US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1256

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 001256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2013 
TAGS: CE, PGOV, PREL, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: NEW PROPOSAL GOES TO LTTE 
 
Classified By: CHARGE DON CAMP; REASONS 1.5 B, D. 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:   On July 17, the Norwegians conveyed to 
the LTTE the new GSL proposal to try to lure the LTTE back to 
the negotiating table.   We may not know for several weeks 
whether it will be successful, but the 19-month old ceasefire 
does not seem at risk.   President Kumaratunga,s own 
political plans are the biggest uncertainty and a potential 
threat to the process.   Cohabitation strains between the 
President and PM are as serious as ever.  If the President is 
successful in her efforts either to align with the Sinhalese 
chauvinist JVP party or to attract dissidents from the ruling 
party, she could attempt to topple the current government. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  In a meeting with Charge, G.L. Peiris, a key 
minister involved in peace process issues, confirmed that 
Norwegian special envoy Jon Westborg carried to the LTTE 
&capital8 of Kilinochchi July 17 the GSL proposal for a 
provisional administrative structure for the north and east 
of Sri Lanka.    He is to report back to Peiris tonight (July 
17), but the LTTE is not expected to respond substantively 
until it has had a chance to study the proposal and pass it 
through their represenatives outside Sri Lanka, including 
Balasingham.   Though the GSL is keeping the details to 
itself, the PM in a July 16 meeting and .Peiris have shared 
with us some of the details.    LTTE representatives would 
have a majority on the &apex body8 of the structure.   The 
government would also be represented (including 
representatives from the President,s party, according to the 
PM) as would the Muslem community.   Peiris stressed that 
this proposal was the basic minimum the LTTE could accept as 
well as being (barely) acceptable to representatives of the 
east,s Moslems.  Peiris also said that the proposal 
incorporated another principle (borrowed from proposals made 
in Quebec and northern Ireland disputes) requiring  that any 
issue affecting the &vital interests8 of a minority 
community (Sinhalese or Muslim) would also require a majority 
vote of that community,s representatives in the apex body. 
 
3.  (C) The President,s political plans continue to roil the 
waters in Colombo, and have potentially serious consequences 
for the peace process.    The long-discussed alliance with 
the far-left and anti-peace process JVP is perhaps the most 
problematic, since the JVP reportedly would want ) at a 
minimum ) to renegotiate the MOU with the LTTE that 
initiated the peace process.    There is increasing backlash 
against the proposed tieup, however, and the papers recently 
claimed the President,s non-political children were 
questioning how the party could countenance an alliance with 
the killers of their father.   (Note:  Vijaya Kumaratunga was 
gunned down in 1988.  The JVP is accused of perpetrating the 
killing, but it has never been proven.)   There are also 
rumors that the President is trying to lure away members of 
the UNP government.  We have not confirmed these reports, or 
their success. 
 
4.  (C)  The President must in any case be convinced she can 
improve her position in parliament with either alliance. 
The politicians and the astrologers are both reportedly 
telling her that the coming months are the best time for a 
move to topple the UNP government or perhaps call fresh 
elections; she would like to have a government in place 
before the provincial council elections next April. 
Elections would disrupt the process and a PA-led government 
would threaten the existing talks; LTTE political leader S.P. 
Thamilchelvam has said they will not negotiate with 
Kumaratunga. 
 
5.  (C)  COMMENT:  The good news is the general assumption in 
Colombo and the north that the ceasefire is not currently 
threatened.   The LTTE is relatively content with the status 
quo, in which it controls much of the northern Vanni and 
parts of the east, while exercising considerable influence in 
the government-controlled Jaffna peninsula.   The LTTE 
collects substantial revenue from customs duties in its 
region as well as taxation of businesses and Tamils 
individuals in the Vanni and Jaffna.  Independent estimates 
in Colombo put the revenue as high as 30 million US dollars 
per year.  The government too desperately wants to retain the 
ceasefires the twentieth anniversary approaches (July 23) of 
the 1983 riots that set off the insurgency,  the ceasefire is 
seen as the major achievement of this government.    The 
peace too has given the government some breathing space for 
the economic reform and investment programs it has initiated. 
  There is hope in Colombo, but always tinged with memories 
of dashed hopes of previous years.  END COMMENT. 
CAMP