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| Identifier: | 03KATHMANDU1381 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03KATHMANDU1381 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Kathmandu |
| Created: | 2003-07-23 10:28:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREF EAID BH NP Bhutanese Refugees |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001381 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM: RMACKLER DEPT PASS TO USAID/ANE LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2013 TAGS: PREF, EAID, BH, NP, Bhutanese Refugees SUBJECT: NEPAL: BHUTANESE REFUGEE ISSUE RECEIVES DRAMATICALLY INCREASED ATTENTION REF: (A) KATHMANDU 1301 (B) KATHMANDU 1237 Classified By: DCM Robert Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Malinowski's letter to the editor, published prominently in several Nepali newspapers on July 10, opened the floodgates to a spate of comments and editorials from others in the international community, the Bhutanese National Assembly and the Government of Nepal (GON) regarding the fate of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. The EU, UNHCR, and Human Rights Watch have issued statements in support of the U.S. position. Nepal's Foreign Ministry spokesperson denied that refugees would seek to stay in Nepal while the Bhutanese National Assembly reportedly condemned the decision by the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan to allow any refugees to return to Bhutan. Some have suggested that the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB), by categorizing the majority of refugees as either non-Bhutanese or Bhutanese who must reapply for citizenship, have sent a message to the refugees that they are not welcome in Bhutan. One thing is clear, the refugees may get caught between two governments, neither of which is willing to accept responsibility for their welfare. Already there are indications that the frustration of the refugees is attracting the attention of political extremists, including Maoists. End Summary. 2. (U) On July 9, Ambassador Malinowski sent a letter to the editors of several local publications expressing concern about weaknesses and inconsistencies in the Nepal-Bhutan Joint Verification Team's categorization of the 12,000 refugees residing in Khundunabari Camp in Eastern Nepal (Ref A). The letter also called for international oversight of repatriation and resettlement, questioned the integrity of the appeals process, and underscored UNHCR's unique mandate to undertake this kind of mission. The letter was well-received in the press, enjoying front page coverage in three national daily newspapers. UNHCR and Human Rights Watch both publicly supported the U.S. position on the issue. 3. (U) Subsequent to the letter's publication, a spate of commentaries and editorials have been published in Nepal's English-language dailies. On July 18, the EU issued a press release expressing concern over the JVT's findings and the appellate procedures and calling for transparency in the repatriation process. 4. (C) On July 19, Nepal's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Joint Secretary Madan Kumar Bhattarai, was reported in the media as saying that the GON was confident that none of the Category II refugees (Bhutanese who allegedly had departed Bhutan voluntarily) would apply for Nepali citizenship. (Note. Category II comprises 70.5 percent of Khundunabari Camp residents. End note.) Bhattarai was quoted as saying that "even if they (the refugees) apply for citizenship, they will not meet the terms and conditions of Nepali citizenship." According to UNHCR Director Abraham Abraham, the GON has not agreed to discuss a local resettlement program for the refugees. (Comment. The GON position could be a calculated attempt to discourage refugees in large numbers from deciding to stay in Nepal under the assumption that they will be able to integrate easily with the local population. End Comment.) 5. (U) Also on July 19, the Druk National Assembly in Bhutan reportedly attacked the JVT's decision to allow any refugees to resettle in Bhutan, stating that the team had "paved the way for the return of anti-nationals (Ngolops) into the country." Members of Bhutan's Parliament also reportedly stated that "taking people from the camps in Nepal will only aggravate the problems in the country." 6. (U) On July 22, two locally published editorials stressed the importance of including the international community in resolving the Bhutanese refugee problem. One specifically suggested that the Government of India should be brought in to facilitate the return of the refugees to Bhutan. On July 23, an editorial written by Dr. S. Chandrasekharan, a former director of the Government of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), cited the need for international organizations to play an active role in the repatriation of the Bhutanese refugees. He suggested that the Government of Bhutan is looking to "create as many difficulties as possible so that these people remain in Nepal." Also on July 23, a self-styled Bhutanese "liberation organization" reportedly issued a statement asking the RGOB to revoke the criminal charges against refugees charged with political crimes and appealing to the international community to exert pressure on the RGOB. 7. (C) In a private conversation on July 22, UNHCR Director Abraham Abraham expressed concern that the RGOB intends to repatriate only Category I refugees (293 people) from the total Khundunabari camp population of 12,000. Moreover, he fears that the RGOB intentionally categorized the majority of residents in Category II as a means to discourage most of the 100,000 refugees in seven camps from repatriating to Bhutan. Already 94 percent of the 12,000 Khundunabari Camp residents have taken issue with the categorization by filing an appeal to the JVT. If Category II residents opt not to return to Bhutan, the RGOB may wash its hands of the affair, claiming that it could do nothing more than provide the refugees with an opportunity to return. Abraham said that the 15th Joint Ministerial taking place in Thimpu on August 11-15 will reveal whether the two sides are planning for a major movement of people or only a small group of refugees. 8. (C) Comment. Greatly increased media coverage and editorial interest in the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal has politicized and internationalized the issue. Many commentators have argued that the RGOB does not intend to repatriate significant numbers of refugees, while the GON has stated that the refugees would not likely receive Nepali citizenship in the event that they decide to settle locally. What this is likely to mean for the refugees is that their status will deteriorate, at least in the eyes of the two governments, from that of refugees to that of stateless persons. Also, the mood in the camps is likely to turn from one of long-suffering aspiration to one of frustration and anger as the hopes raised by the JVT's categorization and verification are dashed. In particular, the large number of idle young people in the camps may become targets for recruitment into the Maoist organization or into militant anti-monarchical organizations of Nepalese Bhutanese. There are signs already that the Maoists are infiltrating the camps through their student wing ANNISU-R (Ref B). The uncertainty surrounding the Bhutanese refugees has made one thing clear: the need to find a solution to the refugee problem is more urgent than ever before. End Comment. MALINOWSKI
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