US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4550

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: MFA DISCUSSES ARMENIA, CAUCASUS ISSUES 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason:1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  MFA officials have provided us with the 
latest GOT thinking on developments regarding Armenia and the 
Caucasus, including efforts to reach out to the Armenian 
Diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere, and heightened attention 
to the strategic situation in the Caucasus region in the wake 
of the Iraq war.  End summary. 
 
 
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Diaspora, NK 
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2. (C) Ecvet Tezcan, DG for Intelligence and Research, told 
us following his recent visits with the Armenian Diaspora 
that he is trying to put together a package that combines 
improving access to Armenian religious sites in Turkey with 
improved Turkish-Armenian state relations as a way to move 
past the "genocide" issue.  On the Diaspora issue, Tezcan 
said that the GOT is exploring identifying the Armenian 
religious sites at Ani and Akdamar Island in Lake Van as 
World Patrimony, conducting restoration work and promoting a 
visit to these sites by leading Armenian Patriarchs.  During 
such a visit Turkish authorities would be prepared to express 
sorrow at the tragedy of 1915-1918 events.  The opening of 
the sites would be accompanied by establishment of reciprocal 
academic institutes -- for Armenian and Turkish scholars in 
Yerevan to access relevant archives and study the events to 
provide greater historical perspective. 
 
 
3. (C) On the state side Tezcan suggested that he believed 
the Diaspora could support a package of measures yielding 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement if delivered from 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK).  He suggested Armenia could recognize 
the existing border indirectly, either by confirming 
pre-existing treaties or accepting the OSCE resolution on the 
inviolability of Soviet borders.  The Armenians might also 
withdraw from a limited number of occupied areas whole 
keeping others linked to the NK dispute.  In exchange Turkey 
would be able to open the Armenian border and pursue further 
rapprochement, without linkage to NK.  Tezcan suggested he 
had found significant support for this approach in the 
Diaspora as he portrayed an opening with Turkey as the only 
way to avoid further deterioration in Armenia and greater 
dependence on Russia. 
 
 
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Strategic Considerations 
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4. (C) In a July 16 meeting MFA Caucasus DDG Ertan Tezgor 
related to A/POL that discussions with Armenian officials at 
and since the Madrid Summit have focused on a package of 
issues aimed at normalizing GOT-GOA relations, including: 1) 
efforts to elicit Armenian acceptance of Turkish territorial 
integrity and existing borders; 2) the matter of "Armenian 
genocide" and the Diaspora; and 3) resolution of the NK 
conflict -- with Tezgor asserting that, in the GOT view, an 
NK settlement, while important, is "no longer a precondition" 
for improving bilateral ties.  According to Tezgor, Armenian 
F.M. Ozkanian is pleased with the fact that NK is not, 
strictly speaking, a quid pro quo, adding that while the 
Turks expect continuing good faith efforts to solve the 
problem, the change in attitude paves the way for progress on 
the other fronts.  A solution to NK, Tezgor said, is "crucial 
for the Armenians"; Yerevan has its own domestic political 
and other reasons to press ahead.  The problem is that GOA 
policy making is dominated by ethnic NKers, who look to 
Russia for support.  Ozkanian, meanwhile, is trying to make 
sure that Armenia's ties to the West are not undercut. 
 
 
5. (C) Tezgor went on at length about the Russians, who he 
said in the aftermath of the Iraq war are increasingly 
exhibiting a "Czarist mentality."  Moscow is seeking to 
exploit a power and interest vacuum caused in part by the 
diversion of USG attention elsewhere.  The Iranians are also 
increasingly active, for similar reasons.  Tezgor admonished 
that the USG and Turkey "should work together" against these 
challenges.  He elaborated that Russia in particular is 
trying to drag Turkey into diplomatic initiatives, along with 
Iran, that are designed in part to undercut USG influence. 
 
 
6. (C) A/Pol queried whether, given the MFA's careful 
attention to domestic political developments on this front in 
Armenia, Russia and even the USG, Tezgor could provide a 
similar analysis about the lay of the land in Ankara.  This 
would be helpful, given that we have heard public comments on 
occasion from officials who take a far more benign view of 
Russia and others in the region -- notably Gen. Tuncer 
Kilinc, current SecGen of the powerful Turkish NSC.  Tezgor 
acknowledged that there are different views and considerable 
sensitivities in Ankara, but that his view, not Kilinc's, is 
the dominant one.  That said, Tezgor also asserted that 
tensions in USG-GOT mil-mil relations since the Iraq war -- 
and particularly since the July 4 incident involving the 
brief detention of Turkish soldiers by U.S. forces in 
Suleimaniyah -- have created opportunities for "mischief" 
(yaramazlik) in the Caucasus and elsewhere by casting a 
shadow over the bilateral military relationship. 
 
 
7. (C) Tezgor noted that he would be traveling to the 
Caucasus on July 20, and will be in Yerevan at the Yerevan 
hotel July 21-22.  He would be more than happy to discuss the 
issues with Ambassador Ordway if the opportunity presents 
itself, he noted. 
PEARSON