US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI2895

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002895 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/PPD 
 
NSC FOR PETER THEROUX 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TC 
SUBJECT:  AMBASSADOR PRESSES UAEG ON ZAYID 
CENTER 
 
REF: A) Abu Dhabi 2236 (081254Z MAY 03) 
B) 02 Abu Dhabi 4712 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador has repeatedly 
engaged the senior UAEG leadership on the need to 
make substantive changes at the controversial Abu 
Dhabi-based, Arab League-affiliated and UAEG-funded 
Zayid Center for Coordination and Follow-Up.  The 
Ambassador's most recent engagement was on June 11, 
when she separately raised the issue with MFA 
Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid, de facto Defense 
Minister Muhammad bin Zayid (MbZ) and Ahmed Juma'a 
Al-Zaabi, the Chief of Staff to Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Khalifa bin Zayid.  She had previously 
raised it in May and on several occasions over the 
last year or so (Ref A).  The Emiratis have assured 
her they will take action against the Center, 
including a turnover in administration and a change 
in the Center's name (presumably to remove any 
direct connection to Shaykh Zayid).  In the short 
term, steps have been taken to clean up the 
website, including the removal of most of the anti- 
semitic language and the placement of a disclaimer 
noting that the views expressed by Center speakers 
do not reflect the views of the Center, the Arab 
League or the UAEG. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador's senior interlocutors have 
cautioned that the long-term changes may well take 
time because of internal Al-Nahyan family dynamics. 
The Center's patron, erstwhile Deputy Prime 
Minister Sultan bin Zayid, is Shaykh Zayid's second 
eldest son.  Any move against Sultan by his younger 
half-brothers MbZ and Hamdan would be viewed as an 
outright power play.  Thus the difficult task of 
managing Sultan and cleaning up the offensive Zayid 
Center has fallen on the shoulders of Zayid's 
eldest son (and Sultan's older half-brother), Crown 
Prince Khalifa.  We believe that Khalifa will do 
the right thing.  The Ambassador will continue to 
follow-up vigorously with Khalifa to ensure that 
prompt and effective action is taken, as has been 
promised. END SUMMARY. 
 
A ZAYID CENTER PRIMER 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador continues to engage the 
senior Emirati leadership on the need to make 
substantive changes at the Abu Dhabi-based Zayid 
Center for Coordination and Follow-Up, a UAEG- 
funded "think-tank" affiliated with the Arab 
League.  As reported Ref A, the Ambassador first 
raised concerns about the Center's activities with 
MFA Minstate Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan in 
2002, following the Center's arrangement of an 
offensive series of lectures and the release of 
publications containing noxious material about 
Judaism.  Hamdan agreed that the Center had crossed 
the line and noted that it did not reflect the 
views of the UAEG.  However, he explained the 
difficulty in affecting change given the fact that 
Center's sponsor was Zayid's second eldest son and 
Hamdan's older half-brother, erstwhile UAE Deputy 
Prime Minister Shaykh Sultan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan. 
 
5. (C) In May of 2003, the Embassy's Public Affairs 
Office was contacted by Harvard University's 
Divinity School seeking information about 
connections between the UAEG and the Center. 
Several students at the Divinity School, noting the 
Center's intolerance, had protested Harvard's 
decision to accept a generous gift from UAE 
President Zayid to establish a chair for Islamic 
Religious Studies.  The Ambassador drew this issue 
to the attention of Shaykh Hamdan, highlighting the 
active damage the Center was doing to Shaykh 
Zayid's reputation.  She pressed the UAEG to take 
action before Harvard felt compelled to reject 
Shaykh Zayid's offer of a chair.  Hamdan promised 
to take the matter to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh 
Khalifa bin Zayid Al-Nahyan and asked the 
Ambassador to put her request in writing. 
6. (C) The Ambassador followed-up with a three-page 
letter outlining the USG's concerns with the Zayid 
Center, including material contained on its website 
and the Center's highly questionable choice of 
speakers.  She noted that while the UAEG may 
maintain that the Center does not speak for Shaykh 
Zayid or the government, "that distinction is 
neither understood nor appreciated...many in the 
U.S. take the view that if a government wholly or 
partially funds an organization, that government is 
responsible for the organization's behavior." 
 
PLUS CA CHANGE... PLUS CA RESTE LA MEME 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) On May 6, Hamdan reported to the Ambassador 
that Shaykh Khalifa agreed on the need to make 
changes at the Zayid Center.  He said one option 
was to move it from under Sultan's sponsorship and 
place it under the supervision of the President's 
Office.  We also learned from a ZCCF employee that 
orders had been issued to remove anti-semitic 
references from the website.  Embassy officers 
began monitoring the Center's website on a regular 
basis.  We noted that much of the more offensive 
material (though not all) was in fact removed and 
that a caveat has been placed on summaries of 
lectures placed on the website, explaining that 
"the views expressed...are solely those of the 
speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Centre (sic), the position of the League of 
Arab States, or the official policies of the 
government of the United Arab Emirates."  However, 
the website maintained one reference to a "Zionist 
media conspiracy." 
 
8. (C) The Embassy continued through the month of 
May to prod the UAEG to make changes at the Center. 
The Ambassador raised the issue with Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MbZ) 
on the margins of his May 19-22 visit to the United 
States.  The DCM also raised it with Shaykh Mansour 
bin Zayid, the Director of Shaykh Zayid's office. 
Both agreed on the need for action. 
 
ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Following her return from consultations in 
Washington, the Ambassador used the opportunity of 
a 5/31 meeting with Hamdan to ask what actions had 
been taken at the Center.  Hamdan, who had also 
just returned to the UAE from a trip to Morocco, 
promised to get back to the Ambassador.  In a 6/11 
meeting with Hamdan, the Ambassador raised the 
Center again, noting the continuing negative 
attention it was garnering in Washington and 
drawing Hamdan's attention to the offensive 
material still on the website.  She also discussed 
it with MbZ in a meeting later the same day.  Both 
Hamdan and MbZ indicated that the decision lay with 
Crown Prince Khalifa. 
 
10. (C) Late in the evening on 6/11, the Ambassador 
telephoned Khalifa's Chief of Staff, Ahmed Juma'a 
Al-Zaabi in Paris where Khalifa was on an official 
state visit.  Al-Zaabi, who was fully briefed on 
the issue, said that the Crown Prince was very much 
concerned and understood the damage inflicted on 
the UAE's reputation by the Zayid Center.  Al-Zaabi 
said the Crown Prince would take action when he 
returns to the UAE (at the end of June).  In 
response to the Ambassador's query as to what 
specific actions would be taken, Al-Zaabi said the 
administration would be changed and the Center's 
name would be altered (presumably to remove any 
reference to Shaykh Zayid).  He also noted that 
Khalifa planned to discuss the issue personally 
with his younger half-brother and Deputy Prime 
Minister Sultan. 
 
NOW FOR THE REST OF THE STORY... 
--------------------------------- 
11. (S) At the heart of the UAEG's apparent 
reluctance to take immediate steps against the 
Zayid Center is filial tension in the Al-Nahyan 
ruling family.  The Center's sponsor -- as noted 
above -- is Deputy Prime Minister Sultan bin Zayid, 
Shaykh Zayid's second eldest son.  Sultan is no 
stranger to personal controversy, linked to his on- 
again, off-again drug and alcohol addictions (see 
Ref B).  Sultan's direct competition in the 
succession line-up is Zayid's third eldest son and 
for many years our primary interlocutor, Chief of 
Staff Muhammad bin Zayid (MbZ).  It is widely 
assumed that with Zayid's passing and Khalifa's 
assumption of the Abu Dhabi ruler and UAE President 
titles, MbZ will move into the Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince slot and Sultan will be given the largely 
ceremonial role of Deputy Ruler.  MbZ and his full 
brothers effectively manage the critical 
governmental portfolios -- i.e. defense, foreign 
affairs, intelligence and information.  Despite his 
current job title and not insignificant ties to 
some Abu Dhabi tribes, Sultan's actual value-added 
in governance terms is minimal; he sometimes 
oversees the weekly cabinet meeting and from time 
to time greets and sees off visitors. 
 
12. (C) Nevertheless, for the sake of the family's 
honor and dignity, as well as the fact that a 
public brouhaha involving Sultan would upset the 
elderly Zayid, Sultan's half-brothers will not move 
against him.  Furthermore, as MbZ noted to the 
Ambassador, any move regarding the Zayid Center 
orchestrated by MbZ or his full brothers -- 
including Hamdan -- would likely be seen in 
domestic political terms as an unprincipled power- 
play to move Sultan out of the line of succession, 
something that would not redound to the longer term 
benefit of MbZ or his brothers. 
 
13. (S) Thus the difficult task of managing Sultan, 
and cleaning up the offensive Zayid Center, has 
fallen squarely on the shoulders of his elder half- 
brother, Crown Prince Khalifa.  We believe that 
Khalifa will do the right thing, despite the 
embarrassment entailed in a face-to-face 
confrontation with Sultan.  The Ambassador will 
continue to follow-up vigorously with Khalifa to 
ensure that he begins to take to take effective 
action to restructure the Zayid Center. 
 
WAHBA