US embassy cable - 03ANKARA4026

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TURKEY: AK GOVERNMENT TIGHTENS THE SCREWS ON CORRUPTION

Identifier: 03ANKARA4026
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA4026 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-06-24 11:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241133Z Jun 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: AK GOVERNMENT TIGHTENS THE SCREWS ON 
CORRUPTION 
 
 
REF: A. 02 ANKARA 1927 
     B. ANKARA 3784 
     C. 02 ANKARA 7317 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: AK Party is engaging in a broad and popular 
anti-corruption campaign for both normative policy and 
narrower, hardball political reasons.  By doing so, P.M. 
Erdogan and AK are: 1) implicating both their political and 
bureaucratic rivals; thereby 2) putting them on the defensive 
and undercutting their ability to mount opposition to EU 
reform and other elements of the AK agenda; and in the 
process 3) deflecting criticism from long-standing corruption 
charges against Erdogan and other AK members.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) As noted in ref A, corruption in all its forms is 
deeply embedded in Turkish social, political, and 
bureaucratic life, although public attitudes are noticeably 
changing.  Ongoing economic difficulties and the drive for EU 
membership have focused public opinion on the more subversive 
aspects of graft in politics but also, significantly, in the 
military -- long viewed as Turkey's most respected 
institution.  Increased public criticism of endemic 
corruption helped paved the way for the ruling AK Party's 
victory in the November 2002 elections in part because AK was 
seen as cleaner than its electoral rivals. 
 
 
----------------- 
The new offensive 
----------------- 
 
 
3. (C) AK -- which means "clean" in Turkish -- made 
corruption a campaign theme but until now had done little on 
this front, given the pressing business of Iraq and other 
issues.  With the war over, AK is refocusing on the issue. 
An AK-led  Parliamentary investigative commission is probing 
the improprieties of previous governments, including those of 
Bulent Ecevit and Tansu Ciller. 
 
 
-- Thus far, the commission has interviewed a host of senior 
politicians from the Ecevit administration, including 
then-Deputy P.M.s Mesut Yilmaz (long seen as up to his neck 
in corrupt business deals) and Ecevit's former right-hand man 
Husamettin Ozkan.  It has also "invited" Ecevit himself to 
speak to the panel.  While it remains to be seen whether the 
commission's efforts will bear fruit, its inquiries continue 
to make media headlines. 
 
 
-- The commission is also interested in probing the proposed 
sale of AWACS aircraft to Turkey, including allegations that 
the price was "improperly inflated" and not fully accounted 
for on the books.  (Note: Boeing and SSM officials tell us, 
however, that Parliament's decision to take a closer look at 
the deal is not new.  They also insist the contract -- which 
recently entered into effect -- is not in jeopardy.  End 
note.) 
 
 
4. (C) Moreover, on June 12, Turkish authorities seized 
control of Cukurova Electricity and Kepez Electricity, both 
of which are owned by the notoriously corrupt Uzan family -- 
including Motorola deadbeat Cem Uzan, head of the Genc 
(Young) Party that is emerging as AK's most ardent 
challenger.  As reported in ref B, the Uzans have allegedly: 
1) used these companies to extort money and favors from local 
industries; 2) failed to comply with investment commitments 
and GOT regulations; and 3) misused its Imar Bank for 
nefarious financial purposes (septel). 
 
 
------- 
Why Now 
------- 
 
 
5. (C) This latest push comes against a backdrop of sustained 
popularity for P.M. Erdogan and the AK Party.  It also comes 
amid a growing willingness -- even among more 
Establishment-oriented elements in the press and elsewhere -- 
to scrutinize defenders of the status quo, including the 
military, for their widely perceived resistance to 
comprehensive EU-related and other reforms.  Clearly, AK 
recognizes the anti-corruption campaign as good policy and 
good politics. 
 
 
-- AK members of Parliament's Defense Committee have recently 
expressed to us their determination to bring the budgeting 
process under more direct scrutiny and oversight, including a 
defense budget that heretofore has been subjected to 
virtually no civilian control.  Kemal Kaya, a close adviser 
to NATO Parliamentary Assembly Chairman Vahit Erdem, offered 
to us the AK perspective on the corruption problem. 
"Whatever exists in society," he said, "exists in the 
military too."  The goal, according to AK contacts, is aimed 
at nothing less than ending the military's dominance of 
political and social life in Turkey. 
 
 
-- Uzan, the newest poster-boy for corruption, has lashed out 
publicly against P.M. Erdogan, calling him "merciless" and 
"godless" in a recent stump-speech in Bursa.  Erdogan is now 
suing Uzan for defamation, and the Bursa Prosecutor's office 
has filed similar motions -- which, given Turkey's current 
restrictive speech regulations, could in theory land the Genc 
leader in prison and ban him from politics. 
 
 
----------------- 
Its All Relative? 
----------------- 
 
 
6. (C) While AK makes the right noises, there are legitimate 
questions as to the extent it is in fact different from the 
other parties and players on the corruption issue.  AK is 
generally regarded as far and above the rest of the crowd, a 
legacy in part of its Islamist roots and the widespread 
perception in Turkey that Islam-influenced politicians are 
therefore more moral and dedicated at least in some measure 
to a cause beyond themselves.  On the other hand, as the 
party increasingly inclines toward the "mainstream," it has 
taken on some of the traits it criticizes in its mainstream 
rivals.  While most observers seem willing for now to give AK 
on balance the benefit of the doubt, they do not 
automatically bestow upon it the mantle of (relative) 
personal probity that many conceded, however grudgingly, to 
former P.M. Erbakan, founder of the Refah-Fazilet-Saadet 
parties and godfather of Islamism in Turkey.  While Erbakan's 
skirting of the law was generally chalked up to his 
movement-building enterprise, there is a whiff of simple 
pocket-lining surrounding both Erdogan and some of his 
associates from his days as Mayor of Istanbul.  While 
venality is not a dominant theme associated with AK, it is 
present nonetheless in the commentaries of AK opponents in 
the press and elsewhere. 
 
 
7. (C) Erdogan has long been accused of impropriety, 
beginning with mayoral tenure and more recently involving 
questionable relations with shady characters including failed 
bankers and other elements (ref c).  While much of this 
reflects a failed effort by the State Establishment to 
discredit Erdogan and his party before the 2002 elections, 
the rumors persist -- with some justification.  According to 
several Embassy contacts, AK officials in the bureaucracy 
have solicited bribes in return for their support for 
particular projects.  As one leading businessman explained to 
us June 24, Turkey in 2003 is still dominated by the 
customary grant of favors and "gifts" to grease the wheels. 
 
 
-------------- 
The Upper Hand 
-------------- 
 
 
8. (C) Despite such charges, the anti-corruption campaign 
serves both AK's normative and narrower, hardball political 
interests by: 1) offering a public demonstration that AK is 
living up to its billing; 2) providing a convenient club with 
which to subdue the Government's rivals and challengers -- 
including the TGS and Uzan; and 3) deflecting criticism from 
long-standing charges against Erdogan and others.  Cuneyt 
Ulsever, "Hurriyet" columnist and a leading critic of both 
the Establishment and AK, explained to us June 20 that 
"Erdogan is basically challenging the Establishment" to show 
its cards, which Ulsever thought required a certain element 
of intestinal fortitude on the part of the P.M.  In Ulsever's 
view, AK's jiu-jitsu tactics make charges against 
Erdogan-the-corruption-fighter appear even more like an 
Establishment put-up job. 
PEARSON 

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