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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA4061 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA4061 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-06-25 13:01:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN ENRG TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004061 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR E, EUR/SE AND EB TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS AND LEICHTER NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/DDEFALCO USDA FOR FAS FOR EC AND CCC/FSA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON, EFIN, ENRG, TU SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY SWIRLS AROUND PETKIM PRIVATIZATION REF: (A) ANKARA 2130 (B) ANKARA 3784 Sensitive but unclassified. Not for internet distribution. 1. (SBU) Summary: The first major sale in Turkey's ambitious 2003 privatization program is nearing the finish line, with the imminent submission of the winning bid for the state petrochemical company Petkim to Turkey's High Privatization Council for approval. The tender is engulfed in controversy, however, both because of the bid amount--too low in the estimation of some, at USD 605 million, against a pre-tender market capitalization of just over USD 1.1 billion-- and because of the identity of the winning bidder: Turkey's notorious Uzan family, well-known for its telecommunications exploits and more recently stripped of the concession contracts of its two power companies-- Kepez and Cukorova Electric-- for persistent contract and legal violations (ref b). With a USD 4 billion revenue target for the year, but only USD 12 million realized to date, Privatization Administration (PA) officials stress that completion of the sale at the bid price would mark an important step forward. They defend their decision to permit the Uzans to participate, noting that the family has fulfilled its obligations to the PA in the past, and they are not permitted to consider bidders' dealings with other state bodies. Given Cem Uzan's emergence as a chief political rival of the ruling AK Party and the controversy surrounding the family, however, high council approval is not a foregone conclusion. End Summary. 2. (SBU) A Lackluster Bidding War: PA Project head Meray Ekin outlined the bidding process in a June 20 meeting with Econoff and economic specialist. Of the original five bidders who submitted bids in April 2003, three remained in the final round: the Uzan's Standart Kimya, Vakif Bank, and Sanko and Zorlu holding (individual bidders in the first round, who elected to join forces). Speculation has swirled around the presence of Vakif, a semi-state bank in the process, with some market observers in Istanbul speculating that it served as a stalking horse for the PA, enabling it to set a floor price in the auction. (Separately, Treasury sources told us that the PA gave an instruction to Vakif to bid, given legal requirements that at least three bidders participate.) For her part, Ekin dismissed such speculation, suggesting instead that Vakif was acting as a front for an Iranian group, but indicating that she did not have any proof. 3. (SBU) Price Controversy: In response to bidding demand, the PA decided to sell the full 88.86 percent of the company's shares that remain in government hands (the original tender specified a range from 51 to 88.86 percent). The Uzan's winning bid came in at USD 605 million. The Zorlu/Sanko partnership dropped out at USD 570 million (the price one major Istanbul brokerage told us it expected the company to bring). Bidders are expected to pay 40 percent as an immediate payment, and then 20 percent each year for three years. There is a 10 percent discount if the full price is paid at the outset. The amount of the Uzan's offer immediately sparked controversy, with critics calling it a "firesale" price, given that before the tender the company's market capitalization on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (where some 11 percent of shares are traded) approached USD 1.1 billion. (It has since dropped by over 20 percent.) Prime Minister Erdogan, who serves as chair of the Privatization High Council, added his voice to those who questioned the sale price. PA officials, however, defend the price, noting that whoever takes over the company will need to invest at least USD 1 billion to make the company productive and efficient (a figure Ekin said all bidders accepted). Separately market analysts at brokerages including HC Istanbul and Global told us that they had anticipated a figure between USD 500 and 570 million. 4. (SBU) Controversial Winner: Adding to the controversy is the identity of the winning bidder: the controversial Uzan family, whose dealings in areas ranging from telecommunications to electricity have sparked lawsuits and complaints of deceptive and illegal business practices. Most famous for defrauding Motorola and Nokia out of nearly USD 2 billion in supplier credits, the Uzans' other business practices have also been widely questioned. In addition, family scion Cem Uzan's Genc (Young) Party has played on a set of nihilist, anti-American themes to emerge as the AK party's most ardent challenger. Ekin stressed, however, that legally the PA had no basis for excluding the family from participating in the Petkim tender: they had, she said, the "best company record" with the PA regarding payments and meeting privatization terms in the past. She conceded that the family's post-PA dealings with their companies were less blameless, but noted that Turkish legislation does not permit the PA to consider a bidder's dealings with other state institutions. Failure to pay taxes or meet obligations to other parts of the GOT is not grounds for exclusion from the bidding, she said, so the family's difficulties regarding its power companies Cukorova and Kepez, which were stripped of their government concessions for legal and contract violations, "cannot legally be an obstacle." (A point Industry Minister Ali Coskun emphasized publicly following the companies' takeover.) 5. (SBU) Next Steps: After clearance by the PA, the Uzan offer was submitted to Turkey's Competition Council, which also cleared it on June 23, saying it posed no problems under Turkey's competition law. The final decision is thus left to the high council, chaired by Erdogan and composed of four other ministers. The council's discretion is constrained only by the need to preserve confidence in the privatization process. It thus does not need a legal pretext to disallow the Uzan's bid. 6. (SBU) A Tough Call: Ekin stressed that because of the large price difference between the Uzan and Zorlu bid, the contract could not be awarded to the next highest bidder, if the Uzan bid is not accepted by the high council. Instead, the process would have to start from scratch. This, she judged, would negatively impact the upcoming privatization of Tekel (the state alcohol and tobacco monopoly) and Tupras (the state refinery), and imperil the government's target of USD 4 billion in privatization revenue for the year. 7. (SBU) Comment: The government faces a tough call on the Petkim privatization, with political considerations-- both normative and tactical-- mitigating against approval of the tender, in the first place to keep the company out of the hands of a notorious clan, and in the second in order to keep the pressure on the family, which has been shaken by the Cukorova and Kepez decision. On the other hand, however, rejection of the tender would deal a blow to government attempts to jump-start its privatization program and make a real dent in the year's ambitious revenue goal. It would also negatively impact upcoming privatizations, particularly if officials continue to argue that the price is too low. In our contacts with GOT officials, we have stressed our hope that the council will avoid second guessing the bid price, and will not make its decision on that basis, but on other, sounder (i.e. anti-corruption) grounds. Clearly, the tender has highlighted shortcomings in Turkey's privatization law, in that broader requirements for bidders would have prevented this embarrassing outcome. PEARSON
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