US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1190

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  07-08-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  President's party weighs in on Tigers, GSL, 
and alliance with left-wingers 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1143, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Donald Camp, Charge d'Affaires. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In the wake of the June Tokyo donors 
conference, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga, and her People's Alliance (PA) party, have 
been relatively quiet in their attacks on Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe and his government's ruling United 
National Party (UNP).  In recent meetings with Charge, 
key presidential advisors and high-ranking PA members 
discussed the PA's mounting distrust of the Tigers, the 
president's continuing uneasy cohabitation relationship 
with the PM, and their commitment to an alliance with a 
radical, left-wing Sinhala chauvinist party.  Perhaps 
reflecting the general popularity of the peace process, 
the PA members were all clear that a (potential) change 
in government would not mean a breakdown in talks, at 
least from their side.  END SUMMARY 
 
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PA WARINESS OF THE TIGERS 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The most vocal interlocutor against the actions 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was key 
presidential advisor Lakshman Kadirgamar who met with 
Charge on June 27.  Kadirgamar characterized the recent 
sidelining of LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham as 
noteworthy, with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran's higher 
visibility correlating to a more hardline approach. 
(Note:  Just prior to the Tokyo conference, Balasingham 
abruptly cut short his trip to the Wanni, a move seen as 
suggesting that Prabhakaran was changing negotiating 
tack.)  In separate meetings with Charge, Opposition 
Leader Mahinda Rajapakse and Anura Bandaranaike 
(President Kumaratunga's brother) were also harshly 
critical of the LTTE's belligerent attitude and 
continual rejection of each and every government offer 
of an interim administration.  Rajapakse said the Tigers 
were also destroying any public softening of attitudes 
toward them with the recent killings of anti-LTTE Tamil 
politicians. 
 
3.  (C) (Note:  Bandaranaike stated, however, that the 
president maintains an informal mid-level dialogue with 
the LTTE through intermediaries.  Through them, she has 
assured the Tigers of her intent to continue the peace 
process, regardless of who is in government.) 
 
---------------------------- 
COHABITATION REMAINS FRAGILE 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Kadirgamar and Bandaranaike highlighted the 
tense cohabitation situation.  They acknowledged the 
prime minister's efforts to engage the Tigers in the 
peace process, even speaking of the president's support 
for the government's interim administration proposals. 
In the next breath, however, each complained about the 
PM's lack of consultation -- on the peace process, on 
ministry issues -- with the president.  While the 
president knew working with the prime minister was 
essential, especially re the peace process, Kadirgamar 
stated that cohabitation was not really working and 
Bandaranaike reminded us of his sister's strong dislike 
for the PM.  Kadirgamar added that it was a long- 
standing request of the PA to be included in the peace 
talks.  Rajapakse said that the president's non- 
consultative move to take over the Development Lotteries 
Board was retaliation against the PM for his absence of 
consultation with her. 
 
---------------------------------- 
COMMITMENT TO AN ALLIANCE WITH JVP 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) For months, the media has been detailing the 
impending linkup between the PA and the left-wing, 
Sinhala chauvanist Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). 
Reports focus on the unresolved differences between the 
two as dates for the final inking of the deal are 
regularly announced, passed, and then rescheduled weeks 
later.  All the PA interlocutors, however, consistently 
told us the differences are being worked out and the 
alliance will be signed.  Anura said such an alliance 
was a matter of survival for both parties.  The growing 
electoral strength of the JVP has made them attractive 
to the PA, especially in the latter's desire to regain 
control of parliament.  Still, snap elections following 
any alliance do not seem likely.  Bandaranaike opined 
that his sister would call for general elections before 
the scheduled April 2004 provincial council elections, 
reasoning that the new PA-JVP alliance would win the 
general election and, therefore, the provincial one as 
well. Bandaranaike dismissed the risk of losing PA 
supporters over such an alliance, stating his party 
followers had greater disillusionment with the current 
UNP government than with the JVP. 
6.  (C) Both Bandaranaike and Rajapakse claimed the JVP 
had changed its opposition to the peace process, 
although Bandaranaike indicated a presidential warning 
to walk away from the proposed alliance may have helped 
them change their minds.  Calling the current JVP 
"mainstream," Kadirgamar characterized the change in 
dealing with the JVP as "democracy at work." 
 
7.  (C) Original differences between the parties related 
to the JVP's aversion to the peace process and 
unwillingness to accept any "devolution" of power to the 
LTTE.  At the moment, the sticking points seem to be 
over the logistics of power sharing, both within the PA 
and between the two parties.  The JVP reportedly has 
blamed political jockeying within the PA for the hold up 
in finalizing the alliance.  Rajapakse, for his part, 
stated that his position in the party had not changed 
and he remains senior vice president.  When pressed on 
the issue, he did all but admit that the president was 
using the alliance to ensure a political future for her 
brother, Anura Bandaranaike.  (Note:  Bandaranaike is 
arguably vying with Rajapakse for control within the 
president's Sri Lankan Freedom Party, the main faction 
of the PA.) 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  With the constant guessing as to the 
PA's future moves, it was telling that all three 
interlocutors had similar messages, perhaps indicating a 
rough unity at the top.  While roundly critical of the 
Tigers, no one offered a different approach for working 
with the group or suggested alternatives to the PM's 
peace process efforts.  Each interlocutor focused 
negatively on the lack of consultation and congenial 
working relationship between the president and prime 
minister, instead of specific deficiencies in the 
government.  Rather than working on the poor 
cohabitation relationship, the president may only be 
waiting for the finalized alliance with the JVP to set 
the stage for eventual election.  For the moment, 
however, the party appears committed to the peace 
process and not poised to make any sudden changes within 
in the government. 
 
9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
CAMP