US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI3416

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
NSC FOR ABRAMS, THEROUX AND KHALILZAD 
DOD FOR OSD/NESA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/22/08 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: CPA Senior Advisor Slocombe Meets UAE Chief of Staff 
 
 
1.(U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.(C) Senior Advisor Walter Slocombe and UAE Chief of Staff 
Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) discussed the current 
situation in Iraq and the workings of the governing council. 
Mr. Slocombe reassured MBZ that the U.S. was committed to 
rebuilding Iraq and to stay for the "long haul."  They discussed 
the role of the UN and the international community in Iraq.  MBZ 
was especially interested in the steps the coalition was taking 
to restore security in Iraq and gave suggestions on how to seek 
out "untainted" officers for the military.  He also raised the 
Iranian threat and discussed how the coalition could deal with 
the threat of Sunni and Shia extremism.  Mr. Slocombe gave an 
interview to Abu Dhabi TV where he had the opportunity to 
explain coalition activities in Iraq and the Iraq Governing 
Council to a wider Arab audience.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE SECURITY SITUATION 
---------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Senior Advisor Slocombe, Ambassador Wahba, and DAS John 
Scott Carpenter met with UAE Chief of Staff Lt. General Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) on July 23 to discuss current 
developments in Iraq and the efforts of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraq Governing Council (GC). 
MBZ was very interested in the current security situation in 
Iraq.  He asked whether the U.S had any evidence of foreign 
participation in the attacks against coalition forces, and if 
so, whether the foreigners had ties to Al-Qaeda.  Mr. Slocombe 
explained that the coalition had no clear evidence of foreign 
involvement in the post-war attacks.  He said that we believed 
that most of the attacks were carried out by either Saddam's old 
security forces or for pay.  He noted that, in a country where a 
good monthly wage was USD $200, people were being paid $1,500 to 
attack coalition troops. 
 
4. (C) They discussed the Iranian threat to Iraqi stability. 
MBZ said that he thought that the Iranians had a long-term and a 
short-term strategy.   In the near term, he said that the 
Iranians would provoke the Sunnis against the coalition 
presence.  Their long-term strategy is to fully infiltrate and 
build closer relations with Iraqi Shia.  He also advised Mr. 
Slocombe that the best way for the coalition to co-opt the Shia 
was to encourage them to think of themselves as Iraqis with 
religious roots in Karbala not in Qom.  He noted that the 
Iranians are working hard to convince the Shia to view the 
Americans as invaders and present themselves as powerful allies 
against the US.  DAS Carpenter noted that Iran was spending a 
lot of money to build up support among the Iraqi Shia, but that 
its money was not buying strong, widespread support. 
 
5. (C) MBZ was interested in the steps that the CPA was taking 
to rebuild security in Iraq.  He was pleased to hear that the 
Iraqis are starting to take a more active role in maintaining 
their own security.  (There are already approximately 35,000 
Iraqi police and plans to hire another 30,000.)  He was also 
impressed by the plan to build three Iraqi divisions in three 
years.  He suggested that it would be useful if the CPA could 
convince Arab states (specifically mentioning Morocco and 
Tunisia i.e. outside of the ME and GCC) to provide military 
forces.  The participation of an Arab state, even in a "quiet 
sector of Iraq" would encourage non-Arab countries to take a 
more positive and active role in stabilizing Iraq. 
 
REBUILDING THE MILITARY 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C) MBZ, in response to a question from Mr. Slocombe, 
suggested how the CPA could find good military officers that 
were not tainted by association with Saddam.  First, he said 
that the coalition should "look to the north" since 70% of the 
officer corps came from the Sunni tribes in the north.  If the 
coalition wanted an officer corps of 30-40% Sunni, he said, it 
needed to look in the area of greatest concentration.  Secondly, 
he recommended that the coalition look for 2-3 good senior 
officers - division or corps commanders or deputies - who had 
been purged by Saddam "a long time ago."  They would be able to 
find good junior and mid-level officers.  MBZ specifically 
suggested that the coalition consider the governor of Mosul, 
Ghanim Bessou who was a respected officer in the Iraqi military 
and would know many others who were purged by Saddam. He told 
Mr. Slocombe that in a recent conversation with him Ghanim spoke 
very highly of the U.S. military forces and the level of 
cooperation he enjoyed with them. 
DEALING WITH RELIGION 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) The group also discussed the impact of religion in Iraq 
and shared concerns about the efforts of religious groups to 
take over the government's role in providing social services and 
to dominate civil society. MBZ noted that it didn't matter how 
balanced the governing council was if the religious extremists 
dominated the society.  He also suggested that the CPA increase 
its outreach efforts to religious leaders, noting that an Imam 
could turn from a "nice guy" to a "Wahabi" overnight if he had a 
reason.  He suggested that the U.S. bring in U.S. Muslim groups 
to reach out to the Iraqi religious community by meeting with 
clerics and attending Friday prayers etc.  He said that, if it 
were him, he would monitor the Friday sermons continuously and 
put the Imams on the payroll of a Muslim organization "I could 
trust."  He noted that if the Imams were well salaried, they 
would be less vulnerable to shifting loyalties.  MBZ then 
suggested that the GC limit the number of new mosques through 
building permits and designate those that could offer the main 
Friday prayer sermons.  Only A-list mosques above a certain size 
should have Friday prayer.  The rest would be open for regular 
prayer.  (Note:  This would obviously facilitate monitoring of 
the Friday sermons and limit large crowds to a designated number 
of mosques. End note.)  He also gave a telling example of how 
the UAE limits numbers and maintains supervision over mosques. 
He said that the UAE was building a new housing complex of 3500 
homes.  When the government looked at the site, it found 46 
sites designated for mosques and worried that there was no way 
to monitor that many mosques in one neighborhood.  The UAEG came 
up with a religiously sanctioned answer by noting the saying 
that "he who walks further to a mosque is more blessed" and 
decreed that there would be a minimum distance of 1000 meters 
between mosques. 
 
MEDIA OUTREACH 
-------------- 
 
8. Mr. Slocombe also gave a brief interview to Abu Dhabi 
television on the situation in Iraq.  Abu Dhabi TV is the second 
most watched Arab television station behind Al-Jazeera.  This 
was an important opportunity to reach out to a larger Arab 
audience with our message on the situation in Iraq and on 
coalition efforts there. 
 
ATTENDEES 
--------- 
 
9.  (C) Other attendees at the meeting included MG Obaid and the 
Director of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research on the UAE side and the Defense Attach  the Chief of 
the US Liaison Office, and Mr. Slocombe's military advisor on 
the U.S. side. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C)  This visit was a very useful opportunity for the CPA to 
discuss policy issues and to describe the situation on the 
ground to a senior UAE official. The UAE leadership is very well 
informed about events in Iraq, through their robust humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance there. While some of his comments 
reflected UAE specific concerns, MBZ's recommendations and ideas 
reflect his strategic thinking on the broader challenges of 
stabilizing Iraq and the region. End Comment 
 
10.  (U) This cable has been cleared by Senior Advisor Slocombe. 
 
WAHBA