US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4552

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 004552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH FONMIN GUL'S JULY 24 VISIT 
TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
REF: 02 ANKARA 6339 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson.  Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  F.M. Gul comes to Washington as we try to 
pull Turkey into a more fully helpful role in Iraq.  The last 
year has shaken the confidence of the Turkish public, 
politicians, and military in the strength of the relationship 
with the U.S., just as it has shaken our confidence in the 
Turks.  While we have been able to manage the issue of the 
July 4 incident, it is likely to fester for a long time in 
the minds of many Turks as a humiliation to the military, and 
could thus continue to affect U.S.-Turkey security 
cooperation broadly.  In part, our problems come from 
divergent views on Iraq, particularly the security threat 
from various possible development in northern Iraq.  However, 
in large part they are also a function of Turkish domestic 
politics.  The ruling AK Party is seen as a threat to the 
existing order of Turkey that the military and much of the 
Establishment is trying to defend -- and the military is seen 
as a barrier to the changes AK and others would like to make 
in Turkey.  The relationship with the U.S., the reforms 
needed for the EU and even the range of Iraq issues have been 
approached, frequently, by both sides in the context of the 
relationship between the military/traditional Establishment 
and AK, rather than on their merits.  In reacting to the July 
4 incident, P.M. Erdogan and Gul maintained a measured 
approach, while the TGS, under pressure from military 
hard-liners, refused any responsibility and stirred national 
outrage.  The implications of the internal political dynamic 
for the wider issue of GOT Iraq policy are considerable. 
Civilian authorities would like to complete a transformation 
of Iraq policy away from the historic northern-Iraq centered 
obsession and fear of a Kurdish state -- a change in focus 
that stems in part from efforts by the MFA and other civilian 
authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's Iraq policy from 
the Turkish military.  Following on the July 18th visits of 
CMDRUSEUCOM and CMDRUSCENTOCM, we have cooperative 
perspectives for Iraq stabilization force, terror action, and 
greater transparency and liaison before us.  This visit needs 
to reinforce the direction, but we cannot press hard on the 
stabilization force contribution at the risk of being 
counterproductive.  It will also be important to present 
positive and operational response to Turkey's offers of 
civilian humanitarian assistance.  End summary. 
 
 
-------------------- 
The Domestic Context 
-------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Gul, Erdogan, and the rest of the AK leadership have 
maintained a measured approach to the incident in Iraq in 
order to protect our bilateral relationship and to press its 
proposed reform package to loosen the TGS's grip on Turkish 
policy.  However, to keep their political opponents off 
balance, they have publicly been supportive of the military. 
The hard-liners saw the event as a way to resist AK's effort 
and weaken its standing by attacking it as an American 
"supporter."  Thus, the AK stance contrasts starkly with the 
reaction from the military, President Sezer, and opposition 
CHP, all of whom have used the press to castigate both AK for 
being "too soft" and the U.S. for its actions.  After the 
release of the joint statement the Turkish press focused on 
the absence of an apology. 
 
 
3. (C) U.S.-Turkey tensions fit into a complex competition 
between AK and the military. They portray themselves as 
having opposed visions of Turkey's future.  Within each group 
there are tensions too.  There are increasing signs of 
discontent among hard-liners in the senior military 
leadership, who are trying to force TGS chief Ozkok into a 
more confrontational stance toward the USG as a way to rally 
nationalism and counter AK.  The difference between the AK 
Government and the Establishment on this front highlights a 
basic gap in Turkey between those -- led in the first 
instance by the military hawks -- who support an order linked 
to a rigid, statist-oriented view of what Ataturk wanted for 
the Republic of Turkey, and those who say they want a more 
open, EU candidacy-linked, conservative Turkey, with greater 
opportunity for Islamic influences, to prevail.  In this 
political competition there are also question marks regarding 
AK's: 1) ultimate social, political, and economic intentions 
domestically; and 2) its ability to run a competent 
government and willingness to respond to U.S. interests.  The 
domestic competition is often more important to the TGS or AK 
than the issues being addressed, and many U.S.-Turkey 
questions are dealt with as fodder as much as on their 
merits. 
 
 
---------------- 
Turkish Military 
---------------- 
 
 
4. (S) Contacts in the MFA, press, and among national 
security analysts think the Turkish military misjudged 
Turkey's equities in Iraq after the end of operations and 
that TGS's efforts to use the Turkmen issue as a wedge 
against U.S. policy was a mistake.  TGS D/CHOD Buyukanit, 
regarded as one of the senior officers pushing a harder line 
against the US during the Iraq war, also admitted that the 
Turkish military had misplayed its hand on Iraq.  While 
arguing that both sides had made mistakes and defending 
(without great conviction) TGS's attempts to persuade the 
Parliament to pass the March 1 troop deployment resolution, 
Buyukanit had said -- before the July 4 incident -- that TGS 
was ready to move forward with the U.S.  TGS supported the 
recent Cabinet decree to allow the U.S. and other coalition 
partners to use Turkish bases and ports for operations 
consistent with UNSCR 1483, including a positive response in 
principle to EUCOM's request to station up to 10 tankers and 
1 ISR aircraft at Incirlik in support of OEF and OIF 
operations (EUCOM is in the process of reviewing TGS's 
operating guidelines for the deployment and stationing of the 
aircraft, but we are taking a slow approach in the wake of 
the detention of TSF in Iraq). 
 
 
5. (C) TGS asserts privately and publicly that it supports 
Turkey's EU candidacy and wants to adopt stances on important 
issues (i.e. non-military approach to PKK/KADEK) that would 
help Turkey vis-a-vis the EU.  However, top military officers 
also have recently publicly criticized the EU and taken 
measures to delay EU-related reforms.  Many continue to 
believe that TGS was behind President Sezer's recent decision 
to veto an article of the GOT's 6th EU-related reform package 
and that the Turkish military will continue to resist all 
efforts by AK to lessen the military's control over what it 
considers to be its sacred role in protecting Turkey's 
"secular" status and national security interests. 
 
 
6. (S) On the TGS horizon is the August Supreme Military 
Council (YAS).  Among the four-star ranks, both the Navy and 
Air Force commanders retire this year, as will the commanders 
of the First and Third Turkish Armies, and the National 
Security Council Secretary General.  The YAS could allow 
Ozkok, who is beginning the second year of his four-year tour 
as Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the first real 
opportunity to shape his own leadership team.  Last year, 
contrary to tradition, the outgoing chief made all the 
general officer assignment and promotion selections.  Ozkok, 
however, may be constrained by the hard-liners and other 
traditionalists with whom he is contending on a number of 
issues. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Iraq: Signs of a Shift In Policy 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
7. (S) The detention of TSF by the U.S. military in northern 
Iraq on July 4 has raised suspicions on both sides of the 
other's intentions.  CDR EUCOM Gen. Jones reiterated our 
concerns to Ozkok July 18; while Ozkok stuck to the TGS 
position on the issue, he added that he would punish any 
"lack of discipline" he found among the TSF elements 
involved; he added that visible cooperation was the best way 
to move ahead.  While letting Gul know we want the matter 
behind us, we should reiterate to him that U.S. forces had 
solid information and found concrete evidence.  We should 
also press for an outcome of the Iraq discussion which 
underscores that the U.S. and Turkey are jointly focused on 
Iraq's recovery and democratization country-wide. 
 
 
8. (S) Turkey's civilian authorities would like to complete a 
transformation of Iraq policy away from the historic 
northern-Iraq centered obsession with border security, fear 
of a Kurdish state, and Turkish military presence towards a 
more Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on trade and 
assistance.  This change in focus, to the extent it has been 
realized, appears to stem in part from efforts by the MFA and 
other civilian authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's 
Iraq policy from the Turkish military.  During a recent 
one-on-one with the Ambassador, MFA U/S Ziyal said he had 
asked P.M. Erdogan after the end of combat operations in Iraq 
to transfer authority over the issue of northern Iraq (and 
Iraq) from the TGS to the MFA. 
 
 
9. (SBU) The Turks have taken a number of concrete steps in 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction since the 
Secretary's April visit to Turkey. Turkey has become a hub 
 
SIPDIS 
for facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance to 
northern Iraq.  The World Food Program has shipped 341,000 
tons of food through Turkey since March.  Turkey is also the 
world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP.  Turkey 
recently allowed an energy barter arrangement organized by 
Delta Petroleum to go forward.  This will enable coalition 
authorities to supply essential energy supplies to the Iraqi 
people.  Indeed, Turkey has an opportunity to build strong 
trade links with Iraq.  During his Washington meetings in 
June, MFA U/S Ziyal raised Turkey's interest in building a 
second border crossing to relieve the burden on the Habur 
Gate (now handling some 2000 vehicles daily).  Bottlenecks in 
processing vehicles continue on both sides of the border, 
with the KDP continuing to charge some (including UN) 
vehicles fees and the GOT carefully scrutinizing incoming 
trucks to limit fuel smuggling.  The Turks have applied to 
reestablish THY commercial air links with Iraq when that 
becomes feasible.  We hope that the visit will allow us to 
begin to operationalize further civilian reconstruction 
cooperation as offered by Ziyal that CPA views favorably. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Relations with Iraqi Kurds 
-------------------------- 
 
 
10. (C) The MFA has portrayed the mid-May visit to Iraq by a 
three-person MFA delegation as improving Turkish-Kurdish 
relations.  The Turkish delegation found both KDP leader 
Barzani and PUK leader Talabani willing to take concrete 
steps to improve relations.  The MFA delegation proposed a 
number of confidence-building measures designed to improve 
relations, including: (1) more equitable and transparent 
duties charged to Turkish businesses crossing the border; (2) 
softening of rhetoric between Kurdish and Turkmen groups in 
Iraq; (3) establishment of Turkish-Kurdish joint ventures in 
the north; and (4) establishment of "one-stop shopping" in 
key northern Iraqi cities for Turkish business groups. 
Barzani reportedly committed in principle to taking steps to 
improve Kurdish-Turkmen relations, but said he could not 
"change course overnight."  He said the KDP would explore 
taking incremental steps toward improving relations, and said 
that that much would depend on the actions of the Turkmen. 
The KDP and PUK leaders also reportedly heeded Turkey's 
request to refrain from calling for the end of the Peace 
Monitoring Force and the withdrawal of the Turkish 
participating troops at least until the end of the year to 
give the Turkish military time to "feel more comfortable" 
with the overall security situation on the ground in Iraq. 
 
 
11. (C) The GOT remains concerned about what it perceives to 
be undue Kurdish influence on coalition authorities in 
northern Iraq.  They have strongly objected to coalition 
plans to disarm all groups except the Kurds, which they 
believe gives the Kurds too much power over the other ethnic 
groups, particularly the Turkmen. 
 
 
--------------- 
Turkmen in Iraq 
--------------- 
 
 
12. (C) While the GOT remains concerned about the fate of 
Turkmen, the frequency and tone of Turkish "complaints" of 
mistreatment of the Turkmen by other Iraqi groups have 
declined significantly.  GOT officials appear to have made a 
conscious decision to change the way they talk about the 
Turkmen.  The nearly daily reports of Kurdish efforts to 
marginalize Turkmen have been replaced by statements about 
the importance of ensuring proportionate representation for 
all Iraqi groups in local and central decision-making bodies. 
 The MFA regularly talks about the need for the Iraqi Turkmen 
Front to become a real political party, to not be seen as a 
tool of Ankara, and to integrate itself into the political 
process in Iraq.  The GOT continues to look to the U.S. to 
help ensure proper Turkmen representation on key leadership 
councils in the north as well as in the IIA. 
 
 
--------- 
PKK/KADEK 
--------- 
 
 
13. (S) The Turks remain interested in working with us on 
collaborative planning to address the PKK/KADEK presence in 
the north; TGS Chief Ozkok reiterated this July 18 to CDR 
CENTCOM Gen. Abizaid.  Nevertheless, recent developments 
might complicate the modalities of such cooperation.  The 
GOT's draft law to reintegrate PKK/KADEK militants and their 
leadership in exchange for a PKK/KADEK agreement to lay down 
their arms and return to Turkey appears now to have been 
watered down owing to resistance from parts of the military 
and the traditionally hard-line civilian staff of the Turkish 
NSC.  In the wake of widespread press speculation -- fomented 
in the first instance by a well-known conduit for hard-line 
military views -- the MFA has expressed concern to us about 
Iraq Governing Council member Mahmoud Othman's alleged 
PKK/KADEK ties.  It is likely that Gul will raise this with 
the Secretary.  We have not uncovered any information 
suggesting his support for PKK/KADEK and have told the GOT to 
share the evidence. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Stabilization Force for Iraq 
---------------------------- 
 
 
14. (C) TGS Chief Ozkok and MFA U/S Ziyal told CDR CENTCOM 
Gen. Abiziad and Gen Jones July 18 that they welcomed the 
chance to begin thinking in earnest about the modalities of a 
Turkish contribution to the Stabilization Force -- in Ozkok's 
view, preferably under NATO auspices -- but warned that 
public opinion and politics could make approval difficult. 
Given the sennsitivities involved, we should avoid creating 
the impression with Gul that we are pushing too aggressively 
on this front.  Rather, we need to let the planning process 
move forward towards the right answer from the Turks. 
 
 
------------------- 
Middle East Roadmap 
------------------- 
 
 
15. (C) The GOT wants to use its excellent relations with 
Israelis and the Palestinians as a vehicle for its larger 
ambitions in the region.  P.M. Erdogan told President Bush 
May 14 he would send F.M. Gul to Israel and Palestine "soon;" 
we understand from an AK party deputy chairman that a Gul 
visit is now more front and center given AK's recognition of 
the importance of such a visit for Turkey's relations with 
the U.S.  TGS CHOD General Ozkok went to Tel Aviv July 3 and 
Israeli President Katzav visited Turkey July 8-9.  Israeli 
F.M. and DefMin have been to Ankara in the last two months as 
well.  An MFA official also has told us the idea of 
supporting Abu Mazen at the expense of Arafat "poses certain 
problems for the AK party and P.M. Erdogan."  We have had 
similar intimations from AK M.P.s.  During his meetings in 
Washington, Gul expects to hear the current status of play 
and Administration views of how Turkey can best contribute. 
 
 
---------- 
Syria/Iran 
---------- 
 
 
16. (C) The Turks remain disturbed by what they see as unfair 
criticism from Washington that they are "soft" on Syria and 
Iran.  GOT officials have argued that Washington's perception 
that Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran was inconsistent 
with USG policy were "totally unfounded" and denied that 
Turkey was pursuing a strategic partnership with either 
country.  The GOT argues that Turkey shares the same values 
and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. (stability, 
democracy and prosperity), and Gul delivered a call for 
democracy and reform in the Islamic world at the June OIC 
Summit in Tehran.  MFA has gone so far as to argue that the 
U.S. message on Syria that we conveyed to FM Gul prior to his 
May visit to Syria was "softer" than the message Gul 
delivered.  Turkey shares our concern about Iranian support 
for terrorists (including the PKK/KADEK) and WMD programs). 
If the GOT's perception is accurate and Washington does 
believe that Turkey is "soft" on Syria and Iran, we recommend 
that the Department make clear what Turkish actions have led 
to this conclusion and what Turkey needs to do to prove that 
it shares U.S. concerns and objectives regarding Syria and 
Iran.  Turkey should be cautioned that Iranian 
destabilization tactics in the region will be met with equal 
and appropriate countermeasures and the USG expects its full 
support should events come to this.  On this latter point, 
however, we can expect Gul, who sees Iran as a much tougher 
nut to crack than Iraq, to be ultra-cautious about endorsing 
active measures against Iran. 
 
 
17. (C) IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei's findings as a result 
of his latest visit to Tehran to discuss the capabilities of 
the recently tested Iranian surface-to-surface Shahab-3 
ballistic missiles is a potential source of worry for both 
the GOT and the US. Turkey shares the USG's concerns 
regarding Iran's nuclear program, and has fully supported the 
USG in its call for total Iranian compliance with IAEA's 
inspection process and safeguard requirements.  Nevertheless, 
Turkey exhibits a preference for appearing to cooperate with 
Iran while, at the same time, seeking to hide behind USG 
cover to constrain Iran's nuclear capabilities.  It will be 
important to remind Turkey of the necessity to present a 
public, unified stance regarding Iranian nuclear 
capabilities. 
 
 
------ 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
 
18. (C) Although the AK government has retreated from its 
much more forward-leaning initial approach in the face of 
concerted political pressure from the military, presidency, 
MFA bureaucracy, and "TRNC President" ReDenktash, senior AK 
officials tell us this was a tactical retreat and Erdogan 
intends to solve the problem before Cyprus's entry into the 
EU May 1, 2004.  AK owes Denktas nothing politically, and we 
understand that the GOT is willing to use the Annan III Plan 
as the basis for renewed negotiations, but wants adjustments 
on land and the numbers involved in population shifts between 
the two sides.  It would be useful to emphasize to Gul the 
benefits to U.S.-Turkish relations from GOT acceleration of 
the negotiations and a settlement. 
 
 
------- 
Armenia 
------- 
 
 
19. (C) The AK government is much less wedded to Aliyev and 
tying improvement of relations with Armenia to a settlement 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, but remains under sniper fire from 
entrenched anti-Armenian interests.  AK officials tell us 
they recognize the trade and development benefits to Turkey 
from opening the border.  We understand there may be secret 
F.M.-level contacts continuing at this time.  However, AK 
officials have made it clear that passage of any Armenian 
genocide language, even by only one chamber of Congress, will 
set progress back significantly. 
 
 
------------ 
EU Candidacy 
------------ 
 
 
20. (C) Since coming to power in the November elections, the 
ruling AK Party has made EU membership a top priority.  The 
GOT in January adopted two EU-related legislative reform 
packages designed to crack down on torture and remove 
barriers to free expression, association, and fair trial. 
Parliament adopted another package June 19, the sixth package 
in the past two years, and the GOT plans to pass a seventh 
package before a parliamentary recess in August.  Our 
contacts have confirmed press reports that the seventh 
package will be focused on limiting the military's political 
influence, including measures that will change the structure 
of the National Security Council.  However, the pro-EU, 
pro-reform AK government faces opposition from nationalistic 
opponents in the bureaucracy and parts of the military.  In 
several instances, bureaucratic institutions have undermined 
reform legislation by developing highly restrictive 
implementing regulations.  For example, Parliament lifted 
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the 
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict 
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned 
media outlets.  In addition, our European contacts say that 
while the GOT has made impressive legal reforms, Turkey's 
standing in the EU has also been undermined by recent actions 
such as the closing of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party and 
indictment of its sister party, DEHAP, and the recent police 
raid of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices. 
 
 
------------- 
Child Custody 
------------- 
 
 
21. (C) The Hague Convention on Child Abduction requires the 
expeditious return of a child to its country of residence so 
the courts in that country can decide on custody.  Turkey has 
been a signatory to the Hague Convention since August 2000. 
During that period of time, we are unaware of any children 
being returned to any country without the agreement of the 
abducting parent.  There are systemic problems:  1) Court 
meets for 10 minutes monthly and does not focus on Hague 
issues;  2) judges do not understand the Hague Convention 
requirment and rule on custody rather than Hague issues, 
thereby requiring a lengthy appeal process; 3) the legal 
process lasts between 2-3 years total; and 4) the Ministry of 
Interior does not focus resources on finding the abducted 
child and the parent.  The US currently has four applications 
pending for return of a child to the US.  In one case the 
child has now been in Turkey over a year due to the slow 
court process and the judge used that delay to rule the child 
should stay in Turkey.  In another case, the Government of 
Turkey has been unable to locate a child abducted to Turkey 
in October 2002.  Due to physical abuse by the abducting 
father, the Turkish court ordered the child returned to the 
mother immediately.  The Interior Ministry places a low 
priority on these types of cases and has been unable to 
locate the child. 
 
 
----------------- 
Human Trafficking 
----------------- 
 
 
23. (C) We have discussed with the GOT at various levels the 
need to show progress on Trafficking in Persons (TIP) by 
September in order to avoid facing sanctions as a consequence 
of Turkey's Tier III ranking in the TIP report.  GOT 
officials have been highly defensive on the issue, insisting 
that the report is unfair and that they are already taking 
adequate measures. 
 
 
---------- 
Article 98 
---------- 
 
 
24. (C) GOT contacts have repeatedly maintained that, in 
principle, they share our concerns about the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and favor reaching an Article 98 
agreement with us.  However, given their status as an EU 
candidate country, they believe it is not in their interest 
to sign an agreement until the U.S. and EU resolve their 
differences on the issue. 
 
 
----------- 
The Economy 
----------- 
 
 
25. (SBU) The economy is sending mixed signals.  On the one 
hand, there are solid signs of growth and declining 
inflation.  On the other hand, after having rallied strongly 
in the aftermath of the Iraq operation, particularly once the 
USG announced it would provide $1 billion in financial 
assistance, markets have stalled due to the lack of investor 
confidence in the government's commitment to reform.  Markets 
are particularly concerned about continuing delays in the 
Government's implementation of its IMF-backed reform program. 
 As a result, interest rates on the extremely large 
government debt remain high, and the economy remains 
vulnerable to a sharp depreciation of the currency, which 
would put the entire program and economic stability at risk. 
We need to stress the importance of Turkey flawlessly 
implementing its commitments under the IMF-backed program (to 
the IMF).  Disbursement of USD 1 billion in U.S. assistance 
-- which Gul might raise -- is contingent on continued 
implementation of the IMF program. 
 
 
26. (SBU) In June, MFA U/S Ziyal and U/S Larson agreed to 
convene a fall meeting of the Economic Partnership Commission 
(EPC), which was established in early 2002 to find ways to 
enhance the bilateral economic relationship.  The meeting 
will be an opportunity to press a broad economic agenda 
including structural reform, reduction of trade barriers 
improving the investment climate, and enhancing regional 
economic cooperation. 
PEARSON