT), AND WOULD MOST LIKELY REMAIN SHELVED. 
INDEED, THE DFA OFFICIALS ALMOST APPEARED RELIEVED THAT MANDELA 
WOULD NOT HAVE TO FOCUS FURTHER ON THE ISSUE, AND EXPRESSED HOPE 
THAT HIS SUCCESSOR (THE SAG IS ALREADY QUIETLY PROMOTING THE DEPUTY 
CHAIR, CHISSANO OF MOZAMBIQUE) WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE THE ISSUE 
FORWARD.  HOWEVER, BRAMMER STRESSED THAT WHILE THE CONFLICT 
CONTINUES IN THE DROC, MUGABE WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN ANY 
RESOLUTION. 
 
CONTINUITY IN LIGHT OF DROC MISTAKE 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  RATHER SHEEPISHLY ADMITTING THAT SOUTH AFRICA NOW 
REGRETTED HAVING SUPPORTED DROC'S INCLUSION AS A SADC MEMBER, 
BRAMMER SAID THAT, THE CONFLICT ASIDE, HAVING DROC AS A MEMBER HAD 
UNPLEASANTLY STRETCHED THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF SADC.  AS 
BRAMMER EXPLAINED, ONLY SOUTHERN DROC (MAYBE) HAD A CULTURAL OR 
ECONOMIC AFFILIATION WITH THE REST OF SADC, AND BY ADMITTING DROC, 
SADC HAD ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE PULLED INTO AN ESSENTIALLY CENTRAL 
AFRICAN CONFLICT.  BRAMMER THEN NOTED THAT TO ALLOW FOR THE DROC'S 
SPEEDY ENTRY INTO SADC, PROCEDURAL RULES HAD BEEN BENT, WHICH IN 
RETROSPECT, ONLY SERVED TO FURTHER EXACERBATE INTERNAL DIVISIONS. 
IN LIGHT OF THAT DECISION, BRAMMER AND BEZUIDENHOUT BOTH STRESSED 
THAT THE SAG WOULD LIKE TO SEE A COMMITTED CHAIR, SUCH AS 
MOZAMBIQUE, SELECTED IN 1999, ONE THAT WOULD PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE 
IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY DECISIONS. 
THEY ALSO COMPLEMENTED MOZAMBIQUE'S FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS FOR 
 
6.  (C)  BOTH OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THE SAG WAS LOOKING FORWARD 
TO THE UPCOMING U.S.-SADC FORUM AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO MOVE FORWARD 
ON SOME ISSUES.  BOTH WELCOMED OUR REQUEST FOR INPUT ON POSSIBLE 
AGENDA ITEMS OR AREAS OF CONCERN (REFTEL), BUT NOTED THAT THE DROC 
WAS CONSUMING MUCH OF SADC'S ATTENTION. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C)  IT APPEARS THAT THE SAG HAS RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE FACT 
THAT NO SIGNIFICANT SADC INSTITUTIONAL OR STRUCTURAL REFORM WILL 
TAKE PLACE DURING THE REST OF MANDELA'S CHAIRMANSHIP, WHICH 
INCLUDES THE FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL IN LUSAKA AND THE SEPTEMBER 1999 
SUMMIT IN MAPUTO.  THAT SAID, BOTH BRAMMER AND BEZUIDENHOUT 
INDICATED THAT THE SAG REMAINS COMMITTED TO SADC AS AN INSTITUTION 
IN THE LONG TERM, AND THAT THE SAG WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE 
STRENGTHENING OF SADC AS A REGIONAL BODY, ESPECIALLY ON THE 
ECONOMIC FRONT.  GIVEN THE EVER-STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN 
MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA, THE SAG CLEARLY HOPES THAT A 
MOZAMBICAN CHAIR WOULD GENERALLY SUPPORT SOUTH AFRICA'S SADC 
VISION.  ALTHOUGH THE SAG WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO SEE CHISSANO 
REPLACE MANDELA, IT SEEMS THAT THE ISSUE IS AN OPEN ONE, AND COULD 
TAKE THE NEXT CHAIRMAN AS COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE AS MANDELA WAS 
TAKEN IN MASERU IN 1996.  TO THAT END, SOUTH AFRICA CLEARLY 
REALIZES THAT SADC IS A LONG TERM INVESTMENT - LITERALLY AND 
FIGURATIVELY. 
 
JOSEPH 

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