US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4477

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENS. ABIZAID AND JONES' JULY 
18-19 VISIT TO ANKARA 
 
 
Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (S)  Summary:  Your visits come as we try to close the 
July 4 incident and pull Turkey into a more fully helpful 
role in Iraq.  The last year has shaken the confidence of the 
Turkish public, politicians, and military in the strength of 
the relationship with the U.S., just as it has shaken our 
confidence in the Turks.  While we have been able to manage 
the issue of the July 4 incident, it is likely to fester for 
a long time in the minds of many Turks as a humiliation to 
the military, and could thus continue to affect U.S.-Turkey 
security cooperation broadly.  In part, our problems come 
from divergent views on Iraq, particularly the security 
threat from various possible development in northern Iraq. 
However, in large part they are also a function of Turkish 
domestic politics.  The ruling AK Party is seen as a threat 
to the existing order of Turkey that the military and much of 
the Establishment is trying to defend -- and the military is 
seen as a barrier to the changes AK and others would like to 
make in Turkey.  The relationship with the U.S., the reforms 
needed for the EU and even the range of Iraq issues have been 
approached, frequently, by both sides in the context of the 
relationship between the military/traditional Establishment 
and AK, rather than on their merits.  In reacting to the July 
4 incident, P.M. Erdogan and F.M. Gul maintained a measured 
approach, while the TGS, under pressure from military 
hard-liners, refused any responsibility and stirred national 
outrage.  The implications of the internal political dynamic 
for the wider issue of GOT Iraq policy are considerable. 
Civilian authorities would like to complete a transformation 
of Iraq policy away from the historic northern-Iraq centered 
obsession and fear of a Kurdish state -- a change in focus 
that stems in part from efforts by the MFA and other civilian 
authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's Iraq policy from 
the Turkish military.  End summary. 
 
 
-------------------- 
The Domestic Context 
-------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) F.M. Gul and P.M. Erdogan have maintained a measured 
approach to the incident in Iraq in order to protect our 
bilateral relationship and to press its proposed reform 
package to loosen the TGS's grip on Turkish policy.  However, 
to keep their political opponents off balance, they have 
publicly been supportive of the military.  The hard-liners 
saw the event as a way to resist AK's effort and weaken its 
standing by attacking it as an American "supporter."  Thus, 
the AK stance contrasts starkly with the reaction from the 
military, President Sezer, and opposition CHP, all of whom 
have used the press to castigate both AK for being "too soft" 
and the U.S. for its actions.  After the release of the joint 
statement the Turkish press focused on the absence of an 
apology. 
 
 
3. (C) U.S.-Turkey tensions fit into a complex competition 
between AK and the military. They portray themselves as 
having opposed visions of Turkey's future.  Within each group 
there are tensions too.  There are increasing signs of 
discontent among hard-liners in the senior military 
leadership, who are trying to force TGS chief Ozkok into a 
more confrontational stance toward the USG as a way to rally 
nationalism and counter AK.  The difference between the AK 
Government and the Establishment on this front highlights a 
basic gap in Turkey between those -- led in the first 
instance by the military hawks -- who support an order linked 
to a rigid, statist-oriented view of what Ataturk wanted for 
the Republic of Turkey, and those who say they want a more 
open, EU candidacy-linked, conservative Turkey, with greater 
opportunity for Islamic influences, to prevail.  In this 
political competition there are also question marks regarding 
AK's: 1) ultimate social, political, and economic intentions 
domestically; and 2) its ability to run a competent 
government and willingness to respond to U.S. interests.  The 
domestic competition is often more important to the TGS or AK 
than the issues being addressed, and many U.S.-Turkey 
questions are dealt with as fodder as much as on their 
merits. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Iraq: Signs of a Shift In Policy 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
4. (S) Turkey's civilian authorities would like to complete a 
transformation of Iraq policy away from the historic 
northern-Iraq centered obsession with border security, fear 
of a Kurdish state, and Turkish military presence towards a 
more Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on trade and 
assistance.  This change in focus, to the extent it has been 
realized, appears to stem in part from efforts by the MFA and 
other civilian authorities to wrestle control over Turkey's 
Iraq policy from the Turkish military.  During a recent 
one-on-one with the Ambassador, MFA U/S Ziyal said he had 
asked P.M. Erdogan after the end of combat operations in Iraq 
to transfer authority over the issue of northern Iraq (and 
Iraq) from the TGS to the MFA.  However, the detention of TSF 
by the U.S. military in northern Iraq on July 4 has raised 
suspicions on both sides of the other's intentions. 
 
 
5. (SBU) The Turks have taken a number of concrete steps in 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction since the 
Secretary's April visit to Turkey. Turkey has become a hub 
 
SIPDIS 
for facilitating the flow of humanitarian assistance to 
northern Iraq.  The World Food Program has shipped 341,000 
tons of food through Turkey since March.  Turkey is also the 
world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP.  Turkey 
recently allowed an energy barter arrangement organized by 
Delta Petroleum to go forward.  This will enable coalition 
authorities to supply essential energy supplies to the Iraqi 
people. 
 
 
6. (C) Turkey has an opportunity to build strong trade links 
with Iraq.  During his Washington meetings in June, MFA U/S 
Ziyal raised Turkey's interest in building a second border 
crossing to relieve the burden on the Habur Gate (now 
handling some 2000 vehicles daily).  Bottlenecks in 
processing vehicles continue on both sides of the border, 
with the KDP continuing to charge some (including UN) 
vehicles fees and the GOT carefully scrutinizing incoming 
trucks to limit fuel smuggling.  The Turks have applied to 
reestablish THY commercial air links with Iraq when that 
becomes feasible. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Relations with Iraqi Kurds 
-------------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) The MFA has portrayed the mid-May visit to Iraq by a 
three-person MFA delegation as improving Turkish-Kurdish 
relations.  The Turkish delegation found both KDP leader 
Barzani and PUK leader Talabani willing to take concrete 
steps to improve relations.  The MFA delegation proposed a 
number of confidence-building measures designed to improve 
relations, including: (1) more equitable and transparent 
duties charged to Turkish businesses crossing the border; (2) 
softening of rhetoric between Kurdish and Turkmen groups in 
Iraq; (3) establishment of Turkish-Kurdish joint ventures in 
the north; and (4) establishment of "one-stop shopping" in 
key northern Iraqi cities for Turkish business groups. 
Barzani reportedly committed in principle to taking steps to 
improve Kurdish-Turkmen relations, but said he could not 
"change course overnight."  He said the KDP would explore 
taking incremental steps toward improving relations, and said 
that that much would depend on the actions of the Turkmen. 
The KDP and PUK leaders also reportedly heeded Turkey's 
request to refrain from calling for the end of the Peace 
Monitoring Force and the withdrawal of the Turkish 
participating troops at least until the end of the year to 
give the Turkish military time to "feel more comfortable" 
with the overall security situation on the ground in Iraq. 
 
 
8. (C) The GOT remains concerned about what it perceives to 
be undue Kurdish influence on coalition authorities in 
northern Iraq.  They have strongly objected to coalition 
plans to disarm all groups except the Kurds, which they 
believe gives the Kurds too much power over the other ethnic 
groups, particularly the Turkmen. 
 
 
--------------- 
Turkmen in Iraq 
--------------- 
 
 
9. (C) While the GOT remains concerned about the fate of 
Turkmen, the frequency and tone of Turkish "complaints" of 
mistreatment of the Turkmen by other Iraqi groups have 
declined significantly.  The military has tried to play the 
Turkmen card for several years, but civilian officials appear 
to have made a conscious decision to change the way they talk 
about the Turkmen.  The nearly daily reports of Kurdish 
efforts to marginalize Turkmen have been replaced by 
statements about the importance of ensuring proportionate 
representation for all Iraqi groups in local and central 
decision-making bodies.  The MFA regularly talks about the 
need for the Iraqi Turkmen Front to become a real political 
party, to not be seen as a tool of Ankara, and to integrate 
itself into the political process in Iraq.  The GOT continues 
to look to the U.S. to help ensure proper Turkmen 
representation on key leadership councils in the north as 
well as in the IIA.  They have expressed disappointment that 
only one Turkmen, who is not part of the ITF leadership, was 
named to the Governing Council. 
 
 
------------ 
EU Candidacy 
------------ 
 
 
10. (C) Since coming to power in the November elections, the 
ruling AK Party has made EU membership a top priority.  The 
GOT in January adopted two EU-related legislative reform 
packages designed to crack down on torture and remove 
barriers to free expression, association, and fair trial. 
Parliament adopted another package June 19, the sixth package 
in the past two years, and the GOT plans to pass a seventh 
package before a parliamentary recess in August.  Our 
contacts have confirmed press reports that the seventh 
package will be focused on limiting the military's political 
influence, including measures that will change the structure 
of the National Security Council.  However, the pro-EU, 
pro-reform AK government faces opposition from nationalistic 
opponents in the bureaucracy and parts of the military.  In 
several instances, bureaucratic institutions have undermined 
reform legislation by developing highly restrictive 
implementing regulations.  For example, Parliament lifted 
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the 
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict 
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned 
media outlets.  In addition, our European contacts say that 
while the GOT has made impressive legal reforms, Turkey's 
standing in the EU has also been undermined by recent actions 
such as the closing of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party and 
indictment of its sister party, DEHAP, and the recent police 
raid of the Human Rights Association's Ankara offices. 
 
 
---------------- 
Turkish Military 
---------------- 
 
 
11. (S) Contacts in the MFA, press, and among national 
security analysts think the Turkish military misjudged 
Turkey's equities in Iraq after the end of operations and 
that TGS's efforts to use the Turkmen issue as a wedge 
against U.S. policy was a mistake.  TGS D/CHOD Buyukanit, 
regarded as one of the senior officers pushing a harder line 
against the US during the Iraq war, also admitted that the 
Turkish military had misplayed its hand on Iraq.  While 
arguing that both sides had made mistakes and defending 
(without great conviction) TGS's attempts to persuade the 
Parliament to pass the March 1 troop deployment resolution, 
Buyukanit had said -- before the July 4 incident -- that TGS 
was ready to move forward with the U.S.  TGS supported the 
recent Cabinet decree to allow the U.S. and other coalition 
partners to use Turkish bases and ports for operations 
consistent with UNSCR 1483, including a positive response in 
principle to EUCOM's request to station up to 10 tankers and 
1 ISR aircraft at Incirlik in support of OEF and OIF 
operations (EUCOM is in the process of reviewing TGS's 
operating guidelines for the deployment and stationing of the 
aircraft, but we are taking a slow approach in the wake of 
the detention of TSF in Iraq). 
 
 
12. (C) TGS asserts privately and publicly that it supports 
Turkey's EU candidacy and wants to adopt stances on important 
issues (i.e. non-military approach to PKK/KADEK) that would 
help Turkey vis-a-vis the EU.  However, top military officers 
also have recently publicly criticized the EU and taken 
measures to delay EU-related reforms.  Many continue to 
believe that TGS was behind President Sezer's recent decision 
to veto an article of the GOT's 6th EU-related reform package 
and that the Turkish military will continue to resist all 
efforts by AK to lessen the military's control over what it 
considers to be its sacred role in protecting Turkey's 
"secular" status and national security interests. 
 
 
13. (S) On the TGS horizon is the August Supreme Military 
Council (YAS).  Among the four-star ranks, both the Navy and 
Air Force commanders retire this year, as will the commanders 
of the First and Third Turkish Armies, and the National 
Security Council Secretary General.  The YAS could allow 
Ozkok, who is beginning the second year of his four-year tour 
as Chief of the Turkish General Staff, the first real 
opportunity to shape his own leadership team.  Last year, 
contrary to tradition, the outgoing chief made all the 
general officer assignment and promotion selections.  Ozkok, 
however, may be constrained by the hard-liners and other 
traditionalists with whom he is contending on a number of 
issues. 
 
 
----------- 
The Economy 
----------- 
 
 
14. (SBU) The economy is sending mixed signals.  On the one 
hand, there are solid signs of growth and declining 
inflation.  On the other hand, after having rallied strongly 
in the aftermath of the Iraq operation, particularly once the 
USG announced it would provide $1 billion in financial 
assistance, markets have stalled due to the lack of investor 
confidence in the government's commitment to reform.  Markets 
are particularly concerned about continuing delays in 
completing the work for the fifth review under the IMF 
program.  As a result, interest rates on the extremely large 
government debt remain high, and the economy remains 
vulnerable to a sharp depreciation of the currency, which 
would put the entire program and economic stability at risk. 
We need to stress the importance of Turkey flawlessly 
implementing its commitments to the IMF.  Disbursement of USD 
1 billion in U.S. assistance is contingent on continued 
implementation of the IMF program. 
 
 
15. (SBU) In June, MFA U/S Ziyal and U/S Larson agreed to 
convene a fall meeting of the Economic Partnership Commission 
(EPC), which was established in early 2002 to find ways to 
enhance the bilateral economic relationship.  The meeting 
will be an opportunity to press a broad economic agenda 
including structural reform, reduction of trade barriers 
improving the investment climate, and enhancing regional 
economic cooperation. 
PEARSON