Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 03OTTAWA2115 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03OTTAWA2115 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ottawa |
| Created: | 2003-07-24 18:17:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | KNNP PARM MNUC PREL IR CA IAEA Iran Iraq |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T OTTAWA 002115 SIPDIS STATE FOR NP/RA, NP/MNA, IO/T, NEA/NGA AND WHA/CAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013 TAGS: KNNP, PARM, MNUC, PREL, IR, CA, IAEA, Iran, Iraq SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: CANADA AGREES ON NEED TO MOVE UP EL BARADEI REPORT BUT DOUBTS AUGUST 15 IS DOABLE REF: (A) STATE 210913 (B) OTTAWA 1670 (C) OTTAWA 2109 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Canada agrees with us that the IAEA Director General's next report on Iran needs to be issued prior to August 29 in order to mount an effective campaign before the September 8-12 Board of Governors meeting (ref. A), but believes that August 15 may not be feasible. Terry Wood, Foreign Affairs' Deputy Director for Non-Proliferation, told us on July 23 that the extended absences of El Baradei and of Deputy DG Goldschmidt (who will be returning from leave on August 18) and the need for a thorough report will make it difficult for the IAEA to proceed two weeks earlier. But Wood said that we must have more time to prepare for this BOG meeting than we had in June, when the DG's Iran report came out on the 6th and the BOG meeting was held on the 16th. Exactly how far in advance of August 29 is the challenge. 2. (S) Wood said that Canada has an added complication if the DG's report is moved up to August 15. Another GoC agency is preparing to provide "sensitive information" on Iran to the IAEA Secretariat, and had not planned to do so before mid-August (the Secretariat's informal deadline for submissions to be considered in the report is August 15). Wood was unsure whether or how much the sharing of this information, which was out of Foreign Affairs' hands, could be accelerated. Wood was not suggesting the report be held up on account of this, but said that Canada wanted to bring the information to bear on the report if at all possible. (NOTE: Canada has not previously shared intelligence with the IAEA, and is grappling with how to do so. The GoC has informed us (ref. B) that it has intelligence from the late 1990s regarding nuclear activity at Kalaye. END NOTE.) 3. (C) The GoC continues to push both the Iranian Government and the IAEA on full disclosure and full accountability. Wood said that Canada's Ambassador in Vienna is meeting with IAEA Acting DG Waller on July 24 to reiterate Canadian concerns, including moving up issuance of the Iran report, maintaining a rigorous approach to inspections, and using all the IAEA's tools, including special inspections. Wood told a Secretariat official earlier this month that if Iran did not SIPDIS agree to environmental sampling at Kalaye, Canada would push for a special inspection to be conducted there. Wood was preparing a letter from Minister Graham to El Baradei reiterating these messages, and said that Graham discussed Canadian concerns again this month with Iranian FM Kharazzi. He noted that Canadian access in Tehran will be more limited now that the Canadian Ambassador has been recalled over the death in custody of Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi (ref. C). 4. (C) Overall, Wood was pessimistic about bringing Iran around. He noted that experts who travelled with El Baradei to Iran this month had returned early because of the lack of cooperation by the Iranians. Wood said that the IAEA's investigation was showing additional Iranian work with nuclear materials that had not been declared. CELLUCCI
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04