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| Identifier: | 98BEIRUT3570 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 98BEIRUT3570 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Beirut |
| Created: | 1998-09-29 14:20:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PINR KISL MEPP LE |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
O 291420Z SEP 98 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7429 INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003570 NICOSIA FOR ILMG E.O. 12958: DECL 10/01/08 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KISL, MEPP, LE SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALLS ON PARLIAMENTARY LEADERSHIP 1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD. REASONS 1.5 (B AND D). 2. (C) SUMMARY: DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALLS AT THE PARLIAMENT, SPEAKER NABIH BERRI AND HIS DEPUTY ELIE FERZLI INDICATED THAT LAF COMMANDER GENERAL EMILE LAHUD IS THE MOST OBVIOUS CHOICE TO BECOME THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF LEBANON. THEY HEDGED THEIR BETS BY NOTING THAT SEVERAL OTHER CANDIDATES (SUCH AS NASSIB LAHUD AND JEAN OBEID) ALSO HAD A CHANCE TO BECOME PRESIDENT. BOTH EXPRESSED THE NEED TO ELECT A STRONG PRESIDENT TO COUNTERBALANCE THE POWER OF PRIME MINISTER RAFIQ AL-HARIRI. THEY ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE ELECTION OF A MILITARY LEADER WOULD NOT ENDANGER "DEMOCRACY" IN LEBANON. END SUMMARY. 3. (C) AMBASSADOR PAID A COURTESY CALL ON SPEAKER BERRI ON 24 SEPTEMBER. AFTER EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT POLITICAL TURMOIL IN WASHINGTON WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "A PLOT TO UNDERMINE THE PRESIDENT," BERRI TURNED TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND DOMESTIC LEBANESE POLITICS. --------------------------------------------- SITUATION IN THE SOUTH: APPRECIATION FOR ILMG --------------------------------------------- 4. (C) BERRI EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE OF THE ISRAEL-LEBANON MONITORING GROUP (ILMG) IN CALMING DOWN THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. HE SAID THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION'S ATTACHMENT TO ILMG HAS BECOME SIMILAR TO THAT TOWARDS UNIFIL. "IF WE DID NOT HAVE THE ILMG, WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SOUTH," BERRI EMPHASIZED. BERRI ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE ALWAYS URGES THE RESISTANCE (I.E., HIZBALLAH AND AMAL) NOT TO LAUNCH ATTACKS FROM INSIDE VILLAGES. SUCH ADVICE, IF HEEDED, WOULD DEPRIVE ISRAEL OF AN EXCUSE TO RETURN FIRE AGAINST THESE VILLAGES. BERRI BELIEVED THE SITUATION, ALBEIT UNSTABLE, WAS BETTER THAN IN THE PAST AND THAT DAMAGES WERE LESS THAN LAST YEAR. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE MEPP. ------------------------------------- EMILE LAHUD AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS ------------------------------------- 5. (C) THE AMBASSADOR CONGRATULATED BERRI ON HIS RECENT REELECTION TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMAL MOVEMENT. REFLECTING ON HIZBALLAH AS A RIVAL FOR POLITICAL PROMINENCE, BERRI SAID THAT "ISRAEL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING HIZBALLAH ALIVE," BY CONTINUING -- THROUGH ITS OCCUPATION OF THE SOUTH -- TO PROVIDE A PLATFORM FROM WHICH HIZBALLAH COULD ADVANCE ITS POLITICAL STANDING AS THE "NATIONAL RESISTANCE." BERRI WAS DISMISSIVE OF HIZBALLAH'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN A PROMINENT POLITICAL ROLE ONCE THE "RESISTANCE" ENDED. (COMMENT: THIS STRIKES US AS AN ALTOGETHER TOO ROSY VIEW OF A LIKELY POST-ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SHI'A POLITICS: AMAL -- AND BERRI IN PARTICULAR -- FACE SERIOUS CREDIBILITY AND IDENTITY PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH AND ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. END COMMENT.) 6. (C) TURNING TO PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, BERRI MENTIONED THAT GENERAL EMILE LAHUD APPEARED TO HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF BECOMING THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF LEBANON. HE NOTED IN PASSING THAT HE HAD ONCE RECOMMENDED NAMING EMILE LAHUD AS HEAD OF THE ARMY DURING AMINE GEMAYEL'S TERM IN OFFICE IN THE EARLY 1980S, BUT WAS OVERRULED IN FAVOR OF GEMAYEL'S SELECTION OF MICHEL AOUN. OTHER CANDIDATES SUCH AS NASSIB LAHUD AND JEAN OBEID ALSO HAD A CHANCE THOUGH, HE QUICKLY HEDGED. BERRI SAID HE WANTED TO FINISH WITH THE ELECTION BEFORE OCTOBER 15, BECAUSE THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE MATTERS BEFORE PARLIAMENT. 7. (C) BERRI POSTULATED THAT BUILDING "INSTITUTIONS" WAS THE BEST WAY TO FIGHT ENDURING SECTARIANISM WITHIN THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC; HE ALSO DISCOUNTED THE NOTION THAT LAHUD'S ELECTION MIGHT RESULT IN THE POLITICIZATION OF THE ARMY. ASKED IF A LAHUD PRESIDENCY RAISED THE SPECTRE IN LEBANESE MINDS OF ARMY (OR MORE SPECIFICALLY G-2 MUKHABARAT) INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS -- THE LEGENDARY "DUALITY" OR "IZDIWAJIYAH" OF PRESIDENT FUAD SHIBAB'S RULE -- BERRI STATED FORCEFULLY THAT LAHUD "WOULD BE AN EISENHOWER," AND SEPARATE HIMSELF FROM THE LAF ONCE IN OFFICE. "HE KNOWS NEITHER WE (THE POLITICIANS) NOR THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT ANY "DUALITY." (COMMENT: OTHER PROMINENT LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES -- AND WE -- ARE LESS CERTAIN, GIVEN THE PROMINENT ROLE NOW PLAYED BY THE LAF G-2 (AT LAHUD'S -- AND UNDOUBTEDLY SYRIAN -- DIRECTION) IN MONITORING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSONALITIES. END COMMENT.) 8. (C) BERRI HIGHLIGHTED THREE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENT: CREDIBLE TO THE CHRISTIANS, ACCEPTABLE TO THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND SATISFACTORY TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (I.E., THE SYRIANS AND OTHER "FRIENDS"). HE EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE OTHER CANDIDATES MIGHT EXCEL IN SOME OF THESE AREAS, ONLY LAHUD EMBODIED ALL THREE CHARACTERISTICS. 9. (C) BERRI SAID HE WANTED TO HAVE A PRESIDENT WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING THE CHRISTIANS BACK INTO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL LIFE OF THE NATION. BERRI INSISTED THAT CHRISTIANS HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE WAKE OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WHICH WERE CONDUCTED LAST MAY/JUNE. CHRISTIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE BALLOTING DOUBLED THAT OF THE SHI'A IN PERCENTAGE TERMS AND REACHED 93 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE 21 CHRISTIAN MUNICIPALITIES IN SOUTH LEBANON. STRONGER CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE OVERBEARING INFLUENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER "AND CREATE A BALANCE" IN THE (TRIPARTITE) PRESIDENCY (I.E., AN ALLY FOR ME AGAINST HARIRI). LAUNCHING INTO A WELL-REHEARSED CRITIQUE OF THE PM, BERRI SAID HARIRI WAS NOT "A MAN OF INSTITUTIONS." IN A FINAL JAB AT THE PRIME MINISTER, BERRI CLOSED SAYING, "HARIRI IS IMPORTANT FOR THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF HIS INTERNATIONAL STATURE, BUT HARIRI DEALS WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES LIKE A PRINCE IN SAUDI ARABIA. WE HAVE NO PRINCES HERE." --------------------------------------------- ----------- DEPUTY SPEAKER FERZLI ON SYRIAN INTEREST IN THE ELECTION --------------------------------------------- ----------- 10. (C) ILY FERZLI, THE GREEK ORTHODOX DEPUTY SPEAKER WHO HAS VERY CLOSE TIES WITH THE SYRIANS BUT LIMITED POLITICAL CREDIBILITY IN LEBANON, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING THAT GENERAL LAHUD HAD A GOOD CHANCE TO BECOME THE NEXT PRESIDENT. REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZING TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE, FERZLI, SHOULD BE SEEN AS A CHANNEL TO THE SYRIANS AND POINTING OUT HOW INTIMATE HIS CONTACTS WERE WITH SENIOR SYRIAN OFFICIALS, FERZLI STATED THAT LAHUD WAS BACKED BY SYRIA, AND THAT WITHOUT SYRIAN SUPPORT LAHUD WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BUILD A UNIFIED ARMY. "SYRIA PROTECTED LAHUD AND MADE HIM A MINI-PRESIDENT," FERZLI ADDED. FERZLI ECHOED BERRI'S COMMENT THAT THE ELECTION OF A MILITARY LEADER WOULD NOT ENDANGER "DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON." 11. (C) FERZLI ALSO HEDGED HIS BETS, HOWEVER, NOTING THAT "NOTHING IS FINAL." AS IF TO EMPHASIZE THAT POINT, FERZLI COMMENTED THAT NEITHER BERRI NOR HARIRI HAD A REAL INTEREST IN HAVING A STRONG PRESIDENT. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT HIZBALLAH PREFERENCES, FERZLI SAID THEY DO NOT WANT A STRONG PRESIDENT EITHER. QUERIED ON WHETHER LAHUD HAD A KNOWN PROGRAM HE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT IF ELECTED, FERZLI SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT LAHUD SHOULD NOT HAVE A "PROGRAM," SINCE THAT WOULD ONLY ENGAGE HIM IN PETTY DOMESTIC "POLITICAL SQUABBLES." (READ: WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT.) INSTEAD, THE NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD BE A MORAL EXEMPLAR -- UNLIKE HRAWI -- AND ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS. --------------------------------------------- -------- PROSPECTS FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE HINGE ON THE PRESIDENCY --------------------------------------------- -------- 12. (C) FERZLI WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT BETTER GOVERNMENT WAS POSSIBLE IN LEBANON IF THERE ARE "ANGELS" AT THE LEVEL OF THE TROIKA. "IF WE HAVE DEVILS AT THE TROIKA LEVEL, ALL OTHER OFFICIALS WILL ALSO TURN INTO DEVILS," FERZLI SURMISED WRYLY. FERZLI EXPECTED THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT HRAWI, TO CALL FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT TO CONSIDER A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS SUCH AS LAHUD TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT. IF THAT SCENARIO DOES NOT TRANSPIRE, THE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT CAN PROPOSE SUCH A SESSION ONCE PARLIAMENT CONVENES ON OCTOBER 20. AFTER OCTOBER 24, HOWEVER, PARLIAMENT CAN NO LONGER CALL A SPECIAL SESSION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. (NOTE: THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION IS COMPLEX ON THIS PROCEDURAL ISSUE, AND IT NOT INTERNALLY CONSISTENT. IN FACT, MOST LEBANESE TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WITH BROAD SUPPORT COULD BE PASSED WHENEVER NECESSARY, THOUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE OCTOBER 24 WOULD SEEM MOST CONVENIENT. END NOTE) --------------------------------------------- ------ SYRIAN STRATEGY IN LEBANON: WIN OVER THE CHRISTIANS --------------------------------------------- ------ 13. (C) FERZLI BELIEVED THAT SYRIA WAS NOW "INSIDE THE LEBANESE REGIME," AND NO LONGER HAD AN INTEREST IN DESTABILIZING LEBANON. FERZLI ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN ROLE IN LEBANON, BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER A PEACE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL. HE SAID "SYRIA, AND IN PARTICULAR, HAFEZ AL-ASAD, IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN GIVE LEGITIMACY TO ANY PEACE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL". HE ALSO STATED THAT SYRIAN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS IN LEBANON WAS A GUARANTEE FOR PEACE. 14. (C) FINALLY, FERZLI -- GETTING IN ONE LAST PRO-SARG POINT -- ARGUED THAT ASAD WAS A "STRATEGIC THINKER" WHO WANTS TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN WORLD, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. THE PROVING GROUND FOR ASAD TO PROMOTE HIS IMAGE ABROAD IS IN LEBANON. FERZLI BELIEVED THE SYRIANS WANTED TO ACHIEVE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON TO FACILITATE THIS END. --------------------------- AMBASSADOR'S PRESS COMMENTS --------------------------- 15. (U) THE AMBASSADOR MADE BRIEF REMARKS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS AT THE PARLIAMENT, NOTING THAT "WE HAVE CLEARLY UNDERLINED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN LEBANON. THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS A LEBANESE CHOICE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS." SATTERFIELD
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