US embassy cable - 97RIYADH4701

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 004701 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER, SA 
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA:  1997 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:  STATE 223177 
 
1.   THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS 
SET FORTH IN REFTEL. 
 
A.   DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY 
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1997, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION RELATING TO TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM 
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U.S. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL.  ALTHOUGH THE SAG HAS REPORTEDLY DETAINED AND ARRESTED 
SAUDI CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, IT HAS NOT YET BEGUN 
PROSECUTION OR TAKEN ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION REGARDING ANY 
SUCH PERSONS.  THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS 
THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1997. 
 
B.   DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA.  CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL-SAYEGH 
ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMB ATTACK.  HOWEVER, CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE UNITED 
STATES.  THE SAG HAS NOW REQUESTED THAT THE USG DEPORT AL-SAYEGH TO 
SAUDI ARABIA.  THE SAG SEEKS TO QUESTION AND PERHAPS PROSECUTE AL- 
SAYEGH FOR HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KILLING OF 19 UNITED STATES 
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING.  THE SAG HAS ALSO 
REPORTEDLY REQUESTED THAT THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN 
PROHIBIT SAUDI BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND SUPPORTER USAMA BIN 
LADEN FROM INSTIGATING OR ENCOURAGING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST 
SAUDI ARABIA OR ITS WESTERN ALLIES.  BIN LADEN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF 
HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, ENCOURAGES AND IS BELIEVED TO 
PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS IN ACTS OF 
TERRORISM AGAINST THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY AND COUNTRIES SUPPORTIVE 
OF THE ROYAL FAMILY, SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES.  THE SAG IS 
REPORTED TO HAVE UNSUCCESSFULLY REQUESTED THAT SYRIA EXTRADITE OR 
DEPORT A SUSPECT IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR 
QUESTIONING AND POSSIBLE PROSECUTION.  THE SUSPECT IN QUESTION WAS 
REPORTED TO HAVE DIED WHILE IN POLICE CUSTODY IN SYRIA. 
 
C.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S 
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS 
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA.  HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS NOT ENTERED INTO 
EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE 
UNITED STATES.  (NOTE:  EXTRADITION TREATIES EXIST WITH YEMEN AND 
EGYPT.) 
 
D.   DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. 
THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A 
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, 
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, OFFICIAL ISLAMIC CLERGY, AND OFFICIAL NEWS 
MEDIA, PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL 
TERMS.  THE SAG STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE NOVEMBER 1997 LUXOR MASSACRE 
IN EGYPT.  THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBING AND HAS ASSISTED THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BOMBING.  HOWEVER, PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG EXPRESSED 
FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND SUSPECTS. 
ACCORDING TO HIGH LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
(SHARIA) DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO FACE ACCESS TO 
SUSPECTS. 
 
E.   DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1997 BY 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBING.  IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN 
SECURITY PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. 
THESE STEPS INCLUDE ASSISTING IN THE RELOCATION OF U.S. DEPLOYED 
PERSONNEL AND MANY TRAINING MISSION PERSONNEL TO PRINCE SULTAN 
AIRBASE AND ESKAN VILLAGE, LOCATIONS REMOVED FROM POPULATION 
CENTERS, AND INCREASING SECURITY MEASURES AT OFFICIAL U.S. 
PREMISES.  AT A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR 
MINISTERS IN TUNIS, THE SAG ENDORSED A NON-BINDING ARAB LEAGUE 
ACTION PLAN TO COMBAT TERRORISM.  AT A DOHA MEETING OF THE GCC 
INTERIOR MINISTERS, THE SAG AGREED TO INCREASE SECURITY COOPERATION 
AND COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AMONG THE MEMBER STATES.  AT A MEETING 
OF ARAB JUSTICE MINISTERS IN CAIRO, THE SAG JOINED THE OTHER MEMBER 
STATES IN CALLING FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PLAN TO ALLOW FOR THE 
EXTRADITION AMONG ARAB STATES OF MILITANTS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION 
WITH TERRORIST ATTACKS.  THE SAG ALSO ENTERED INTO A MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING TERRORISM. 
 
F.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORIST, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING 
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS 
OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC 
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC 
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION SANCTUARY AND/OR 
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR 
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON 
TERRORISM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DOES NOT FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES.  ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE 
THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES 
OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES.  NONETHELESS, THERE CONTINUE TO 
BE ALLEGATIONS THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
G.   HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT 
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN 
COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S SO-CALLED "TERRORISM LIST" OF STATE SPONSORS 
OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND 
SUDAN.) 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DID NOT MAKE OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S 
TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE.  HOWEVER, THE SAG 
JOINED IN THE NON-BINDING ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTION TO LIFT UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA DESPITE LIBYA'S 
FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
BOMBING OF A PAN AM PASSENGER JET OVER LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND.  THE 
SAG ALLOWED LIBYAN AND IRAQI AIRCRAFT CARRYING HAJJ PILGRIMS TO 
LAND AT JEDDAH'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND DEPART IN VIOLATION OF 
UNSC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LIBYA AND IRAQ.  THE SAG HAS REPEATEDLY 
COMMENTED PUBLICLY THAT ALL PILGRIMS WITH VALID HAJJ VISAS SHOULD 
BE RECEIVED BY SAUDI ARABIA, REGARDLESS OF THEIR MEANS OF 
TRANSPORTATION. 
 
H.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1996, POSITIVE OR 
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, 
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
RESPONSE:  TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 1995 AND 1996 GREATLY HEIGHTENED 
SAG CONCERNS ABOUT THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM.  THE ATTACKS 
MET WITH WIDESPREAD OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC CONDEMNATION, AND HAVE 
SPURRED GREATER COOPERATION AMONG SAUDI SECURITY ORGANS IN 
ADDRESSING INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES.  THE SAG HAS ALSO 
SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED ITS DIALOGUE WITH GCC AND OTHER REGIONAL 
NEIGHBORS ON COMBATING TERRORISM.  ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE 
SAG CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED WITH SAUDIS AND OTHERS WHO RECEIVED 
TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER WEAPONS. 
THREE OF THE FOUR TERRORISTS EXECUTED FOR PERPETRATING THE NOVEMBER 
1995 BOMB ATTACK IN RIYADH RECEIVED SUCH TRAINING DURING THE AFGHAN 
WAR.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT REMAINS VERY CONCERNED WITH A CONTINUED 
TERRORIST PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY TERRORISTS UNDER THE 
LEADERSHIP OF USAMA BIN LADIN, A TERRORIST FINANCIER AND SUPPORTER 
OF SAUDI ORIGIN.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT BIN LADIN 
PROMOTES TERRORISM IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. 
 
I.  DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH 
RESPECT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
SPECIFIC U.S. REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION AND 
EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS 
DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.  DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF 
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, 
INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE 
SPECIFIC REQUESTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG 
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG 
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED HIGH-LEVEL, 
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES.  THIS INTEREST AND 
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 1997.  THE USG AND SAG 
EXCHANGED INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES 
AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE REGION. 
CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY 
OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED.  FOLLOWING THE 1996 
KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG FURTHER INCREASED 
COOPERATION.  FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH VISITED SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997 
TO COORDINATE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER 
PRINCE NAIF.  THE FBI MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE 
OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY.  WHILE COOPERATION IN 1997 ON THE 
KHOBAR TOWERS INVESTIGATION WAS STRONG, IT HAS NOT ALWAYS MET THE 
EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS.  PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG 
EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND 
SUSPECTS.  ACCORDING TO HIGH LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (SHARIA) DOES NOT ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO 
FACE ACCESS TO SUSPECTS.  THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECIFIC COOPERATION 
BETWEEN THE USG AND THE SAG REGARDING THE ELIMINATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS. 
HOWEVER, THE SAG'S REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR 
INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. 
 
J.   IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN 
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR 
INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: 
 
     (I)  THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, 
CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE ACT; AND 
 
     (II) IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION 
DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE 
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH 
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS.  IN DOING SO, THE SAG HAS 
COOPERATED WITH THE USG AT UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS.  HOWEVER, THE 
SAG'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN UNEVEN AND HAS NOT ALWAYS MET THE 
EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS.  WHILE SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI 
HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON MANY INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH 
BOMBINGS, PRESS REPORTS ASSERTED THAT THE USG EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION 
AT THE LACK OF ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND SUSPECTS.  ACCORDING TO HIGH 
LEVEL SAG OFFICIALS, THE SAUDI JUDICIAL SYSTEM (SHARIA) DOES NOT 
ALLOW FOREIGNERS DIRECT FACE TO FACE ACCESS TO SUSPECTS. 
NONETHELESS, THE USG AND THE SAG CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE 
STATUS OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING INVESTIGATION. 
 
      (II) THE SAG HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE 
OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS.  IT MADE AVAILABLE TO 
COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST 
U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A VERY LARGE 
RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR 
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL.  THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS.  THE SAG ALSO 
WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE 
MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE 
U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND 
DHAHRAN.  USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN 
CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN 
SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
K.   IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE 
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG HAS GENERALLY PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON 
THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO 
LIAISE CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS 
AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM.  THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO 
THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT 
OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE 
DETERRENTS. 
 
FOWLER