US embassy cable - 03ROME3047

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, IT, ITALIAN POLITICS 
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI'S MOUTH MAKES SECOND ROME TREATY FAR 
LESS LIKELY -- AND IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN 
 
REF: ROME 3029 
Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Berlusconi's tasteless insult to German 
MEP Martin Schulz reduces the likelihood of a second Treaty 
of Rome and exacerbates the difficulties the Prime Minister 
will have serving in the role of "honest broker" as European 
Council President-in-Office.  The vast majority, 
non-headline-grabbing work of the Presidency will not be 
affected; Italy's MFA has laid the ground well to make 
progress on GOI priorities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Berlusconi's offensive rejoinder to Schulz's attacks 
is not unexpected, although it came earlier in the Italian 
Presidency than most would have predicted.  Berlusconi must 
be extremely frustrated with the unfairness of the criticism 
directed against him, questioning his (and by extension, 
Italy's) fitness to lead Europe.  This criticism, in the eyes 
of many Italians, comes from those who already enjoy the 
immunity the Prime Minister was awarded by the Italian 
Parliament; who have never accepted Berlusconi and his 
non-traditional, self-made roots; and who insist on 
besmirching an Italy that in 2003 bears little resemblance to 
the stereotypes perpetrated in much of the commentary across 
Europe. 
 
3.  (C)  Berlusconi has used the same tactics in his domestic 
political battles, to great effect.  When the center-left 
opposition attacks, he turns the attack back on them, 
ratcheting the volume and intensity up by degrees.  It has 
worked, and he remains popular among his electorate.  His 
stupid rise to Schulz's bait, however, will not win him the 
respect of Italy's centrist or undecided voters, and 
certainly is not in keeping with Italian devotion to avoiding 
the "brutta figura."  Berlusconi's reaction was predictable, 
too, in that Schulz's criticism was part of a coordinated 
campaign among European socialists, as the PM later claimed. 
(NOTE:  We agree it is likely that the Italian opposition 
provided the ammunition for Schulz's fusillade.)  In 
responding to Schulz, Berlusconi was responding to his own 
opposition, employing tried and true tactics.  Berlusconi is, 
as well, convinced of overarching collusion on the left, 
whether between Italy's left-wing parties and its judiciary 
(reftel explains why we don't think he's completely off base 
with this one); Italy's left and its European counterparts; 
or the left and the media (including both state-owned RAI and 
his own TV networks; certainly neither spares Berlusconi from 
criticism). 
 
4.  (C)  Explaining his reaction does not make it any less 
stupid.  EC President Prodi's recommendation was right.  When 
asked how the EU could avoid "personalizing" the EU 
Presidency for the next six months, he replied "by not 
answering your question."  We are hard-pressed to predict 
whether Berlusconi's staff and close associates can 
successfully train their shoot-from-the-hip, self-confident, 
at times arrogant, self-made tycoon-turned-Prime Minister to 
follow Prodi's sage advice in the case of future 
provocations, which will come any time he sets foot in the 
European Parliament.  History does not suggest Silvio 
Berlusconi can restrain himself.  His exchange with Schulz is 
emblematic of why Berlusconi has been a successful 
businessman and winner in Italy's political trench warfare, 
but it also shows why he may not be cut out for the role of 
the EU's back-room broker.  Before giving up all hope, 
however, we note that many political and business deals are 
also made in back rooms, where Berlusconi's skills at 
persuasion, if not compromise, have been proven. 
 
5.  (C)  The vast majority of work under the Italian 
Presidency will not be affected by the outburst. Berlusconi's 
prepared remarks to the European Parliament, which few will 
now bother to read, actually outlined a forward-looking 
agenda that should enjoy consensus support.  The Italian MFA 
is well-prepared and the machinery is in place for a 
successful Presidency.  Most GOI priorities for its semester, 
such as promoting further Balkans stability, closer EU-Russia 
relations, and EU-wide immigration reform, will continue 
unimpeded.  Decisions that can be reached at the working 
level will be made.  Those that must be resolved by heads of 
state -- and we cannot predict which those will be -- will be 
harder.  There will be, we are certain, plenty of cases where 
political compromise will be in the self-interest of all, and 
will be reached.  There may be others where this incident, 
and more importantly Berlusconi's personality traits which 
 
 
underpin it, may impede progress. 
 
6.  (C)  His imprudence may eventually be held against him 
when he attempts to bring the Convention/Constitution 
document back to Rome after the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) process is completed, most likely during the Irish 
Presidency.  We suspect that lingering bad feeling and 
distaste may make many EU member states reluctant to allow 
Berlusconi to preside over the highly symbolic treaty signing 
ceremony, and risk another of his tirades which could mar 
Europe's big day.  His chances may depend in part on whether 
and how well he apologizes to German Chancellor Schroeder in 
a telephone call later today. 
Sembler 
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	2003ROME03047 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL