US embassy cable - 03HARARE1267

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MDC LEADER TSVANGIRAI WELL AND DETERMINED TO MOVE FORWARD

Identifier: 03HARARE1267
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE1267 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-06-23 12:58:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINS ZI MDC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 001267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/FO, AF/S 
NSC FOR AFRICA SR DIR FRAZER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PINS, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC LEADER TSVANGIRAI WELL AND DETERMINED TO MOVE 
FORWARD 
 
Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D 
 
1.(c) Tsvangirai released: The Ambassador met MDC President 
Morgan Tsvangirai at his home on June 23.  Except for a bad 
cold, he was upbeat and determined following his June 20 
release from prison after two weeks.  Tsvangirai expressed 
appreciation for the many messages of solidarity received and 
for the public pressure for his release and for a political 
solution to Zimbabwe's crisis. Tsvangirai was stoic and 
strong and determined that neither he nor the MDC would be 
broken through GOZ tactics of violence, intimidation or 
humiliation.  He acknowledged that his family had feared for 
his fate inside prison, but said that he was not mistreated 
by the guards and that the prisoners were very supportive. 
He suffered only as other prisoners suffered, 150 to a large 
cell with poor food and inadequate cover for the cold winter 
nights.  Tsvangirai hopes that this second treason charge 
will never be taken to court and that the first treason 
charge will be dismissed shortly based on a defense motion 
following the conclusion of state testimony. 
 
2. (c) MDC politics: Tsvangirai said that the MDC would never 
be lured into ZANU/PF efforts to divide the MDC and to play 
up to a supposed moderate group led by Sec Gen Welshman 
Ncube. Tsvangirai said that all recognized that the MDC 
derived its strength from unified positions and that anyone 
acting outside the party had little weight.  The Party would 
be meeting in the next week to chart the way forward, but, 
while mass action was still part of MDC options, Tsvangirai 
did not anticipate any such action in the near term.  Nor did 
he believe that pressure for violent action would grow within 
the MDC. 
 
3. (c) President Bush's travel to Africa/ Need for a roadmap: 
Tsvangirai was very focused on President Bush's upcoming 
 
SIPDIS 
travel to Africa and anxious that Zimbabwe be raised 
prominently by the US during the visit.  Tsvangirai said that 
what was needed was a "roadmap for resolving the political 
crisis.  The first and most difficult was finding a dignified 
way for Mugabe to step down.  A transition process was next, 
although its length would depend on the shape and content of 
a transition. Elections were also  critical to restore 
legitimacy; their timing would depend on the transition. 
Tsvangirai promised to keep us informed of the status of 
 
SIPDIS 
negotiations efforts in anticipation of President Bush's 
visit. 
 
4. (c) South African and other mediation efforts:  Tsvangirai 
described South African efforts to broker a solution so far 
as "talks about the conditions and content of inter-party 
talks.  He did take some comfort in a reportedly tough 
message delivered to Mugabe by Vice President Jacob Zuma 
following President Mbeki's discussions at the G-8 meetings 
to the effect that South Africa could not wait indefinitely 
for a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis.  Tsvangirai believed 
that the South Africans had belatedly accepted that the MDC 
was essential to a solution and that eventual elections were 
also necessary.  Nonetheless, the South Africans gave 
preference to stability over democracy and would most like to 
see the MDC absorbed as a junior partner in a ZANU-PF 
government.  Tsvangirai said he would also be open to any 
efforts by Father Fidelis to arrange an "ice-breaking" 
meeting between Mugabe and Tsvangirai.  Similarly, Tsvangirai 
viewed meetings between a Church delegation and senior 
ZANU-PF leaders as potentially useful because of the 
seniority of the ZANU delegation.  However, Tsvangirai was 
skeptical of apparently independent initiatives by State 
Security Minister Goche seeking to talk with Welshman Ncube 
during Tsvangirai's imprisonment and by Justice Minister 
Chinamassa offering Tsvangirai the Vice Presidency in a 
Mnangagwa Presidency.  Tsvangirai noted that President Mugabe 
appeared to show no urgency in finding a solution and to 
continue searching for a succession formula dominated by 
ZANU-PF. 
 
5.(c) Comment:  ZANU-PF's effort to take advantage of its 
suppression of MDC-organized marches, its demonstrated 
control of the security forces and its ability to imprison 
and humiliate Tsvangirai have not succeeded.  Tsvangirai has 
emerged undeterred and ZANU-PF will have to recognize the 
need to deal with him and the MDC in order to resolve the 
national crisis. 
 
SULLIVAN 

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