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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA4240 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA4240 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-07-07 10:51:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004240 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: GROWING HOSTILITY TOWARD USG IN WAKE OF N. IRAQ INCIDENT (U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason:1.5(b)(d) 1. (C) Summary: Despite the release of the Turks detained by U.S. forces in Suleimaniye, negative press and public reaction to the U.S. operation reached new heights in the July 7 morning papers. The hostile press reaction will continue to grow absent a clear and forceful public justification for the operation. The Turkish public's sense of outrage is amplified and fed by the domestic political struggle underway between the AK Government, more traditional parties and the military -- and among elements of the military leadership -- for primacy of place in policy decision-making. End Summary. -------------------------------- Criticism from U.S. "Friends"... -------------------------------- 2. (U) "Hurriyet," Turkey's largest-circulation daily, described the event on its front page as a "shock" equal to that of the 1964 "Johnson letter" which warned Turkey not to use U.S. weapons in Cyprus. -- Ertugrul Ozkok, "Hurriyet" editor-in-chief (who strongly supported the defeated resolution for U.S. troop deployments), characterized the incident as a "fiasco as deep as the Bay of Pigs." Ozkok said the decision to carry out the raid was "beyond stupidity" and asserted that by this action the U.S. has "lost the best friends it had in Turkey." He accuses the U.S. of "taking revenge" on Turkey by an action that goes beyond the limits of "penalizing Turkey" for the March 1 vote. He also urged Turkey to "keep its distance" from the United States. -- Former P.M. Ecevit asserted to journalists that the U.S. was acting "like an enemy" and "provocateur." Other mainstream political leaders -- including the dovish former FONMIN Ismail Cem -- seeking to boost their pro-Establishment credentials and strike a blow against P.M. Erdogan, have roundly criticized the AK Party/Government for its relatively mild reaction against the USG. -- All papers highlight the decision of the TGS to withdraw its liaison officers from U.S. Centcom Headquarters in Tampa, as well as the cancellation of General Hursit Tolon's planned travel to Centcom for a change of command ceremony. Calls for further Turkish action are gaining strength. -------------------------- ...And From Other Quarters -------------------------- 3. (U) Public reaction was further inflamed by press reports from Turkish MFA sources claiming significant damage to the Turkish special forces office in Suleymaniye. An MFA official on the scene said that computers, files, several vehicles, and 106,000 USD in cash had been taken by U.S. forces. A cook who was initially detained with the special forces members described how the prisoners were hooded and treated roughly, "just like al-Qaeda militants." -- An ITF representative claimed to Establishment standard-bearer "Cumhuriyet" that he had been "tortured" by the Americans during his detention. Opposition leaders from across the political spectrum demanded that the GOT seek an apology from the United States. Some characterized the raid as the action of an "enemy." -- The influential Islam-influenced "Yeni Safak" launched a front-page appeal to the GOT to cancel Turkey's purchase of four AWACS planes from Boeing. The deal had already come under scrutiny from Parliament's anti-corruption committee for alleged overcharging and other irregularities. --------------------- Demanding USG Explain --------------------- 4. (U) Many Turkish commentators note that the U.S. has yet to provide any evidence justifying the action. FM Gul claimed that in his two conversations with Secretary Powell, the Secretary failed to provide any details on the reasons for the action, referring only to unspecified "intelligence reports." Gul described the claim that Turkish forces were involved in a plot to assassinate an official in Kirkuk as "absolute nonsense." Following his conversation with Vice President Cheney, PM Erdogan issued a statement claiming that the Vice President had declined to give any explanation of the incident. ----------------- Gen. Ozkok Speaks ----------------- 5. (C) Immediately after his farewell meeting with Ambassador, TGS Chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok announced that the requirements of "Turkish national and Turkish military honor" should be secured. He offered that he does not think that the incident reflected "United States policy or the policy of the U.S. military." However, Ozkok also asserted that he has "difficulty evaluating" the incident as "a purely local event." -------------- The Back Story -------------- 6. (C) Behind the face-saving bluster, we have picked up indications that some Turks privately understand that the current crisis was generated in the fist instance by a Turkish military -- or elements thereof -- up to something in n.Iraq. -- "Hurriyet's" Cuneyt Ulsever in his July 7 column questioned whether the civilian authorities were aware of precisely what Turkish forces were doing in Iraq. He noted to us privately on July 6 that, despite what politicians and others might be saying, it was understood that the military: 1) had been up to "something" nefarious in Iraq, and was acting on its own; 2) is still smarting from the public perception that the USG completely and easily disregarded TGS "red lines" in the run-up and during the war; 3) acted out of frustration, and to change the perception that the military could be easily tilted at by foreign powers and domestic political rivals (i.e., ruling AK party); and 4) is "leaking" comments to journalists to the effect that "the Turkish military will never forget" this incident. -- An MFA official with long experience in the U.S. and with USG-GOT relations privately offered the following assessment: 1) the incident is a blow to USG-GOT ties, but only a temporary set back; 2) the real impact of the affair will be felt in Turkish domestic affairs, and will deepen the mistrust between the elected civilians and the military; and 3) that in the end, "the military will be weakened politically -- and that this is the silver lining" to the crisis, he added. -- Several political and journalist contacts shared with us privately their conviction that the U.S. would not have acted without any justification. Some suggested that the activities of the Turkish Special Forces may have been planned without the knowledge of the most senior TGS leaders. But even they all clearly pulled their punches in pursuing this line in print. ------- Comment ------- 7. (C) The negative press reaction will continue to grow until we can offer a clear and forceful public justification for the operation -- partly because of the Turkish public's sense of outrage, but also because of the domestic political power struggle underway between the AK Government, more traditional parties and the military for primacy of place in policy decision-making. In this context, it is worth keeping in mind that the story is breaking against a backdrop not only of growing AK-TGS tensions, but of tensions within the AK party and in the military itself. PEARSON
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