US embassy cable - 03OTTAWA1899

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001899 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013 
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, AF, CA, Afghanistan 
SUBJECT: ISAF: CANADIAN DEFENSE MINISTER'S VISIT TO 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: OTTAWA 1654 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora, 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Canadian Defense Minister John McCallum 
visited Kabul June 23-24 in advance of Canada's participation 
in ISAF IV and V.  McCallum met with Afghan President Karzai 
and Defense Minister Khan, among others, and visited the camp 
being set up for approximately 1,800 Canadian troops.  While 
mindful of the security risks, McCallum and Canadian MGEN 
Andrew Leslie, who will be ISAF's Deputy Commander, want to 
increase ISAF's visibility in Kabul and its interaction with 
the Afghan Government.  They do not, however, believe it is 
feasible to expand ISAF's role beyond Kabul without a huge 
infusion of troops.  Canada is also concerned that, with NATO 
taking on the leadership of ISAF, we not lose sight of the 
need for another key national contributor as Germany scales 
back its forces.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) McCallum's Executive Assistant Gene Lang and Director 
of Communications Randy Milik, both of whom accompanied 
McCallum to Kabul, debriefed us on the Minister's visit. 
Lang and Milik told us that Karzai was impressive, 
charismatic and optimistic about Afghanistan's future. 
Karzai reaffirmed that he was committed to meeting the June 
2004 deadline for nationwide elections.  UN Under Secretary 
Jean Arnaud, who also met with McCallum, was quite 
pessimistic about holding to the election timetable. 
 
3.  (C) Defense Minister Khan was more hospitable than 
expected, and appreciative of the Canadian contributions to 
OEF and ISAF.  Lang and Milik said that Khan delivered a 
"well-rehearsed" message about his cooperation with Karzai. 
McCallum stressed reform of the military and 
disarmament/demobilization/reconstruction (DDR).  Khan 
concurred that DDR was key, but said it was being delayed by 
lack of funding.  Lang noted the huge disparity between 
Khan's militia, numbering approximately 70,000, and the 
10,000 personnel that have been trained thus far for the 
Afghan Army. 
 
4. (C) In a meeting at the Interior Ministry, McCallum also 
discussed the policing challenge in Kabul where, acording to 
Milik, there are only 7,000 police with little training in a 
city of some 3 million.  RCMP officers recently visited Kabul 
and decided against setting up a training program, but 
McCallum told his Afghan interlocutors that he would revisit 
this issue in Ottawa. 
 
5. (C) MGEN Leslie, who joined McCallum for his meetings, 
wants to build stronger linkages between ISAF and the Afghan 
Government.  While the German forces have done an excellent 
job overall, the Canadians believe ISAF can and should be 
more visible, and do more to advise and assist the Afghani 
Government, possibly including liaison officers.  The 
Canadians are not, however, looking to expand the ISAF's role 
beyond Kabul.  Lang and Milik told us that the current ISAF 
contingent of roughly 6,000 troops is barely enough to do its 
mission in Kabul, and that tens of thousands of troops would 
be needed to do the same job country-wide.  They estimated 
that 80-90% of the people in Kabul strongly supported ISAF, 
but said that some Al Qaida and Taliban elements are also 
present, including among the large number of refugees flowing 
into the capital. 
 
6. (C) Lang told us that there are currently 250 Canadian 
Forces (CF) personnel in Kabul, and that the deployment of 
equipment and 1,800 total CF personnel is on track for 
completion in mid-August.  The Canadian Forces are acquiring 
four low-flying UAVs (the CF's first, prompted by this 
mission) that they will use to help monitor the neighborhoods 
of Kabul.  These Canadian UAVs are expected to arrive in 
October, until which time the Germans will keep their UAVs in 
place. 
 
7. (C) Canada is concerned about ensuring adequate ISAF troop 
strength in 2004, especially as Germany is eager to reduce 
its presence.  Lang told us that the CF (and most other NATO 
militaries) do not have the "skill set" needed to run the 
Kabul airport, and that they would encourage Germany to 
continue in this role.  But another NATO country would have 
to step up to the plate as a major contributor in 2004, and 
most likely targets (UK, France, Italy, Spain) have major 
deployments elsewhere and/or have resisted participating in 
ISAF.  Lang and Milik expected that senior U.S. officials, 
such as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, would need to twist arms 
to find a suitable contributor. 
CELLUCCI