US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA1742

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, STATE FOR WHA/PPC, DRL/PHD, DRL/IL, 
INL/LP, INR, AND DS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2013 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, KJUS, HO 
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON LA CEIBA PRISON MASSACRE 
FAULTS POLICE, ARMED FORCES, AND PUBLIC MINISTRY 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 861 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 1309 
 
Classified By: Political Section Chief, Francisco Palmieri; Reasons 1.5 
 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  Summary.  (SBU) On July 9, Human Rights Commissioner for 
Honduras, Ramon Custodio, presented the results of the 
Commission's investigation into the April 5 massacre of 68 
prisoners at the El Porvenir Prison, located outside of the 
Caribbean port city of La Ceiba.  The report supported 
allegations that elements of the police and military were 
involved in the deaths of prisoners, charging that security 
forces executed unarmed gang members who attempted to 
surrender to authorities (Reftel B).  The report states that 
the 25 individuals who burned to death (23 Mara-18 members 
and 3 female visitors) witnessed the execution of other 
inmates who had surrendered, and thus, may have chosen to 
remain in their burning cells, rather than face summary 
execution.  The report alleges that prior to the arrival of 
military and police forces, only 10 of the 68 deaths had 
occurred.  It charges that nearly all of the remaining deaths 
can be attributed to police and military forces. 
Furthermore, the report implicates the police in a cover-up 
of the executions committed by military and police units, 
while also faulting the Public Ministry's shoddy forensics 
testing and mishandling of the crime scene.  End Summary. 
 
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The Violence Begins 
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2.  (C)  According to the report, the violence began when 
between five and ten Mara-18 gang inmates brandishing 
firearms, shot and killed several prison "trusties" (non-gang 
member inmates charged with enforcing discipline in the 
prison).  (Note:  The report suggests as a possible motive 
for the attack, that gang members may have sought retribution 
for a prison raid on April 3 in which trusties and prison 
security confiscated 4 machetes, 16 knives and 8 firearms 
from cells 2 and 6, where gang members resided.  "Trusties" 
and prison security authorities then sentenced gang members 
to 48 hours of solitary confinement.  The report notes that 
the gang members were released from isolation the morning of 
the massacre.  Furthermore, the report also places blame on 
an unauthorized transfer of 30 Mara-18 inmates from a federal 
prison at Tamara to El Porvenir on February 6, 2003, which 
may have disturbed the balance of power between gang and 
non-gang members, leading to conflict. Separately, 
conventional wisdom here is that this importation was a 
showdown between different prison elements over control of 
the drug trade in the prison.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Police, Military Forces Arrive, Chaos Ensues 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  The report contends that when prison security units 
arrived, only five individuals had been killed.  Shortly 
after prison security deemed the area under control, numerous 
different police and military forces arrived, including the 
Preventive Police Special Forces (COBRA), elements of the 
First Battalion of Marine Infantry, Tourist Police, prison 
police, and members of the Fourth Infantry Battalion, who 
were apparently confronted by a mob yelling for the police to 
kill Mara-18 gang members.  According to the Commission's 
report, security forces entered the prison and opened fire on 
unarmed gang members and either condoned or encouraged the 
remaining trusties to kill those gang members who lay wounded 
throughout the prison courtyard.  Subsequently, the 
"trusties," set fire to the cellblocks where the majority of 
gang members resided.  Some witness testimonies indicate that 
kerosene from the prison kitchen was used to ignite the fire, 
while others point to the use of gasoline. 
 
4.  (C)  The report further contends that police and military 
authorities then ordered inmates in cellblocks 2 and 6 to 
surrender.  The prisoners surrendering, who were unarmed and 
with hands in the air, were then summarily executed by armed 
security agents, who have since alleged that they were 
following orders from "trusties."  Autopsy reports confirm 
eyewitness testimonies that police units were responsible for 
the deaths of unarmed prisoners.  Direct testimony also 
exists implicating a COBRA in the killing of an unarmed, 
wounded man. 
 
--------------------------------- 
25 Burn to Death, Others Executed 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  The report states that, according to witness 
testimonies, most of the gang members were not involved in 
the violence and voluntarily returned to their cells once 
shooting began.  Gang members who retreated to their cells 
left cellblock doors open with the exception of cell block 6, 
whose door was partially obstructed, trapping prisoners 
inside.  The report suggests that many of the remaining 
inmates witnessed or heard the executions of those who had 
surrendered, and subsequently chose to remain in their 
burning cellblocks, rather than face execution.  22 inmates 
and 3 female visitors burned to death as the fire consumed 
two contiguous cell blocks. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Crime Scene Contaminated, Investigation Incomplete 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6.  (C)  According to the report, the integrity of the crime 
scene was compromised by prison "trusties" and police who 
moved bodies and "tampered" with evidence prior to the 11AM 
orders from Commissioner Henriquez not to contaminate the 
crime scene.  Additionally, the report outlines a litany of 
criticisms of the Public Ministry's investigation.  Bodies 
prematurely removed from the crime scene were left to 
decompose in the heat for days before being analyzed by 
forensic experts.  Limited forensics testing was conducted to 
determine the cause of death of most victims, and no analysis 
was done of the carbon dioxide levels in the blood of the 
deceased (to determine if the cause of death was fire).  Most 
of the bullets were not removed from the bodies of the 
deceased.  Consequently, without the requisite forensic 
analyses, x-rays or comprehensive ballistics tests, the exact 
cause of death of most victims was never adequately 
determined. 
 
7.  (C)  The autopsies that were conducted largely document 
external, rather than internal lesions, indicating only a 
superficial examination of the bodies.  To date, 15 bodies 
remain in the San Pedro Sula morgue and have yet to be 
officially identified, nor has any fingerprint testing been 
employed as a means of identification.  According to the 
report, ballistics investigators failed to identify the types 
of arms used during the riot, and thus, were unable to 
determine the exact cause(s) of death. 
 
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Public Ministry Faulted For Incomplete Investigation 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
8.  (C)  The report also directed criticism at the Public 
Ministry for its failure to execute a swift, thorough and 
proper investigation.  The report urges the Public Ministry 
to expedite the four cases it has developed against specific 
individuals involved in the violence and to clarify the 
charges it intends to bring against the individuals. 
Additionally, the report calls for new ballistics tests, 
autopsy reports and asks the Minister of Security to present 
prosecutors with a complete list of all individuals present 
during the killings.  Additionally, the report recommends a 
revamping of the discipline system in the prison and the 
elimination of the role of prison "trusties."  The report 
asks police to identify the trusties killed and investigate 
all of the parties involved.  Finally, it criticizes the 
Director of MOPS Special Preventative Services for ordering 
the premature and unauthorized relocation of Mara 18 gang 
members from the prison to other prisons on February 6. 
 
9.  (C)  Comment.  The Honduras Human Rights Commission is a 
well respected institution that works closely with Post on a 
number of issues.  The Commission's findings support the 
Honduran Internal Security Council's May 9 report that 
assigned responsibility to GOH security forces for the vast 
majority of the deaths at El Porvenir prison on April 5.  The 
Commission's report, however, arrives at much more damaging 
and far-reaching conclusions, including the identification of 
the specific military units that were involved.  It remains 
to be seen exactly what corrective and prosecutorial measures 
the GOH plans to pursue regarding the incident, apart from 
the mere window dressing of changing the prison warden. 
Unfortunately, the extreme unpopularity of gang members, who 
are seen by the Honduran public as the source of much of the 
violence plaguing Honduras today, is unlikely to evoke 
broader public outcry on human rights grounds.  End Comment. 
Palmer