US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1134

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

NIGERIA SIGNS ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT

Identifier: 03ABUJA1134
Wikileaks: View 03ABUJA1134 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2003-06-30 19:02:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS KTIA NI KICC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR: PM/B, L, T, P, D, IO, S/WCI, S/P, CWG/PM, 
PM/AT, 
AF FOR DAS BRIDGEWATER 
AF/W FOR DAN EPSTEIN, 
OSD/ISP/NP FOR LOOK, 
DOD/OGC FOR ALLEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2008 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, KTIA, NI, KICC 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA SIGNS ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D) 
 
 
1.  (U) On June 30, during a private signing ceremony at 
the Ministry of Justice, Solicitor-General I.A. Ayua signed 
the Article 98 Agreement on behalf of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.  Ambassador Jeter signed on behalf of the 
United States.  Signed original has been sent to L/T via 
registered pouch 2105851. 
 
 
2.  (C) At first, Ayua said the GON saw Article 98 as a 
treaty requiring ratification by the National Assembly. 
Ambassador Jeter explained, however, that the Rome Statute, 
by including Article 98 contemplated that a party to the 
treaty would enter into such agreements.  Consequently, 
when the Nigerian National Assembly ratified the Statute, 
the Nigerian National Assembly also assented to the 
possibility of Nigeria entering into such an agreement. 
Because the Statute has been ratified, there was little 
value or necessity in ratifying an act expressly approved 
by the Statute. 
 
 
3.  (C) Responding positively to this line of reasoning, 
Ayua conceded that National Assembly ratification might not 
be required afterall.  Ayua also mentioned that President 
Obasanjo had told him he wanted the "entire issue behind 
him" in time for President Bush's upcoming visit. 
 
 
4.  (C) We are preparing a non-paper for the GON outlining 
the argument in favor of treating Article 98 as an 
Executive Agreement.  Obasanjo's desire to resolve the 
issue before President Bush's visit may weigh heavily on 
the GON's decision to handle this as an executive agreement 
or treat. 
 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador also raised the possible desirability of 
Nigerians concluding Article 98 agreements with member- 
states in the West African Sub-region, recalling the 
allegations of gross human rights abuses by Nigerian troops 
taking part in peacekeeping operations in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.  Had the Rome Treaty existed at that time, 
Nigerian soldiers could have been subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, whether the allegations were 
true or not.  The Solicitor-General took these points and 
directed his staff to explore the possibility of concluding 
Article 98 Agreements with member states of ECOWAS. 
 
 
6.  (C) In any event, President Obasanjo took a positive 
and courageous decision.  Now we have Africa's largest 
country on the right side of the Article 98 ledger.  We 
should be able to use Nigeria's gravitational pull to 
influence other African nations, especially other countries 
in West Africa. 
JETER 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04