US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1356

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NEPAL: MAOIST WARNING AGAINST US-AFFILIATED PROGRAMS

Identifier: 03KATHMANDU1356
Wikileaks: View 03KATHMANDU1356 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2003-07-18 09:12:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PTER EAID PREL CASC NP U
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA, PM/SA, INR 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/ANE, NSC FOR MILLARD, LONDON FOR 
POL/GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013 
TAGS: PTER, EAID, PREL, CASC, NP, U.S-Nepali Relations, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST WARNING AGAINST US-AFFILIATED 
PROGRAMS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The Maoists in Nepal reportedly have issued 
a notice that all Nepali nationals affiliated with the United 
States in Maoist-controlled areas would be subject to 
harassment and travel restrictions.  Reports from many west 
and mid-west districts have indicated that the Maoists' edict 
has been widely disseminated, and anectodal evidence suggests 
that the Maoists have increased travel restrictions on Nepali 
aid workers.  In the western District of Kalikot, a foreign 
development worker was detained by the Maoists for 
questioning, but later released.  U.S.-affiliated 
organizations operating in affected areas have not reported a 
change in treatment by the Maoists.  Despite the Maoist 
edict, ongoing development programs in remote areas may not 
encounter difficulty with the Maoists due to already 
established relationships with local Maoist leaders.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) On July 15, Post received a letter from the Royal 
Nepal Army's Department of Military Intelligence indicating 
that Maoists had issued "a notice stating that all personnel 
who are working for or in any way related with the United 
States of America are to undergo public prosecution and are 
to be denied entry into the villages."  After questioning the 
RNA on this matter, Post learned that the Maoists issued the 
communique in writing two months ago.  It reportedly aimed at 
Nepali nationals -- not Americans -- working in the 
hinterlands, not the Kathmandu Valley. 
 
3. (C) On July 17, PolOff attended the World Food Program's 
quarterly meeting reporting on the food security situation. 
The WFP employs field officers in 30 heavily Maoist-affected 
districts in Nepal.  According to WFP field reports, tensions 
between the Maoists and Royal Nepal Army increased greatly in 
June.  In response, the Maoists have tightened travel 
restrictions in many west and mid-western districts.  In the 
mid-western districts of Jumla, Kalikot, Humla and Mugu the 
Maoists have reimposed pass systems for movement; if the 
local Maoist leader does not approve a person's reason for 
travel, that person is not allowed to leave the village, 
reported WFP field officers.  In Humla, the pass system 
reportedly was implemented as a response to the establishment 
of army medical camps in the district.  In Jumla, the system 
was established because of clashes between the RNA and 
Maoists. 
 
4. (C) In line with previous Embassy reporting, Maoist 
extortion activities continued to increase in all 30 of the 
districts in which WFP has programs.  In Rasuwa and Nuwakot, 
two districts north of Kathmandu, for example, Maoists 
reportedly have doubled the amount of "donations" they 
demand.  And in Jumla, Mugu and Rukum Districts, Maoists will 
not allow any new development activity to be introduced 
without their prior permission.  In the far-western district 
of Bajura, local Maoists have started collecting funds from 
government staff as well as from school teachers. 
 
5. (S/NF) Both WFP field officers and other NGO attendees at 
the briefing said that Maoists in all 30 WFP districts 
recently had made it known that any development program 
associated with the U.S. Government would not be allowed to 
operate in these districts.  The week of June 24, a dual 
American and New Zealand citizen working for a WFP 
implementing partner, was detained by the Maoists in the 
mid-western district of Kalikot and questioned in detail 
about his citizenship.  The detainee said he felt threatened 
by the Maoists, but was able to convince them that he was not 
a U.S. citizen, after which he was released.  He also 
informed PolOff of rumors prevalent in the Maoist-affected 
areas that the Maoists intend to break the cease-fire not 
because of actions taken by the Government of Nepal, but 
because of U.S. and Indian "interferference" in the peace 
negotiations. 
 
6. (C) In a July 17 Embassy security briefing for USAID 
implementing partners, several U.S. - affiliated programs 
suggested that despite increased tension in certain areas and 
a high level of Maoist activity, they had encountered no 
signficant difficulties in continuing on-going programs in 
Maoist-affected areas.  For example, a Johns Hopkins 
University-affiliated family nutrition program run by an 
American in Sarlahi District has been able to continue to 
care for newborns in areas administered solely by Maoist 
insurgents.  All participants of the briefing were encouraged 
to contact program colleagues and related partners to share 
information on the recent Maoist notification. 
 
7. (C) Comment.  RNA reports that the Maoists intend to 
"prosecute" and restrict the travel of individuals associated 
with the United States are supported by anectodal evidence. 
However, local implementation of this decision will vary 
considerably across the country, depending on local Maoist 
personalities and their relationship with ongoing development 
programs.  Post has received no indication that the Maoists 
intend to target individuals directly employed by the U.S. 
Mission in Kathmandu.  However, in coordination with Nepal 
security forces and other diplomatic missions, Post will 
continue to seek information regarding the new Maoist policy 
and how it might affect Mission security and development 
activities.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI 

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