US embassy cable - 03KABUL1744

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NATO ISAF DELEGATION DISCUSSES SECURITY, AIRPORT OPERATIONS, RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

Identifier: 03KABUL1744
Wikileaks: View 03KABUL1744 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kabul
Created: 2003-06-29 05:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV MOPS MARR AF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, DSEDNEY, RHANSON 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, MARR, AF 
SUBJECT: NATO ISAF DELEGATION DISCUSSES SECURITY, AIRPORT 
OPERATIONS, RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert P. Finn for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (C) Post hosted June 19 a meeting with the visiting NATO 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) delegation led 
by Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping Robert Serry. 
Representatives from NATO embassies in Kabul included the UK, 
Spanish, Turks, Danes, and Dutch; the Germans, Belgians and 
French also have embassies in Kabul but did not attend the 
meeting.  Discussion focused on security in and around Kabul, 
necessary preparations for NATO,s assumption of ISAF 
command, lead nation responsibility for Kabul International 
Airport, and potential Russian assistance to ISAF.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
SECURITY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR NATO ISAF 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The delegation expressed pleasant surprise regarding 
the efficiency of the Afghan MFA and Embassy in Brussels, 
which transmitted a NATO paper to Kabul, circulated it 
amongst other Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan 
(TISA) ministries, collected comments, and generated 
constructive feedback. 
 
3. (C) Deputy Secretary General Serry and his staff inquired 
about security in Kabul and throughout the country, 
developments surrounding the October Constitutional Loya 
Jirga (CLJ), the summer 2004 elections, and security sector 
reforms including disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) and restructuring the Ministry of 
Defense.  The discussion touched only briefly on Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), as the delegation intended to 
address the issue separately in a subsequent meeting with 
Office of Military Cooperation Chief MG Karl Eikenberry. 
 
4. (C) Offering the Embassy Kabul perspective on important 
steps in NATO,s assumption of ISAF command, CDA and Poloffs 
stressed the need to immediately establish contact with key 
TISA ministries, especially the Ministry of Interior, UNAMA, 
and counterparts in CJTF-180.  Embassy officers underscored 
the need to start planning for security in the Kabul area of 
responsibility in advance of the selection of CLJ delegates 
and the actual convening of the CLJ in October.  Another 
significant point is the imperative of establishing a robust 
public relations/psychological operations program that 
targets Kabul,s population.  Emboffs suggested that it was 
not too late to start planning with relevant TISA officials 
for the Hajj; such planning should start at least three 
months beforehand, i.e. in September.  ISAF,s major role is 
cooperation at the Kabul airport, which funneled almost half 
of last year,s 26,000 Hajjis, with particular focus on 
security around the airport and passenger assembly point in 
liaison with the Ministry of Interior. 
 
5. (C) CDA and Poloffs also emphasized that NATO should 
consider the role of ISAF in the DDR process when it arrives 
in Kabul.  Furthermore, ISAF,s part in demilitarizing Kabul 
(i.e. removing Afghan Militia Forces in the capital, most of 
whom are Panjshiris loyal to Defense Minister Fahim) in 
accordance with the Bonn Agreement should be carefully 
thought out and strategized as TISA authorities and the 
international community muster the political will and a 
practical plan to carry out demilitarization. 
 
------------------------------ 
LEAD NATION FOR KABUL AIRPORT 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Responding to a query on a lead nation for Kabul,s 
international airport, Serry stated that the Germans were 
ready to continue as lead nation provided there was common 
funding.  (Comment:  Since taking over the APOD (aerial point 
of departure - the military side of the combined 
civilian/military Kabul International Airport) from the 
Turks, the Germans have done a superb job; they have invested 
much in repairing bombed out buildings, paving a new heliport 
area, expanding the apron, marshalling more fire and safety 
equipment, and installing many new prefabs for offices, 
barracks, and storehouses.  Embassy recommends the Germans, 
with whom the Embassy has an excellent working relationship, 
remain in charge of the airport.  End comment.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE OFFER TO NATO ISAF 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) On the question of Russian interest in assisting NATO 
ISAF, Serry conveyed that the Alliance,s Military Committee 
was studying the Russian offer, though NATO members were 
divided in opinion.  Serry explained that Russian transit and 
overflight permissions would be useful, but that no Russian 
soldiers would be stationed with ISAF.  Intelligence sharing 
via Tajikistan and possible Russian military airlift are also 
part of the offer, Serry said.  He also mentioned that 
Secretary General Lord Robertson had phoned Karzai about the 
 
SIPDIS 
Russian offer of assistance and Karzai stated it was a very 
sensitive subject that would have to be considered carefully. 
 (Comment:  Karzai, perhaps, in his first phone call with 
Robertson, was too polite to tell him outright, NOT a good 
idea.  End comment.) 
 
8. (C) Embassy officers held that Russian involvement in ISAF 
is politically infeasible at this time for the Karzai 
administration.  With memories still fresh of the calamity 
inflicted on Afghanistan by the Soviets, most Afghans would 
not understand observable Russian participation in ISAF. 
Were they to become visibly involved, ISAF might face an 
additional security threat with irate Afghans targeting ISAF 
because of the Russian (Soviet) connection.  Also, the 
Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) would try 
to score public relations points against the Karzai 
government and Coalition for including the Russians. 
 
9. (C) Deputy Secretary General Serry informed the group that 
President Karzai invited SG Robertson to Kabul on September 
26, if Karzai himself is not attending the UN General 
Assembly at that time.  He also conveyed that NATO invited 
Foreign Minister Abdullah and SRSG Brahimi to North Atlantic 
Council meetings on July 16 and 23, respectively.  Finally, 
Serry offered that SG Robertson would not come to the August 
12 ISAF change of command ceremony, which NATO wants to keep 
low-key. 
10. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
FINN 

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