US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT2668

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HALTING ASSISTANCE TO HAMAS

Identifier: 03KUWAIT2668
Wikileaks: View 03KUWAIT2668 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2003-06-17 14:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KPAL PREL PTER KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 002668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2013 
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PTER, KU 
SUBJECT: HALTING ASSISTANCE TO HAMAS 
 
REF: A. STATE 157973 
     B. STATE 163613 
 
Classified By: DCM Frank C. Urbancic, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Ambassador called on Kuwait's First Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmed June 17 to 
register U.S. views on the need to shut down all types of 
support for Hamas.  Drawing on points in ref (a) and 
non-paper in ref (b), Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. 
wanted to work with all the states in the region to bring 
peace to Palestinians.  Hamas, unfortunately, was a direct 
threat to this goal and it was important for the U.S. to work 
with its friends in the region to block funds that are, in 
many cases, sent to Hamas in the misguided belief that it was 
supporting bona fide charity. He emphasized as well that the 
U.S. freeze on assets of six individuals and four 
organizations would be imposed on Thursday, June 19, and he 
asked for Kuwaiti support and similar action. 
 
2.  (C) Sabah replied that the U.S. could be sure that Kuwait 
supported the goal of staunching the flow of money to 
terrorist organizations.  Known Hamas members, such as Khalid 
Meshaal, were persona non grata in Kuwait.  Shaykh Sabah was 
unaware of any actual Hamas activities in Kuwait, but he said 
that the government had already given instructions to all of 
its agencies to ensure that charitable contributions were, in 
fact, channeled through verifiably charitable organizations. 
Hamas was not one of those and the government would certainly 
oppose any use of Hamas as a financial channel into the 
territories.  He asked in addition that the U.S. provide any 
additional information to the Kuwaitis on activities that it 
believes might be going on in Kuwait.  If this information is 
available, the GOK will certainly act, Sabah assured the 
Ambassador. 
 
3. (C) On Palestinian-Israeli issues, Sabah said he was now 
more hopeful than he had been in a long time.  He sensed that 
both sides might now be ready to come to an agreement. While 
he acknowledged that the Arabs had a role to play with the 
Palestinians.  He underscored the need for firm U.S. 
treatment of the Israelis.  The Ambassador reminded Sabah 
that the President had already been quite critical in his 
comments about the Israeli attack on Rantissi.  He said that 
the U.S. was fully committed to the roadmap and we were 
looking for full partners to push it forward. 
 
4.  (C) Finally, the Ambassador emphasized that the issue of 
support for terrorist organizations was extremely sensitive 
in the U.S.  Assistant Secretary Burns had been questioned 
sharply on Arab activities in this regard during his recent 
testimony before the House International Relations Committee 
on June 12.  It was crucial for Kuwait to keep its reputation 
intact on the Hill by taking serious steps against Hamas 
quickly. 
JONES 

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