US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA1615

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/LP, INR/AN/IAA, EB, AND L 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2013 
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, PREL, PINR, KJUS, KCRM, ECON, HO 
SUBJECT: HONDURAN ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFERS EXCUSES; 
AMBASSADOR DEMANDS RESULTS 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1109 
 
     B. TEGUCIGALPA 1258 
     C. TEGUCIGALPA 1614 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry L. Palmer for Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  On June 26 Ambassador and DCM met with 
Honduran Attorney General (AG), Roy Medina, to discuss 
corruption in the Public Ministry (PM) and the lack of any 
serious effort to prosecute high-level criminal cases by the 
Attorney General's office.  This meeting came a day after 
Ambassador's meeting with President Maduro where similar 
issues were discussed (ref C).  AG Medina acknowledged 
shortcomings in the PM; however, he also indicated that 
faulty police work and ineffective judges were hampering his 
efforts to bring cases to trial.  Ambassador told Medina that 
the USG expected significant progress soon and that if it was 
not forthcoming, Post would reconsider the support it 
provides the PM, with a view toward suspending all USG aid to 
his office.  Narcotrafficking, money laundering, and other 
corruption issues were also discussed.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (S) On June 26 Ambassador and DCM meet with Honduran 
Attorney General (AG), Roy Medina to discuss corruption in 
the Public Ministry (PM) and the lack of any serious effort 
to prosecute high-level criminal cases by the Attorney 
General's office.  Ambassador specifically cited inaction on 
cases involving narcotraffickers, money launders, and other 
high profile individuals.  Ambassador noted that the PM had 
no difficulty prosecuting low-level criminal cases, but that 
in the Ambassador's nine months at Post, not one high-level 
case has been prosecuted.  Given the USG's disappointment, 
inaction at the PM, and the inertia that seems to have 
developed regarding high-profile cases, Ambassador put Medina 
on notice that the PM has until August 1 to demonstrate its 
commitment and deliver results, or Post would reconsider the 
support it provides the PM. 
 
3. (C)  As an example of the PM's unwillingness to move 
forward against high-profile individuals, Ambassador 
mentioned the case of Jose Israel Pineda Duarte (aka Paico), 
a well-known major narcotrafficker operating on the North 
Coast of Honduras (ref A).  Ambassador also made reference to 
an anonymous document delivered to the PM which contains 
allegations of illicit activity and corrupt officials (Post 
also has copy).  Medina queried Ambassador whether Post had 
done any investigations into the allegations.  Ambassador 
unequivocally stated that it was the job of the PM to 
investigate its own cases. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Public Ministry Inaction on Existing Cases 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) DCM noted that not one of the 160 money laundering 
cases before the PM had been acted upon.  Medina, in 
disbelief, asked an assistant to confirm the number. 
According to the PM there were 136 cases.  Medina expressed 
shock, chagrin, and embarrassment at the number of cases and 
indicated that the PM would begin to move forward on them. 
When asked by Ambassador about inaction on high-profile drug 
related cases, Medina had no response. 
 
5. (C) Medina offered to shake-up the organized crime unit in 
an effort to invigorate the PM, but professed that the PM 
lacked sufficient resources to effectively prosecute 
high-level cases.  Medina also claimed that faulty police 
work, and judges that summarily dismiss cases, were also to 
blame. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Corruption in the Public Ministry 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Ambassador expressed USG concerns over allegations of 
high-level corruption at the PM.  Medina indicated that if he 
became aware of any wrong-doing that we would dismiss the 
individual and assure that he/she went to jail.  Ambassador 
again reiterated that it was the job of the PM to investigate 
cases and that the PM had until August 1 to begin to deliver 
results. 
 
7. (C) Medina noted the limited time-frame the PM had to act, 
but said he was committed to moving forward on high-level 
cases and that his individual honor was on the line.  Medina 
vowed to get to the bottom of inaction at the PM and claimed 
that he would personally work to strengthen the institution. 
8. (C) When questioned by Ambassador as to why seized funds 
were not in accounts at the Central Bank, Medina claimed that 
under Honduran law, all funds must be placed in interest 
bearing accounts in the individuals name until the cases are 
resolved.  Medina assured Ambassador that the accounts were 
frozen and tamper proof. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Action (or Inaction) at the DLCN 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Medina mentioned the recent shake-up at the Direction 
in the Fight Against Narcotrafficking (DLCN) and indicated he 
was considering offering Gustavo Alfredo ((Landaverde)) 
Hernandez the deputy position there (ref B).  He opined that 
Landaverde, as an outspoken critic of the GOH's counter-drug 
efforts, might be interested in working with the DLCN to 
improve the overall effectiveness of the institution. 
(Comment:  Post understands that Landaverde is considering 
accepting an advisory position at the PM after the AG asked 
him to help mend relations with the USG.  End Comment) 
 
10. (C) Medina indicated that he intended to augment the 
DLCN's force by adding another 30 officers to the current 
force of 27. Overall, the DLCN is authorized to employ 100 
agents. (Comment:  This effort is viewed by many to be too 
little, too late.  The DLCN has never been an effective tool 
for combating narcotrafficking.  Perpetually underfunded and 
undermanned, the DLCN has seen its scarce resources limited 
by the AG.  Simply adding another 30 officers to the payroll 
will do little to increase the unit's effectiveness.  End 
Comment)  Medina also told the new DLCN head that while the 
fight against corruption and drug traffickers was important, 
a priority at the PM was increasing its forensic medicine 
abilities. 
 
---------------------------------- 
A Time for Talk, a Time for Action 
---------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) Comment:  Complaints against the ineffectiveness of 
AG Medina are not new.  Either through incompetence (but 
probably due to corruption) the PM under Medina's leadership 
has consistently disappointed those looking for improvements 
in the GOH's ability to effectively fight high-profile 
criminals.  It remains to be seen whether Post's threat to 
withdraw support from the PM will have the desired effect, 
but if history is any precedent, Post is not optimistic. 
Post expects Medina to continue to obfuscate the issues and 
pass the blame, rather than face the heat of prosecuting 
high-level criminal cases.  End Comment. 
 
Palmer