US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1388

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ISSUE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION 
OF TALKS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On July 23, the Maoist leadership publicly 
released a letter responding to the Government of Nepal's 
invitation to resume formal peace negotiations stalled since 
early May.  Blaming the GON for violations of the cease-fire 
code of conduct, the letter represents another effort to turn 
public opinion against King Gyanendra's government and 
against "foreign powers", specifically the United States.  In 
the letter, the Maoists set unrealistic pre-conditions for 
the resumption of peace talks.  Post believes this is a 
continuation of the Maoist strategy of insisting on 
concessions from the GON without having to negotiate.  The 
letter also provided thinly-veiled threats that if the 
pre-conditions are not met, the Maoists will re-initiate its 
campaign of violence and terror.  The GON negotiating team 
has indicated that it would respond as calmly and quickly as 
possible, but that the demands will be difficult to satisfy. 
However, the RNA reportedly has put its forces on heightened 
alert in anticipation of renewed violence.  In sum, by making 
unrealistic demands, the Maoists have brought the cease-fire 
one step closer to collapse.  End Summary. 
 
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The Maoists' Demands 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C) On July 23, the Maoist leadership issued a letter 
signed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai to Prime Minister Surya 
Bahadur Thapa outlining the conditions the Government of 
Nepal must meet before formal negotiations can resume. 
Specifically, the Maoist letter: 
 
-- (a) Demands that the agreements allegedly reached at the 
second round of talks in May must be implemented before peace 
negotiations can resume.  The insurgents claim that the GON 
had agreed to limit the Royal Nepal Army to within 5 
kilometers of its barracks, release three Maoist leaders from 
prison, and make public the whereabouts of missing Maoist 
activists.  The GON, however, has denied reaching agreement 
on limiting the RNA's movements and, in any case, the RNA has 
flatly refused to comply with such a request as it would give 
the Maoists an enormous tactical advantage should hostilities 
resume.  The letter also claimed that although "all district 
headquarters and large cities" were under RNA control, "the 
rest of the villages and rural areas were under the control 
of the Liberation Army."  As a result, the Maoists state that 
they will regard any RNA or police patrol outside urban areas 
to be a violation of the cease-fire code of conduct. 
 
-- (b) Complains that without executive authority, the 
negotiating team is useless and, therefore, the King must 
accord the team full authority before talks can resume. 
-- (c) Demands that the King and political parties must 
reconcile their differences prior to re-initiating 
negotiations. 
 
-- (d) Claims that the RNA has "invited hundreds of U.S. 
military experts and advisors into the country," thereby 
disrupting the peace process.  The letter also refers to the 
RNA as a "foreign puppet military" and likens the Maoist 
insurgency to the 1960s war in Vietnam. 
 
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Government Reaction 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) On July 23, Kamal Thapa, Minister of Information and 
member of the GON negotiating team expressed concern to the 
Ambassador about the letter's contents, describing it overall 
as "negative."  The local press reports that Thapa felt the 
Maoists' pre-conditions are "very tough" and would cause a 
delay in the resumption of peace talks.  Thapa noted to the 
Ambassador that the Maoists had also focused attention on the 
U.S. military in Nepal.  He commented that the GON would 
respond as calmly and quickly as possible, perhaps as soon as 
July 24 or 25.  Other sources indicate that the GON already 
has solicited recommendations from RNA and National Police 
leaders.  Senior police officers reportedly suggested that 
the GON response should focus on Maoist violations of the 
cease-fire rather than directly addressing the insurgents' 
unrealistic demands. 
 
4. (C)   Separately, the Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa 
also expressed concern over the Maoists' intentions and 
confided to the Ambassador that he had raised the Army's 
alert level.  Press reports indicate that all RNA soldiers on 
leave have been recalled in anticipation of renewed violence. 
 
5. (C) Indian Ambassador Saran expressed less concern to the 
Ambassador over the letter, seeing it as a likely tactic to 
gain concessions and not necessarily a prelude to terminating 
the talks.  He claimed to have some information from Maoist 
sources indicating that the Maoists wanted the talks to 
continue. 
 
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Comment 
-------- 
 
6. (C) The Maoist response to Prime Minister Thapa's 
invitation to peace talks represents a continuation of their 
strategy of extracting concessions from the GON without 
entering into formal negotiations.  By all indications, the 
Maoist leadership correctly perceive the more organized and 
structured approach to negotiations of the Thapa government 
as less susceptible to their intimidation and manipulation. 
By setting unrealistic pre-conditions for the resumption of 
talks, the Maoists have set up the peace process for failure. 
 Maoist accusations that the GON is "continuously" violating 
the code of conduct are a transparent effort to shift blame 
for a break in the cease-fire to the RNA and National Police. 
 In fact, Post's assessment is that the Maoists have been 
much more guilty of cease-fire violations than Nepal's 
security forces. 
 
7. (C) Maoist rhetoric against the U.S., while nothing new, 
appeals to Nepali nationalism and politicizes U.S. military 
assistance to Nepal, increasing pressure on the GON to refuse 
such assistance.  The Maoist effort to end U.S. military 
training is further proof that they see our assistance as a 
threat to their political and military objectives.  In sum, 
while the Maoists may be playing some type of brinkmanship 
game to extract concessions, in doing so they have brought 
the cease-fire one step closer to collapse.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI