US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4376

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: (C) DEFENSE MINISTER GONUL SUSPICIOUS OF MILITARY 
 
REF: ANKARA 4355 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson.  Reasons 1.5 
B and D. 
 
 
1. (C) Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul has consistently been one 
of the most responsible members of the ruling AK government. 
In the run-up to the failed March 1 vote, he argued within AK 
governing circles for cooperation with the US.  Throughout 
the tense period that followed, he has always placed top 
priority on repairing the relationship. 
 
 
2. (C) In the Ambassador's 7/10 farewell office call, Gonul 
was true to form.  He did not raise a single objection to the 
US operation against Turkish special forces in northern Iraq, 
and it was clear that there was no doubt in his mind that 
some documents within the Turkish military special forces had 
been up to no good.  He talked only of the values Turkey and 
the US shared and the longstanding friendship between 
governments and peoples that could not be ruined by either 
March 1 or the detention of Turkish troops.  He stressed that 
he had worked hard to prevent the former. 
 
 
3. (C) While admitting that explanations of the failed vote 
and its aftermath were unproductive, Gonul did his best to 
put the best light on PM Erdogan's behavior.  Just after 
becoming PM 3/14, Erdogan noticed that no Turkish minister 
was slated to attend the American-Turkish Council conference 
in Washington starting two days later.  He asked Gonul to 
attend.  During the ATC, Gonul was unexpectedly asked to meet 
with SECDEF, who, Gonul said, asked for overflight 
permission.  Gonul then called Erdogan, who told Gonul to 
offer either overflight or another motion for stationing of 
US troops.  According to Gonul, SECDEF declined the offer of 
a further motion. Gonul then explained how he, the PM and 
CHOD Ozkok had worked hard to subdue hard-line elements 
within the government, Parliament and military who wanted to 
deny overflight as long as Turkish troops were under American 
pressure not to cross the Turkish border and enter norther 
Iraq. 
 
 
4. (C) In a further effort to ease the most recent tension 
with the US, Gonul brought in an usually large press 
contingent (after asking the Ambassador's permission) at the 
end of the farewell call.  Prior to calling them in, Gonul 
had asked the Ambassador to speak to the the ongoing mil-mil 
joint fact-finding discussions in Ankara, which he did. 
Gonul agreed with the Ambassador that the joint team should 
ascertain all the facts and find a way to avoid further 
incidents. 
 
 
5. (C) At a small dinner that evening Gonul hosted in honor 
of the Ambassador and attended by key AK Party members Cuneyt 
Zapsu, Reha Denemec, Yasar Yakis and Vahit Erdem, Gonul 
described with some enthusiasm how the AK-dominated 
Parliament intended to pass the seventh reform package before 
adjourning at the end of the month.  In addition to replacing 
the four-star secretary general of the NSC with a civilian, 
the package would put all defense spending on-budget and thus 
under Parliament's control.  He appeared to take special 
pride in the fact that he had drafted that section of the 
package. 
PEARSON