US embassy cable - 03ROME3368

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/WE, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013 
TAGS: PREL, EU, IT, EUN 
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA POLITIAL DIRECTORS - PRODUCTIVE 
DISCUSSIONS ON ESDP, IRAQ, NON PROLIFERATION 
 
Classified By: A/DCM SCOTT KILNER.  REASON:1.5 (B)(D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  A/S Jones had broad, frank and productive 
discussions at the U.S.-EU Troika Political Directors 
meeting, chaired by Italian MFA POLDIR Giancarlo Aragona in 
Rome on July 18.  Both sides agreed on the need for 
strengthened and complementary U.S.-EU and EU-NATO security 
relations under Berlin plus, and for support of the ESDP 
operation in Macedonia; the US and EU remain open to an EU 
command of SFOR responsibilities in Bosnia, if and when 
conditions merit the transfer from NATO.  Jones stressed that 
Galileo will require a political-level decision, based on 
technical discussions, to successfully resolve the overlay 
problem. The Middle East is a priority for the Italian 
Presidency and the EU praised President Bush's personal 
involvement.  A/S Jones noted the President wants the Quartet 
to play a strong role in the MEPP.  She also noted progress 
on resolving remaining differences on the Container Security 
Initiative and the Passenger Name Record programs.   Although 
little headway was made on ICC/article 98, the 
non-confrontational exchange of views allowed both sides to 
clarify their concerns.  Both sides agreed that in Iraq, the 
international community should focus on security issues, 
improvement of quality of life, development of self-governing 
mechanisms, and economic revitalization. The Afghanistan 
government projects a budget shortfall of over 180 million 
USD; the EU is on track to meet its pledge of one billion 
Euros over five years. A/S Jones expressed appreciation for 
the development and launch of the EU Strategy against 
Proliferation of WMD; now we should focus on practical 
measures in Iran and North Korea. Jones argued that the U.S. 
and EU should develop a strategy to use the next IAEA report, 
which will reportedly be very critical of Tehran. Aragona 
said that North Korea's WMD program is a multilateral, global 
problem, and needs a joint and coordinated response. He 
expressed hope that China would play a helpful role.  A/S 
Jones urged the EU to use Moscow's desire for good relations 
with the West to promote reforms in Russia, and said that the 
US was open to an EU stabilization force in Moldova, under an 
OSCE mandate.  End Summary 
 
------------- 
Participants 
------------- 
 
2. (U) U.S.: Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary European and 
Eurasian Affairs; Chuck English, Director, Office of European 
Union Affairs; Scott Kilner, Econ Counselor, U.S. Embassy 
Rome; Gary Robbins, POL-MIL Counselor, U.S. Embassy Rome; Lee 
Litzenberger, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU; Kent 
Logsdon, Special Assistant to A/S Jones; Marja Verloop, EU 
Desk Officer; and Jim Donegan, Political Officer, U.S. 
Embassy Rome.  Presidency: Giancarlo Aragona, Political 
Director; Sandro De Bernardin, CFSP Coordinator and European 
Correspondent; Gerolamo Schiavoni, Head, North America 
Bureau; and Pierfrancesco Sacco, Deputy European 
Correspondent.  Council Secretariat:  Robert Cooper, Director 
General; Jim Cloos, Director Transatlantic Relations; and 
Massimo Parnisari, European Correspondent.  European 
Commission: Fernando Valenzuela, Deputy Director General for 
External Relations; Percy Westerlund, Director, North 
America; and Peter Dun, Assistant European Correspondent. 
Ireland: David Cooney, Political Director; and Kevin Conmy, 
European Correspondent. 
 
------------------------------- 
European Security Strategy (ESS) 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Aragona began by saying he was pleased that the June 
U.S.-EU Summit had set the right tone for progress on the 
European Security Strategy.  The outline Solana presented in 
Thessaloniki would serve as the foundation for further work; 
the goal is to have the document ready to sign by member 
state heads of government at the December EU Summit.  The 
Italian Presidency would do whatever was necessary to ensure 
the document strengthened and complemented US-EU and EU-NATO 
security relations - in other words, that it was completely 
in accordance with Berlin plus.  The Italian Presidency will 
host a Ministerial at 25 on August 29 to discuss European 
Security Strategy progress and "emerging proposals" from the 
April 29 Brussels Defense Mini-Summit.  Cooper added that the 
 
 
European Security Strategy process was in its beginning 
stages, and should include input from both the US and NATO as 
it progresses.  He offered to travel to Washington for 
consultations, and looked forward to a period of discussion 
and "workshops" during the fall before detailed drafting 
begins in November.  Valenzuela noted that European Security 
Strategy would also encompass internal security issues, such 
as energy and trade. 
 
4. (C) A/S Jones welcomed the Solana European Security 
Strategy draft, and emphasized that it mirrors closely U.S. 
views on ESDP's relationship to NATO.  She was pleased to 
hear Aragona emphasize that the European Security Strategy 
would complement and strengthen US-EU and EU-NATO security 
relations, and accepted Cooper's offer to travel to 
Washington for more detailed discussions - the U.S. wants to 
collaborate in this process, and we look forward to seeing 
the EU move concepts from paper to concrete actions. 
 
--------------------------- 
ESDP Missions - Berlin Plus 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Aragona said that the three active ESDP missions 
(Macedonia, Congo and Bosnia police) demonstrated that the EU 
was committed to enhancing its security capabilities in line 
with Berlin plus.  Europeans do not want to be "laggards" 
when it comes to its security responsibilities, particularly 
when they involve the Balkans.  Aragona noted that the 
Copenhagen EU council expressed willingness for an EU 
takeover of SFOR functions in Bosnia if and when conditions 
merit a transfer from NATO command. 
 
6. (C) Cooper said that in his view, the EU-NATO relationship 
has done well and come a long way from the Berlin plus 
signing last December to launching Operation Concordia just 
three months later.  The EU has "surprised itself" with the 
rapidity with which it deployed to the Congo.  The EU intends 
to be "out on time" from the Congo, which will make it easier 
to deploy other operations in the future, as contributing 
nations will be confident they will not be engaged in drawn 
out operations.  Cooper emphasized that the military 
deployment was but one aspect of the Congo operation.  The EU 
will commit resources and personnel to stabilizing all 
aspects of the Congo's political and economic 
infrastructures.  Cooper reiterated that there was no 
disagreement with the US on a possible EU takeover of SFOR 
command in Bosnia - it will happen only when the U.S., EU and 
NATO decide together that it is time. Cooney agreed, and 
looked forward to a "real test" of Berlin plus in Bosnia.  He 
also expressed satisfaction with the 550 "high quality" 
officers deployed by the EU for police training in Bosnia 
 
7. (C) Cooper said that he was not satisfied with some 
aspects of the Berlin plus relationship, and not entirely 
enthusiastic about the "political atmosphere" between NATO 
and EU.  The EU and NATO had not yet developed a "habit" of 
active cooperation.  SHAPE does not yet function as a 
platform for Berlin plus and planning for EU operations. 
This may be the result of growing pains and the fact that the 
three ESDP operations thus far did not depend heavily on 
sharing NATO assets or planning capabilities.  Aragona 
averred that once ESDP and Berlin plus got up to "cruising 
speed," these initial problems would evaporate. 
 
8. (C) A/S Jones said that the USG was pleased that after 
four years of negotiations between the EU and NATO, an ESDP 
operation in accordance with Berlin plus was finally launched 
in March to Macedonia, and she emphasizes this point with the 
American public whenever possible.  It was unfortunate that 
headlines from elsewhere in the world in March meant 
Concordia did not receive the notice it deserved - especially 
as it relates to the new relationship between ESDP and NATO. 
A/S Jones pledged to work with the EU and NATO so that SHAPE 
does in fact begin to feel like a proper military 
headquarters for the EU.  Our main concern is that we avoid 
duplication of capabilities and headquarters - we want to 
streamline and become more efficient to more effectively 
address new threats. 
 
9. (C) A/S Jones reiterated that the U.S. remains open to an 
EU takeover from SFOR in Bosnia, but not now.  The security 
 
 
situation at the moment and unfinished business relating to 
apprehending Persons Indicted for War Crimes and terrorists 
call for a continued NATO presence of 12,000 personnel at 
least through the fall.  In the Balkans we remain committed 
to "in together - out together."  A/S Jones also praised the 
police training mission in Bosnia, and hoped it could serve 
as a model for missions to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
------- 
Galileo 
------- 
 
10. (C) A/S Jones noted President Bush was clear that the 
U.S. has strong political concerns about how Galileo's 
planned overlay of the GPS M-code could adversely impact 
Allied military communication.  She stressed that technical 
experts have demonstrated that any overlay, even partial, 
will interfere with Allied military capabilities.  She 
reassured the EU that it is not our intention to have Galileo 
be a second-class system; we believe that by separating GPS 
and Galileo we could support the NATO Alliance without 
degrading Galileo.  A/S Jones welcomed the EU offer to stay 
in contact. 
 
11. (C) Valenzuela is hopeful that experts can find a 
solution between the two extremes of satisfying security and 
avoiding second-class status for Galileo.  He stressed the 
importance of a clear political mandate and noted that we 
have everything to gain from complementary systems and 
nothing to gain by impeding one another.  He said that the EU 
is ready to hold classified consultations regardless of 
venue. Once the experts have worked out the issues, the 
Commission will have to consider matters of cost, robustness, 
and delays. 
 
12. (C) Aragona stressed Italy's desire to fully safeguard 
U.S. security concerns, and noted the rest of the EU Member 
States felt similarly.  However, he reiterated that it is 
equally important Galileo be first class -- technologically 
functional and credible.  He was glad to see this is fully 
recognized by the U.S. administration and is confident that 
we are moving ahead on a sound footing.  He applauded the 
Commission's willingness to let the U.S. choose the venue for 
the classified session, provided it is a U.S.-EU 
conversation. Cooper added that it is important to keep the 
prize in mind.  "If the technicians can make it work, two 
systems are better than one -- and our people are instructed 
to find a solution." 
 
13. (C) A/S Jones noted the question of venue will be 
resolved, but stressed this situation may still require a 
political-level decision, based on technical discussions, to 
come to a firm conclusion.  Everyone agreed the next step was 
open-minded technical talks.  David Cooney, Irish Political 
Director, added that there is full consensus in the EU, 
including non-NATO EU countries, that no one wants to 
undermine the NATO alliance. 
 
----------- 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
14. (C) A/S Jones noted that intense discussions are underway 
bilaterally with both Sharon and Abu Mazen, and underscored 
the need to continue working with Palestinians on prisoner 
releases, fence and security issues, and with the Israelis on 
security on the ground.  On the economic side, A/S Jones 
raised need to move fast and get a direct budget for the 
Palestinians in order to expand support for Abu Mazen and 
enhance his ability to make agreements with Sharon for the 
greater good.  Intense cooperation should continue with the 
Quartet; both the U.S. and the EU must push both sides at the 
GAERC and meetings in Washington. 
 
15. (C) Aragona confirmed the Middle East is a priority for 
the Italian Presidency.  He welcomed the U.S. efforts, and 
President Bush's increased involvement.  He agreed the 
situation is fragile and requires commitment, which the EU is 
ready to take on.  He explained Sharon and Abu Mazen would 
appear in succession at the GAERC, and the EU would impress 
upon them the need to move ahead with roadmap implementation. 
 Aragona stressed the need for a credible, effective 
 
 
monitoring mechanism, and highlighted the appointment of new 
special envoy, Ambassador Otte. Cooney noted the EU can play 
a complementary role to push the Arabs to meet their 
commitments, and  pointed out that the EU is not looking for 
glory -- but is looking for peace.  Valenzuela raised the 
importance of keeping the Palestinian Authority functioning 
with economic support, and the need for the population itself 
to see the dividends of peace.  He added that new focus on 
the private sector would also have positive effects. 
 
16. (C) A/S Jones noted the President wants the Quartet to 
play a strong role to resolve the conflict, and that from the 
U.S. perspective, each Quartet member should strive for equal 
credibility with both parties for more effective agreements. 
 
----------------- 
Counter-Terrorism 
----------------- 
 
17. (C) A/S Jones described U.S.-EU CT cooperatio as very 
strong, especially between EU Justice ad Home Affairs (JHA) 
experts and their U.S. counterparts.  This was highlighted 
during the summit with the signing of the Mutual Legal 
Assistance and Extradition agreements.  She noted progress on 
terrorism finance, but urged the EU to designate all wings of 
Hamas and Hizballah, and groups that raise funds for them, as 
terrorist entities.  A/S Jones noted progress on resolving 
remaining differences on the Container Security Initiative 
and the Passenger Name Record programs, and looked forward to 
closing remaining gaps.  Aragona reiterated the high priority 
the EU places on CT cooperation and said the EU wants to 
enhance cooperation in information collection and sharing and 
terrorism finance. 
 
18. (C) Aragona said that EU Foreign Ministers will discuss 
Hamas at the July 21-22 GAERC, an issue now "under constant 
review."  However, he noted that Hamas' respect for the 
current ceasefire would need to be taken into account. Cooper 
said Hamas was not a black and white issue for the EU.  Its 
designation raised questions -- whether the international 
community would ever want to include Hamas in a political 
process; and how to replace the social services Hamas 
provides Palestinians.  He said the EU has also talked 
extensively to Abu Mazen about Hamas, and is "pulled in 
different directions" regarding potential designation.  A/S 
Jones pressed again for EU designation of Hamas and Hizballah 
as terrorist organizations. 
 
---------------------------- 
International Criminal Court 
---------------------------- 
 
19. (C) Aragona stated his understanding of U.S. public and 
congressional pressure against ICC, but noted the equally 
strong conviction in Europe in support of the ICC and the 
principle of international jurisdiction.  In addition, the EU 
view is that the mechanisms of the ICC will protect against 
the politicization of the court that the U.S. fears.  He said 
the U.S. and EU needed to avoid "divisive engagement" on this 
issue; in spite of our differences it was in U.S.-EU 
interests to manage this issue successfully.  Aragona said 
the EU's guiding principles on Article 98 agreements were not 
a campaign against U.S. efforts to negotiate Article 98 
agreements.  Aragona said he hoped the ICC would establish a 
track record that would persuade the U.S. to reconsider its 
position. 
 
20. (C) A/S Jones clarified that there was no disagreement 
between the U.S. and the EU over the importance of 
prosecuting war crimes.  The disagreement was over the 
failure, in drafting the Rome statute, to provide safeguard 
mechanisms such as those applicable to the ICTY, making the 
tribunals accountable to the international community.  Just 
as countries tell us that for constitutional reasons they 
cannot deploy troops abroad without a UN decision, we cannot 
for constitutional reasons subject U.S. citizens to a 
tribunal that is not accountable to the international 
community.  A/S Jones noted that EU guidelines allow Member 
States to negotiate Article 98 agreements.   She noted that 
some Member State Ambassadors, with strong personal 
convictions on the issue, have been overly eager to tell 
accession countries that Article 98 agreements are not 
 
 
allowed, or that signing an agreement could jeopardize EU 
assistance funds.  We know this is not EU policy, and seek EU 
help to clarify to Member State Ambassadors what is 
appropriate for them to tell accession and third countries, 
and what is not. 
 
21. (C) Aragona replied that he could not exclude that some 
Member State Ambassadors might have made the representations 
described by A/S Jones, but the EU position on Article 98 
agreements is clear, and exists in writing.  The only 
authorized way for the EU position to be conveyed to third 
countries is via the Presidency or the EU Troika. Valenzuela 
added that the notion that the EU could threaten to withhold 
assistance from accession countries was remote.  The 
procedures involved would include a European Court of Justice 
decision -- after accession of the country concerned.  Cooney 
noted that the U.S. and the EU had both given countries "a 
pretty hard time" over Article 98 agreements, and cited U.S. 
pressure, via withholding military assistance under 
provisions of the American Servicemembers Protection Act 
(ASPA) as an example.  Although Ireland was not a recipient 
of US Security assistance, the application of ASPA to 
Ireland, Cooney said, would not bring Ireland any closer to 
signing an Article 98 agreement.  A/S Jones responded that 
ASPA was the law of the land, and U.S. military assistance to 
countries amounted to 1/100th of potential EU assistance to 
accession states, so the two situations were not comparable. 
(Comment.  Although little headway was made on the substance, 
the direct but non-confrontational exchange of views allowed 
both sides to clarify their concerns.  End comment.) 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
22. (C) A/S Jones provided an update of the situation in 
Iraq, focusing on five key priorities: security issues, 
improvement of quality of life, assistance from the 
international community, development of self-governing 
mechanisms, and economic revitalization.  She outlined 
developments in police staffing and training, legal and 
judicial reform, electricity production and supply, and the 
establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council.  She noted 
plans to convene a donors, conference in October, adding 
that the US hopes the EU will be an active participant, 
perhaps taking the opportunity of the July 21 GAERC to make 
this commitment. 
 
23. (C) Aragona praised the creation of the IGC as an 
important step, and agreed on the primary importance of 
providing a secure environment in which Iraq,s most pressing 
needs can be addressed.  He said the EU would continue to 
work closely with Ambassador Bremer and his team.  While it 
may be premature to get into specifics about the October 
donors, conference, the US should be assured that the EU 
will play a very supportive role on financial assistance and 
reconstruction.  Aragona stressed the importance of Iraqis 
&owning8 this process. 
 
24. (C) Aragona requested US views about an eventual UN role 
in Iraq.  A/S Jones replied that UNSCR 1483 addresses 
existing responsibilities.  The Allied Coalition understands 
and accepts its responsibilities, and will focus on the five 
priorities outlined earlier.  Any discussion of transfer of 
authority would, at this point, be premature. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
25. (C) A/S Jones noted that the Afghanistan government 
projects a budget shortfall of over 180 million USD.  The EU 
has already committed 50 million USD; we hope it will give 
another 20 million.  Additionally, Afghan elections are 
expected to cost about 100 million USD; we trust that the EU 
will also be supportive of that process.  A/S Jones briefed 
on the Provincial Reconstruction Team program and urged EU 
participation.  She also expressed appreciation for the 
willingness of the EC,s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) to 
permit personnel of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military 
Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) to use UN Humanitarian Air 
Service flights for crucial transport, and urged ECHO to 
 
 
extend such usage beyond August 1. 
 
26. (C) Cooney expressed concern that constitutional 
consultations were taking place without circulation of draft 
texts, saying this was giving rise to suspicions that the 
process was not really inclusive.  Cooney also expressed 
concern about possible delays in the electoral process. 
Cooper added that there is a growing perception among many 
Afghans that a &fix8 is in which will simply ratify 
existing powers. 
 
27. (C) Valenzuela said the EU is on track to meet its pledge 
of one billion Euros over five years, with outlays during the 
current year totaling over 200 million.  He recognized the 
need for electoral funding, but was noncommittal, noting that 
the EC budget is already stretched.  Valenzuela also echoed 
Cooper,s concerns that the electoral process not be 
perceived as favoring status quo warlord power.  In that 
regard, he expressed general support for extending Kabul,s 
power and influence into the provinces, but said present 
plans do not envision EU participation in the PRT,s. 
 
---------------- 
Nonproliferation 
---------------- 
 
28. (C) Aragona said that the conceptual framework for NP 
coordination is contained in the EU Strategy Against 
Proliferation of WMD; now we should focus on practical 
measures in Iran and North Korea.  A/S Jones expressed 
appreciation for the development and launch of the 
nonproliferation initiative.  While we recognize that there 
are some differences of perception, we agree that there are 
ample opportunities for cooperative action.  A/S Jones 
expressed US concerns about proceeding with an initiative in 
the UNGA, but said the US is willing to discuss this 
possibility with EU experts. 
 
29. (C) Cooper said the Commission has developed four main 
areas of emphasis.  First, the IAEA has proven very useful, 
most recently with Iran.  Second, the EU will, in 
consultation with the U.S., review all of its treaty 
relationships with a view to adopting language requiring 
nonproliferation cooperation.  Third, the Commission wishes 
to review (at 25) the best practices of various 
nonproliferation regimes.  Finally, Cooper lauded the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, but noted that not all EU 
member states were asked to participate in PSI, and asked 
whether such EU participation might be possible.   A/S Jones 
said the US would welcome broader participation that expands 
the effectiveness of the PSI.  Aragona said that, as one of 
the original PSI participants and EU Presidency country, 
Italy might be well placed to explore the idea of greater 
inclusiveness. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
30. (C) Aragona noted that Italian FM Frattini recently told 
his Iranian counterpart that prompt and unconditional 
agreement to the Additional Protocol sought by the IAEA is 
essential. He said that political dialogue and economic 
cooperation must be linked, and we should balance our 
approaches and avoid steps that might prove 
counterproductive.  A/S Jones said the U.S. and EU should 
develop a strategy to use the next IAEA report, which will 
reportedly be very critical of Tehran.  The U.S. recognizes 
that Iran is divided; the key question is how to influence 
internal dynamics to achieve the changes in Iranian policy 
that we seek. 
----------- 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
31. (C) Aragona said that North Korea's WMD program is a 
multilateral, global problem, and needs a joint and 
coordinated response. He expressed hope that China might be 
able to foster a renewal of dialogue with the DPRK.  A/S 
Jones welcomed Aragona,s recognition that North Korean 
proliferation is a global issue.  The criminality of the 
 
 
regime is also a factor.  Valenzuela lauded the intensity of 
U.S. dialogue with China and Japan on North Korea, but 
expressed concern that discussions with other KEDO members 
outside the framework of KEDO might affect that body, and 
asked that we keep the EU in the loop on all KEDO-related 
matters. 
 
------ 
Russia 
------ 
 
32. (C) Aragona said the EU is making progress with Russia on 
border/immigration issues, combating organized crime and drug 
trafficking.  The EU raises Chechnya and human rights issues, 
but has not had much success. The EU assessment is the 
Russians are content with their role within the Quartet.  On 
Moldova, Aragona said that Russian FM Ivanov is extremely 
uncomfortable with any "outside" role in a settlement.  On 
nonproliferation, Aragona said the Russians may be moving in 
 
the right direction, but this was an Italian national 
assessment. 
 
33. (C) A/S Jones urged the EU to use Russia's desire for 
good relations with the West to promote reforms.  On 
Chechnya, despite Russian extreme sensitivities, the U.S. 
raises it at all levels, including at summit meetings, 
pointing out that there must be a political solution that 
also addresses underlying causes.  On human rights/media 
freedom and economic reform, much still needs to be done. 
The U.S. is concerned about Putin's recent closure of TV 
stations. 
 
------------------------ 
Moldova/Frozen Conflicts 
------------------------ 
 
34. (C) A/S Jones outlined U.S. frustration with the Russian 
MFA "stone wall" that blocks any effort to move ahead on 
Moldova or any of the frozen conflicts.  The U.S. strategy, 
which is still being developed, is to say to Moscow that if 
it wants good relations with the U.S. and the West (e.g. visa 
free travel with the EU) then it can't say the EU has no 
voice in a Moldova settlement.  A/S Jones outlined upcoming 
U.S.-Russian meetings that can be used to raise these issues 
above the level of the MFA, and said the U.S. would welcome a 
similar EU effort.  Russia cannot be allowed to take "Cold 
War" positions on Moldova and Georgia. 
 
35. (C) Cooney agreed there was a big gap between Russian 
rhetoric and action, and outlined three reasons why the EU 
sought a role in a Moldova settlement.  First, the EU wants 
conflict resolved on what will be its borders.  Second, 
Moldova is an economic basket case -- per capita GDP is two 
percent of the EU average and it is a source of organized 
crime and trafficking in persons.  Third, the EU wants a 
resolution in Moldova before enlargement encompasses Romania 
in order to avoid further tension along that border.  Cooney 
noted that public discussion of a potential EU peacekeeping 
force in Moldova was not helpful in reaching a political 
settlement -- it would just upset the Russians.  Aragona 
added that no decisions have been taken; when the day comes 
that the OSCE does reach a decision, and if the OSCE asks the 
EU to take this role, the EU will have to take the Russian 
connection to Moldova into account.  A/S Jones said that the 
U.S. was open to an EU stabilization force in Moldova, under 
an OSCE mandate, and would want such a mission to draw on 
NATO planning.  It should follow the Macedonia, not Congo, 
model since it would be in the European theatre. 
 
36 (U)  A/S Jones has cleared this cable. 
Sembler 
NNNN 
 2003ROME03368 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL