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| Identifier: | 03ABUJA1113 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ABUJA1113 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2003-06-27 13:59:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ETRD PGOV PREL NI USTR |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001113 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, AF/EPS AND EB/TPP SATE PASS USTR PCOLEMAN TASHKENT FOR BURKHALTER COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD, PGOV, PREL, NI, USTR SUBJECT: NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT DEFENDS IMPORT BANS Summary ------- 1. In June 9 and 10 meetings with Nigerian officials, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa Florie Liser and USTR Director for African Affairs Patrick Coleman highlighted U.S. concern with the expansion of Nigeria's import bans and its frequently changing tariff schedules. With the exception of the Ministry of Commerce, GON officials defended the bans, claiming they were the only route to increasing domestic agricultural and manufacturing production. Unfortunately, this protectionist mind-set is gaining currency, and convincing the GON to reverse its illiberal trade policy will be difficult. USTR Message ------------ 2. In June 9 meetings with officials from the Office of the President, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Finance, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa Florie Liser and USTR Director for Africa Patrick Coleman highlighted U.S. concern with a growing list of Nigerian import bans and fluctuating tariff schedules. In particular, Liser cited textiles and apparel, ice cream, fruit juices, poultry, and mosquito netting as key areas. 3. In addition to constraining U.S. exports, Nigeria's inconsistent trade policy was also diluting U.S. investors' interest in the country, Liser noted. Investors seek a stable regulatory environment; trade bans and fluid tariff schedules make investors fear they might not be able to import inputs required for their investment, she cautioned. Liser also pointed out that the bans were inconsistent with Nigeria's WTO commitments. She suggested WTO-consistent tariffs that earn revenue for the government would be a better way to provide some protection for domestic industry. She pointed out that many of the banned goods continue to be smuggled into the country across Nigeria's overland borders. 4. Liser also pushed Nigerian officials to encourage their National Assembly to pass legislation making Nigeria eligible for AGOA textile and apparel benefits. She said other African countries were creating thousands of jobs due to AGOA and that Nigeria's window of opportunity would soon close. Ministry of Commerce -------------------- 5. Liser met Director of the Ministry of Commerce External Trade Department Fred Agah and other members of his staff. Agah explained that in the 1970s, Nigeria sought to use oil revenues to build a self- sufficient economy through import substitution and large projects to produce steel, paper, aluminum, petrochemicals, and other goods. He said the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s forced successive governments to abandon these projects. Subsequently, an IMF structural adjustment program in the late 1980s focused on demand reduction completed the shift from an economy based on production to one based on speculation, according to Agah. He said imports skyrocketed, and in response the government imposed import bans on as many as 3,000 products by the early 1990s. 6. Agah said there had been some progress eliminating trade barriers and claimed few remained. He pointed to Nigeria's 2002 trade policy documents as evidence of an overall commitment to trade liberalization. However, Agah explained that a command and control approach to economic policy still existed among government leadership. That approach, coupled with demands from politically influential domestic producers, meant that trade barriers on certain goods would be around for some time. Agah acknowledged the negative impact the bans had on investment, both domestic and foreign, but said that his Ministry was essentially powerless on the issue. 7. On AGOA, Agah said both Houses had passed legislation to strengthen the trans-shipment penalty, a change necessary to Nigeria's eligibility for AGOA apparel benefits. He said the National Assembly would send the bill to the President for signature after harmonizing the Senate and House versions. Agah blamed the United States for the delay in getting the legislation through, saying that we were not consistent in providing information on what provisions were necessary to make Nigeria eligible for apparel benefits. 8. Agah requested information on our positions on key issues within the Doha round of WTO negotiations. He understood our basic proposals, but wanted to know the issues on which we would be amenable to compromise and those on which our position is non-negotiable. Agah claimed this knowledge would help Nigeria better support us on areas where Nigeria and the United States have common interests. 9. In response to an inquiry from Liser, Agah said a U.S.-Nigeria TIFA in early July would not be feasible. Agah noted that a Minister likely would not have been confirmed by then, so he proposed postponing the meeting until September. Liser agreed to coordinate with Washington to fix a date. Ambassador's Luncheon --------------------- 10. Ambassador Jeter hosted a luncheon for Nigerian officials where--in addition to discussion of broader issues such as poverty alleviation and corruption-- Liser made her key points on trade policy inconsistency and AGOA eligibility. At the lunch were Head of the President's National Price Intelligence Committee Oby Ezekwesili, Director General of the Bureau of Public Enterprises Nasir El-Rufai, Former Chief Economic Advisor Magnus Kpakol (now Special Advisor on Poverty Alleviation), and Special Advisor to the Vice President for Economic Affairs Hamilton O. Isu. 11. Kpakol attempted to defend the import bans and tariff increases saying that they were relatively few and were necessary to supporting domestic production. He aknowledged Liser's point that in some cases the bans protected only one manufacturer, but insisted that the bans were part of a well-considered plan to promote domestic manufacturing capacity. (Comment: Last year, Kpakol was a free trader and an ally-- although often ineffective--in our attempts to tilt the GON toward greater trade liberalization. However, he appears fully converted to the protectionist congregation. His conversion eliminates a formerly reformist voice from within senior policy circles. It also demonstrates the strength of the protectionists within the GON. End Comment.) Ministry of Finance ------------------- 12. At the Ministry of Finance, Liser met Director for Budget Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation C. D. Gali and Director for Fiscal Policy Haliru Aliyu. Gali said import bans were counterproductive because they were impossible to enforce and brought in no tariff revenue. 13. Aliyu disagreed, saying buyers preferred imports over local goods. Because there is local production, he cited toothpicks, water, biscuits, and textiles as "needless imports." Aliyu added that there was "nothing really permanent" about the bans. On mosquito netting, Aliyu said he recently met netting manufacturers who claimed they are overstocked with yarn. He concluded there was therefore no need to import mosquito netting, since local manufacturing capacity was underutilized. Ministry of Industry -------------------- 14. Ministry of Industry Permanent Secretary Haruni Sanusi and his staff also received Liser's trade policy message. Sanusi explained that Nigeria's industrial policy is to use trade policy to protect domestic industry. He said bans were necessary to encourage growth and allow domestic goods to gain market share. He pointed to fruit juice as one example of a ban that was successful in building sales for a local producer. 15. Sanusi acknowledged that smuggling was a problem but insisted that stronger enforcement effort would all but eliminate smuggling. He said the bans were temporary and more may follow, but insisted they would be closely monitored to assess their impact. Ministry of Agriculture ----------------------- 16. On June 10, Patrick Coleman met Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary O. A. Idachi and staff to discuss trade policy. Idachi insisted the bans were important to food security in Nigeria. He said Nigeria hoped to be a net food exporter again, and recognized that agricultural development was key to poverty alleviation. Idachi identified several priorities for Nigeria: rice, vegetable oil, and livestock. He said trade policy would be used to protect domestic production in those areas. 17. Idachi's staff said trade policy was the only tool available to protect Nigerian farmers from intense competition from developed countries that subsidize their farmers. They complained trade liberalization only benefits developed countries. Coleman countered that USTR's position was to eliminate export subsidies and greatly reduce domestic support in the Doha round. Comment ------- 18. Economic growth and industrialization based on import substitution, a development strategy that has failed more often than it has worked, has become policy in Nigeria. Without question, Nigeria has great economic potential. It possesses abundant natural resources and a large domestic market. That potential has been underutilized thus far. Instead of identifying internal structural flaws that obstruct domestic production, the GON has decided to blame unfair international competition, a convenient fall guy. This sentiment is held not only by those in government, but many people in society. Ask an average Nigerian about the recent ban on fruit juice, and they will answer "why should we import what we can make at home?" 19. This nationalistic sentiment, however, does not duly consider economic realities nor the negative impact on the consumer. Some goods--such as fruit juice--are in short supply because domestic producers cannot meet demand. Consumers now have no choice but to purchase inferior quality goods. Meanwhile, investors who could help local manufacturers build capacity or improve quality hold their money outside Nigeria, fearing that trade or other economic policy will change again abruptly putting them on the wrong side of a trade barrier. 20. Given the relatively strong consensus for the import substitution strategy, Nigeria will not likely turn from its protectionist course very quickly. In fact, additional items will probably be added to the prohibited list in the months to come. However, we hope that our harping and the patent ineffectiveness of the protectionist approach will, sooner rather than later, cause the GON to enter into a new romance with trade liberalization. End Comment. Jeter
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