US embassy cable - 97ISLAMABAD3085

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003085 
 
 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, S/CT, AND EUR/CEN; LONDON FOR POL/TUELLER; PARIS 
FOR POL/RAVELING; MBABANE FOR MALINOWSKI; CENTCOM/CENTPAC FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  4/14/07 
TAGS:  PGOV, PTER, KISL, PINR, AF, PK 
SUBJECT:  AFGHANISTAN:  OBSERVERS SAY "RADICALS" HAVE UPPER HAND IN 
TALIBAN AND ARE PUSHING FOR PROTECTION OF BIN LADEN 
 
REFS:   (A) ISLAMABAD 2987 
        (B) ISLAMABAD 2849 
        (C) PESHAWAR 277 
 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY DAN MOZENA, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR. 
REASONS:  1.5 (C) (D). 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY:  IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, HAMED GAILANI, THE 
POLITICALLY-ACTIVE SON OF PIR GAILANI, AND MULLAH MALANG, AN AFGHAN 
WITH LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY THAT "RADICALS" ARE 
GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE TALIBAN.  THEY PICTURE THE "RADICALS" 
AS BEING STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF OFFERING SAFE 
HAVEN TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER BIN LADEN.  THEY ADDED THAT SOME 
OF THE "RADICALS," INCLUDING "JUSTICE MINISTER" TURABI AND HIGH- 
LEVEL TALIBAN ADVISER WAKIL AHMED, WERE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN 
CLOSE TO MULLAH MANSOUR, A STRONGLY ISLAMIST RESISTANCE LEADER, WHO 
WAS ASSASSINATED IN 1992.  END SUMMARY. 
 
"RADICALS" SEEN AS GAINING THE UPPER HAND 
-----------------------------------------/ 
 
3.  (C) IN AN APRIL 12 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, HAMED GAILANI, 
THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE SMALL NATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF 
AFGHANISTAN, SAID HE HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF "RADICALS" 
HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN TALIBAN DECISION-MAKING.  IN A 
SEPARATE APRIL 14 CONVERSATION, MULLAH MALANG, A COMMANDER IN THE 
AFGHAN RESISTANCE WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TALIBAN, TOLD POLOFF THAT 
HE HAD ALSO NOTED A "MORE EXTREME EDGE" TO THE TALIBAN, ESPECIALLY 
IN THE PAST MONTH.  BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG LISTED THE FOLLOWING 
TALIBAN LEADERS AS "RADICALS" WITH INCREASED IMPORTANCE IN THE 
MOVEMENT: 
 
-- MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ADVISER TO TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR. 
-- MULLAH TURABI, THE "JUSTICE MINISTER." 
-- MULLAH MUTAQI, THE "INFORMATION MINISTER." 
-- MULLAH JALIL, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KANDAHAR. 
-- SHER MOHAMMAD STANEKZAI, THE "DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER" IN KABUL. 
-- MULLAH SIDDIQI, THE "ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE."  (NOTE:  SEE REF B 
FOR RECORD OF POLOFF'S RECENT MEETING WITH SIDDIQI, IN KABUL.) 
 
STRONG PRO-BIN LADEN VIEWS 
--------------------------/ 
 
4.  (C) MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT ALL OF THESE TALIBAN OFFICIALS ARE 
STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE TALIBAN'S POLICY OF PROVIDING SAFE HAVEN 
AND PROTECTION TO FUGITIVE SAUDI FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN.  IN 
PARTICULAR, HE NOTED, TURABI, WAKIL AHMED AND MUTAQI HAVE BEEN 
IDENTIFIED WITH THE PRO-BIN LADEN WING OF THE TALIBAN.  ON THE 
OTHER HAND, MALANG CONTINUED, ALTHOUGH MULLAH RABBANI, THE TALIBAN 
"CHIEF OF THE CARETAKER COUNCIL," AND MULLAH GHAUS, THE TALIBAN 
"FOREIGN MINISTER," ARE NOT AGAINST OFFERING HAVEN TO BIN LADEN, 
THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL 
RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE TALIBAN OF BEING IDENTIFIED WITH BIN LADEN'S 
ANTI-SAUDI AND ANTI-AMERICAN POLICIES.  HOWEVER, MALANG ADDED, 
RABBANI AND GHAUS HAVE "LOST THE ARGUMENT" AND THE TALIBAN HAVE NO 
PLANS TO ADJUST THEIR POLICY ON BIN LADEN. 
 
5.  (C) ASKED WHY BIN LADEN IS SO IMPORTANT TO THE "RADICALS," 
MALANG REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE 
RADICALS SEE BIN LADEN AS A "LEARNED MUSLIM," WHO CAN QUOTE FROM 
THE KORAN AND HADITHS (SAYINGS OF THE PROPHET).  IN ADDITION, THEY 
FEEL HE IS OWED RESPECT BECAUSE HE HELPED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE 
DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS.  FINALLY, MALANG OBSERVED, THE 
"RADICALS" ARE APPRECIATIVE OF THE FUNDS THAT BIN LADEN PROVIDES 
THE TALIBAN. 
 
THE "MANSOUR" GROUP 
-------------------/ 
 
6.  (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ASSERTED THAT MOST OF THE TALIBAN 
"RADICALS" WERE AFFILIATED WITH AN AFGHAN RESISTANCE PARTY LED BY 
NASRULLAH MANSOUR.  GAILANI TOLD POLOFF THAT MANSOUR WAS ORIGINALLY 
THE DEPUTY TO MOHAMMED NABI MOHAMMEDI, THE LEADER OF HARAKAT-I- 
INQILAB-I-ISLAMI (HII), BUT LEFT THE PARTY TO FORM A BREAKAWAY 
FACTION IN 1981.  THE ISSUE THAT LED TO THE HII SPLIT, ACCORDING TO 
GAILANI, WAS NABI'S BELIEF THAT MANSOUR HAD GROWN "TOO 
INTERNATIONALIST" IN HIS ISLAMIC BELIEFS.  HE NOTED THAT MANSOUR 
WAS ASSASSINATED BY UNITS LOYAL TO HEZB-I-ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR) IN 
1992, AND ADDED THAT WAKIL AHMED, TURABI, AND SIDDIQI, IN 
PARTICULAR, ARE CONSIDERED "PROTEGES OF MANSOUR." 
 
"MANSOURIS" SEEN AS LESS ANTI-IRANIAN" 
--------------------------------------/ 
 
7.  (C) NOTING THAT MANSOUR SPENT A NUMBER OF YEARS IN IRAN IN THE 
1980S, MALANG TOLD POLOFF THAT THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE CONSIDERED 
"MANSOURIS" (AS SUPPORTERS OF MANSOUR ARE KNOWN) ARE CONSIDERED TO 
BE LESS ANTI-IRANIAN THAN OTHER TALIBAN.  EXPANDING ON THIS POINT, 
HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE ISLAMIST IN 
ORIENTATION AND LESS NATIONALISTIC, THEY DO NOT HOLD THE STRONG 
ANTI-IRANIAN BELIEFS COMMON TO OTHER AFGHANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE 
PASHTUNS FROM WESTERN PROVINCES LIKE KANDAHAR, HELMAND, URUZGAN, 
AND FARAH.  THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE PRO-IRANIAN, HE CONCLUDED, 
BUT SIMPLY THAT "MANSOURIS" ARE MORE WILLING TO TALK TO THE 
IRANIANS. 
 
A TALIBAN "REFORM COMMISSION" 
-----------------------------/ 
 
8.  (C) NEITHER GAILANI NOR MALANG BELIEVED THAT THE TREND TOWARD 
WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS THE "RADICALIZATION" OF THE TALIBAN WOULD EBB 
IN THE NEAR-TERM.  BOTH NOTED THAT THAT THEY HAD HEARD THAT MULLAH 
TURABI WAS NAMED THE HEAD OF A "REFORM COMMISSION" BY TALIBAN 
LEADER MULLAH OMAR IN MARCH.  FROM THIS POSITION, MALANG COMMENTED, 
IT IS BELIEVED THAT MULLAH TURABI NOW MAINTAINS A GREAT DEAL OF 
INFLUENCE ON PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION.  IN 
ADDITION, SINCE IT WAS REPORTED THAT TURABI WAS CHOSEN FOR THE POST 
PERSONALLY BY MULLAH OMAR, IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE IS NOW, ALONG 
WITH MULLAH WAKIL AHMED, ONE OF OMAR'S CLOSEST ADVISERS, HE STATED. 
 
COMMENT 
-------/ 
 
9.  (C) BOTH GAILANI AND MALANG ARE KNOWLEGEABLE CONTACTS ON 
AFGHANISTAN; MALANG, IN PARTICULAR, APPEARS TO KNOW A LOT ABOUT 
TALIBAN PERSONALITIES AND DECISION-MAKING.  THEIR ASSERTION THAT 
"RADICALS" IN THE TALIBAN HAVE BEEN GAINING INFLUENCE HAS BEEN 
REPEATED BY OTHER OBSERVERS, INCLUDING GENERAL PAYENDA, DOSTAM'S 
REPRESENTATIVE IN PAKISTAN (REF A).  BIN LADEN'S ASSOCIATION WITH 
THE PURPORTEDLY ASCENDANT "RADICALS" IS POTENTIALLY OF GREAT 
CONCERN, ESPECIALLY IF IT MEANS THAT BIN LADEN IS ABLE TO EXPAND 
HIS INFLUENCE ON THE TALIBAN. 
 
 
SIMONS