US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1239

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NIGERIA: GON THINKS SAO TOMEAN COUP LEADERS WILL NEGOTIATE

Identifier: 03ABUJA1239
Wikileaks: View 03ABUJA1239 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2003-07-19 11:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MASS MOPS PINS EPET PGOV TP NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MOPS, PINS, EPET, PGOV, TP, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: GON THINKS SAO TOMEAN COUP LEADERS WILL 
NEGOTIATE 
 
REF: ABUJA 1230 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (C) MFA Permanent Secretary, Ambassador Daniel Hart and 
Nigerian Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe Saidu Pindar 
discussed the Sao Tomean coup with A/DCM Brian Browne on 
July 18.  Hart and Pindar stated that the proximate cause 
of the putsch was sustained frustration over de Menezes' 
foot dragging in paying these soldiers, many of whom were 
tough and battle-tested after having served in Angola as 
mercenaries in the employ of the infamous Executive 
Outcomes outfit.  However, due to the discreet 
encouragement and intrigue of some opposition political 
figures, their limited agenda quickly expanded to encompass 
political demands. 
 
 
2.  (C) Hart explained that the coup leaders called 
themselves the "Buffalo soldiers," the collective nom de 
guerre earned as mercenaries in Angola.  At first, the coup 
leaders claimed their sole reason for the take-over was to 
recompense their back pay.  Apparently, President de 
Menezes had stalled and broken promises to these soldiers 
for quite some time.  Because the amount owed was a 
relatively modest USD 70,000, Nigeria first offered to make 
the payment.  However, by that time, demands had encroached 
into the political realm.  Members of the political 
opposition had gotten in contact with and transformed the 
agenda of the coup leaders. 
 
 
3.  (C) Hart stated that many politicians were unhappy with 
de Menezes and the public was apathetic.  The President did 
not command strong loyalty.  De Menezes had failed to 
implement the proposal of a constitutional review committee 
because the recommendation called for a significant 
reapportionment of power from the President to the Prime 
Minister.  This recalcitrance had estranged de Menezes from 
much of the political class, Pindar asserted.  Moreover, 
many politicians were dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
2002 parliamentary elections.  These politicians have been 
angling for new elections, and many saw the coup as an 
opening to achieve this aim.  Pindar added that the 
political opposition is probably divided.  While none of 
the opposition likes de Menezes, some do not want to broach 
the subject of new elections because they are already in 
parliament.  Thus, the opposition is divided on the role de 
Menezes should play.  Some favored holding elections for 
both Parliament and President, some for only Parliament and 
still others would be satisfied with no election provided 
Menezes honored the constitutional review committee's 
recommendation.  Hart said rumors of Sao Tomean troops 
threatening the Nigerian Embassy were false.  The coup 
leaders assured the GON that the soldiers had been posted 
to protect the Embassy.  More importantly, the coupists had 
signaled their desire for Nigeria to be involved in 
breaking the impasse.  Pindar added that the community of 
Lusophone nations might also send envoys to Sao Tome. 
 
 
4.  (C) In any event, the coup leaders have shown 
flexibility.  They had heard the widespread condemnation of 
their action and realized they were surely against the tide 
of African and international opinion, asserted Pindar. 
They stated that de Menezes could return home to negotiate 
with them and without fear for his personal security. 
However, he would not be immediately returned to office and 
would not, in their eyes, be negotiating as a sitting Head 
of State.  They are adamant that the status quo ante is 
untenable.  At the very least, de Menezes must implement 
the constitutional changes for them to acquiesce in his 
return to power, Pindar stated. 
 
 
5.  (C) Hart emphasized that the GON was exclusively 
focused on a negotiated solution, but he also stressed the 
importance of achieving one quickly.  The longer it takes, 
the greater the likelihood that the coup leaders will grow 
too accustomed to their new positions and the less willing 
they will be to relinquish power.  He said Nigeria was 
considering sending a delegation headed by Ambassador 
Pindar to Sao Tome and Principe to join Ambassador 
Moorefield and their Portuguese counterpart in talking to 
the coup leaders. 
JETER 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04