US embassy cable - 03ROME3107

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

GOI PLEDGES ENHANCED OSCE/EU COOPERATION DURING ITS PRESIDENCY

Identifier: 03ROME3107
Wikileaks: View 03ROME3107 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2003-07-08 15:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: IT PREL OSCE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2013 
TAGS: IT, PREL, OSCE 
SUBJECT: GOI PLEDGES ENHANCED OSCE/EU COOPERATION DURING 
ITS PRESIDENCY 
 
 
Classified By: POL MIN COUN TOM COUNTRYMAN, REASON 1.5(B)&(D). 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary:  On June 23, MFA Political Director 
Giancarlo Aragona told visiting USOSCE Ambassador Stephan 
Minikes that the US and Italy must build on strong bilateral 
relations and work together to put transatlantic relations 
back on a strong footing.  The OSCE is also extremely 
important in this process.  Minikes said he would continue to 
push for strong USG support for the OSCE and for OSCE,s role 
in promoting transatlantic value systems. Aragona said that 
one essential tenet of the Italian EU Presidency would be 
that the GOI must improve transatlantic relations and restore 
the US-European dialogue to a more dynamic and productive 
level.  Aragona and Minikes agreed that a top priority for 
the OSCE is to push all sides to complete the withdrawal of 
Russian equipment, ammunition and troops from Moldova.  They 
also concurred on the need to make changes in OSCE summit and 
ministerial preparations and procedures.  End Summary 
 
2.  (C)  Aragona began the meeting by noting that Amb. 
Minikes' visit was one of many between senior level GOI and 
USG officials, on both sides of the Atlantic, in recent 
months.  This ongoing exchange symbolized the desire of both 
governments to build on strong bilateral relations, and to 
work together to put transatlantic relations back on a strong 
footing.  The OSCE is extremely important in this process, 
continued Aragona, and he noted that FM Frattini, in a recent 
address to the Italian parliament, cited the OSCE's 
importance to regional stabilization in the Balkans, Caucasus 
and Central Asia.  Aragona said that even after  NATO and EU 
enlargement, the OSCE is still relevant, perhaps more so now 
than ever before.  OSCE is active and vital in strategic 
areas in which neither the EU nor NATO can, at the moment, 
devote many resources. 
 
3.  (C)  Minikes agreed, and said that he had been impressed 
by EU cooperation and coordination with the OSCE under the 
Greek and Danish presidencies, and looked forward to 
exploring further joint efforts under the Italian Presidency. 
 During its Presidency, Italy could help by keeping the focus 
on the OSCE in the Political Steering Committee discussions 
in Brussels. 
The OSCE receives strong political support from the NSC and 
DOS, which is backed by solid financial contributions and 
personnel secondments.  The US Congress is also a critical 
support group and very interested in the democratization 
activities of OSCE field missions.  The Helsinki Commission 
in Congress is influential, and the Parliamentary Assembly 
and inter-parliamentary dialogue are becoming more important. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Minikes said he would continue to push for strong 
USG support for the OSCE and for its efforts to promote 
transatlantic value systems, particularly in OSCE's 20 
non-EU/NATO countries.  Minikes noted that in the future, it 
will be more challenging to keep the US interested in 
European Affairs, since within about 50 years, given current 
population trends, over fifty percent of US citizens will be 
of non-European origin for the first time in America,s 
history, with the result that, the classical ties of a common 
heritage will not be as strong.  Aragona and Minikes both 
agreed that a strong and strongly supported OSCE can be an 
important pillar in the transatlantic bridge and that only a 
strong and effective OSCE will be useful in that context. 
 
5. (C)  Aragona said that one essential tenet of the Italian 
EU Presidency would be that the GOI must improve 
transatlantic relations and restore the US-European dialogue 
to a more dynamic and productive level.  PM Berlusconi and FM 
Frattini have stated numerous times that it is the top 
priority for the next six months.  The GOI wants to help 
reconstruct the historic partnership and bonds to a level 
stronger than during the cold war.    Italy will do what it 
can to go beyond statements.  It will promote progress on 
tough issues such as NP/WMD and terrorism.  For example, 
Aragona said, Italy was pushing for a strong statement at the 
US/EU Summit in Washington DC urging enhanced transatlantic 
cooperation on issues of common concern. 
 
6.  (C)  Aragona said that another priority for the Italian 
presidency, and an area where the OSCE could play a role, is 
the Middle East Peace Process.  The GOI feels that there is a 
need for balance, and can use its historic open relations 
with both sides to advantage.  He cited PM Sharon's recent 
statement that Israel had no better friend that Italy in 
Europe.  Minikes said the CSCE/OSCE approach and culture of 
inclusiveness could be exported and applied to the 
Mediterranean partners in general. 
 
7.  (C)  Aragona and Minikes agreed that a top priority for 
the OSCE is to push all sides to complete the withdrawal of 
Russian ammunition, weapons and troops from Moldova, in 
keeping with Russia's Istanbul Commitments, and to help 
 
 
broker a comprehensive political settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict.  Minikes averred that a solution can 
only be reached if all players; OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova and the Transnistrian leadership, are committed.  We 
must put pressure on Moldovan President Voronin and make him 
realize that the future of his country lies with Europe. 
Voronin may need to be pushed, and until he actually takes 
steps in the political solution process that cause him to 
&feel some pain,8 his commitment to a settlement remains in 
question. 
 
8.  (C)  Aragona thought that Russian leadership, 
particularly holdovers from Soviet Union days, may be afraid 
that once the Moldova situation is solved, Russian influence 
in the Caucasus would decrease.  Aragona promised to discuss 
with the Dutch Chairman in Office how the EU and OSCE could 
work together to broker a solution.  Minikes agreed, and 
warned that if not solved soon, international interest would 
shift from Moldova to other more important and pressing 
issues.  Minikes said we need to make clear to Russia that 
Moldova/Transnistria remains a Western priority.  Aragona 
said that if a solution were found it could open an 
opportunity for cooperative EU/OSCE border management and PKO. 
 
9.  (C)  Moving on to Afghanistan, Aragona said the GOI was 
in favor of a border observer role for OSCE.  Minikes said he 
was working hard with Ambassador David Johnson in Washington 
on proposals for police and border monitoring training and 
elections assistance. 
 
10.  (C)  On Chechnya, Minikes said the Russians were looking 
for an OSCE &seal of approval8 without having to answer for 
the human rights situation.  It was hard to see how the 
situation could be assessed properly without an OSCE 
presence.  We need people on the ground rather than 
parachutists who jump in and out.  Aragona agreed that the 
OSCE had an important role to play in Chechnya.  The GOI is 
open to discussing all possibilities, and agrees any effort 
must be continuous and significant, not a "fig leaf." 
Aragona questioned the need for an on the ground presence. 
Which is more effective, a presence in a small confined area, 
which is all that could be established at the moment given 
the security situation, or a focused international effort to 
call attention to the tragedy?  We need a creative solution, 
he said.  Minikes agreed; we need to get the job done in the 
most efficient and effective manner. 
 
11.  (C)  In response to Aragona,s question, Minikes told 
Aragona that a Summit in 2004 would only be possible if the 
U.S. presidential elections allowed, and OSCE could come up 
with "deliverables" worthy of presidential participation.  It 
could also be an opportunity to renew the underlying 
principles upon which the OSCE was founded, and recommit 
leadership to those principles.  Russia was watching 
carefully how US-European leadership views the OSCE - a 
summit would reinforce its importance as a transatlantic 
institution.  Aragona agreed.  Italy would only consider a 
summit if there were something important enough for his PM to 
sign.  If there were a chance to bring President Bush to 
Europe, Italy would support the summit.  Aragona and Minikes 
agreed there was no ground for a clear "yes," but the 
situation could evolve. 
 
12.  (C)  Minikes said Ministerial Council procedures need 
reform.  He would like to see more discussion rather than 55 
ministers reading canned interventions.  He said U/S Grossman 
thought a structure similar to that used in the G-8, with 
more thematic/regional discussions, would be more attractive 
to Ministers and to the U.S. Secretary of State.  Aragona 
said that this year FM Frattini would be at the Ministerial 
in Maastricht; in fact, the GOI had rearranged some EU 
Presidency meetings to make this possible.  Italy will 
support efforts to make the discussions more serious and 
meaningful.  It would be good to have some concrete results, 
on Moldova, for example. 
 
13.  (C)  Aragona said Russia had unrealistic expectations 
for the OSCE Economic Dimension. Italy is open to 
strengthening the dimension, but also knows the OSCE can't 
 
compete with EU, IMF, EBRD, etc.  Minikes agreed, and noted 
that the mandate of the economic dimension was not to compete 
with other IFIs, but to bring a different kind of assistance 
to the table; to stimulate investment, small and medium 
businesses, and human resource development.  Aragona offered 
to host an OSCE conference on economic development during the 
Italian Presidency.  PM Berlusconi and Minister Urso are very 
interested in such development. 
 
14.  (C)  Minikes said that he was now interviewing 
candidates for the Media Rep position.  The Hungarian 
candidate looks best.  Aragona said that when Minikes and the 
Italian Ambassador to OSCE finished interviewing they should 
coordinate on a choice.  Minikes agreed. 
 
 
15.  (C)  Minikes ended by noting the success of the recent 
OSCE conference on Anti-Semitism.  Germany has offered to 
host a follow ) on conference in Berlin next year.  Aragona 
promised Italian Support at Maastricht for such a conference. 
 
16.  (U)  Ambassador Minikes has cleared this cable. 
 
Sembler 
NNNN 
 2003ROME03107 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04