US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4583

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH NGO ASAM ARGUES FOR GREATER ROLE FOR 
TURKMEN IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4544 
     B. ANKARA 4550 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) In a July 16 meeting, Umit Ozdag, Director of the 
Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM -- a leading 
Establishment think-tank), offered poloff his take on the 
July 4 incident in Iraq and the way forward in U.S.-Turkey 
relations. 
 
 
2. (C) Ozdag called the July 4 incident, in which U.S. troops 
detained Turkish Special Forces in N. Iraq, "unacceptable," 
echoing a line from the military, President Sezer, and 
opposition CHP.  Ozdag, who admitted he is considering 
standing for election as chairman of the ultranationalist 
MHP, asked, "How can something like this happen between 
allies?"  In a conspiratorial tone, Ozdag argued that he 
found it hard to believe that the decision to detain the 
Turks could have been made by a local U.S. commander. 
Instead, he averred, the operation "must have been 
retaliation against the Turkish military directed by the 
Pentagon." 
 
 
3. (C) Ozdag conceded that the Turkish Special Forces may 
have been pursuing "independent activities" in Iraq, which, 
he said, is a clear indication that the Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) does not fully trust the U.S. to protect Turkey's 
interests in the region.  He claimed that USG policy toward 
the Turkmen had raised alarm bells in TGS -- even more than 
the PKK/KADEK issue.  As evidence, Ozdag pointed to the 
absence of a senior Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) official on the 
Iraqi Governing Council.  He also referred to the MOU text 
negotiated before March 1, which mentioned "Assyrians and 
Nestorians" as constituent groups in Iraq.  The inclusion of 
these much smaller groups had left the impression among some 
government and military officials that the USG intended to 
shove the Turkmen aside, he said. 
 
 
4. (C) In order to overcome the lack of trust, Ozdag argued 
that "before anything else, the U.S. needs to apologize" for 
July 4.  "The U.S. should make a gesture to the Turkmen," 
Ozdag added without elaborating.  Explaining Turkish policy 
on Iraqi Turkmen, Ozdag referred to an academic study of Iraq 
published in the late 1950s, in which the population of 
Kirkuk is described as "mostly Turkmen."  This, he claimed, 
suggests that the population of Turkmen in Iraq could be as 
high as 3 million, while "there are only 4 million or so 
Kurds."  An accurate census in Iraq would confirm these 
numbers and underscore the central role Turkmen should play 
in administering the country. 
 
 
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Comment 
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5. (C) The nominally "independent" ASAM in fact has long had 
ties -- financial and other -- to the Turkish military and 
bureaucracy, including widespread reports of direct funding 
from TGS (ref A).  Consequently, over the years Embassy has 
often sought ASAM's view as a reliable indicator of 
Establishment thinking on a wide variety of issues.  In this 
context several points are worth clarifying.  First, 
throughout the meeting, Ozdag referred to himself as a 
"Eurasianist" ("Avrasyaciyim") -- a code word often used to 
indicate a perceived need to re-orient Turkish foreign policy 
toward Central Asia and Russia, a position Ozdag shares with 
some military hard-liners including NSC SecGen Gen. Kilinc 
(ref B and previous).  Second, Ozdag is considering running 
for leadership in MHP, a party known for its strong interest 
in "Eurasia."  MHP is also assiduously trying acquire a more 
sophisticated gloss (partly by seeking out people like 
Ozdag), and is promoting the question of the Iraqi Turkmen as 
a wedge issue between the U.S. and Turkey in a bid to 
position itself as the TGS' potential best political friend 
and alternative to the ruling AK Party.  Finally, we note 
Ozdag's insistence that the "independent activities" of 
Turkish Special Forces occurred in a wider framework of 
alleged TGS distrust of the USG, and thus that the July 4 
incident reflected an anti-Turkish plot from the highest 
levels in the Pentagon.  We suspect this perspective owes a 
great deal to the mirror-imaging often misapplied by Turks 
when looking at the USG. 
PEARSON