US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI2861

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002861 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CAIRO AND RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY 
 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
 
STATE FOR T, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, ETTC, IR, TC 
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY 
BOLTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (S) Secretary Bolton:  Your visit to the UAE 
will provide an excellent opportunity to discuss 
our concerns about Iran with the UAEG.  We have 
secured a meeting with de facto Foreign Minister, 
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan, who has primary 
responsibility for the UAE's bilateral relationship 
with Iran.  Unfortunately, Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (with 
whom you recently met in Washington) will not be in 
the UAE at the time of your visit.  We have also 
scheduled a meeting with the Executive Director of 
Dubai Ports and Custom Authority, Sultan bin 
Sulayem.  Bin Sulayem is our primary interlocutor 
on Dubai-related exports controls issues. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
3. (S/NF) The UAE has long viewed Iran as a far 
greater threat to its existence than that posed by 
Iraq.  With a small national population (between 
600-700,000 Emirati citizens), ten percent of the 
world's oil reserves and among the region's most 
developed economies, the UAE's vulnerabilities are 
not inconsiderable.  Chief of Staff Shaykh Muhammad 
bin Zayid, in a June 11 meeting, briefed me that in 
the recently held GCC Intelligence Chief's semi- 
annual meeting, there was consensus that with 
Saddam's regime removed, the primary threat in the 
region is Iran.  The Emiratis have viewed with 
alarm Iran's nuclear and WMD-collection effort and 
have offered to work with us to coordinate on 
intelligence-collection efforts. 
 
4.  (S) The combination of Iran's robust illicit 
arms collection effort and increasing domestic 
instability has greatly unsettled the Emiratis.  De 
facto FM Hamdan told me June 11 that the UAEG has 
determined that Khatami -- in whom they held great 
hopes -- has been completely sidelined by the 
hardliners.  Hamdan shared that it is now President 
Zayid's view that the Iranian leadership writ large 
cannot be trusted.  For the UAE, this has 
translated into a major setback in the resolution 
of their dispute with Tehran over Iran's occupation 
of three islands in the Gulf claimed by the UAE. 
Hamdan had personally invested time and prestige -- 
making several journeys to Tehran -- to hammer out 
a resolution on the largest of the three islands, 
Abu Musa.  At one point last year, Hamdan believed 
that a resolution was close and had extended, on 
behalf of President Zayid, an invitation to Khatami 
to visit the UAE.  Those efforts now appear to have 
been for naught, though Khatami's invitation still 
stands.  On June 11, Hamdan briefed that relations 
have soured to the point that the Iranians have 
arrested an Emirati national of Iranian origins on 
espionage charges.  This despite, in Hamdan's 
words, the "hundreds of Iranian agentsz' the UAEG 
knows are operating in the UAE. 
 
5. (C) Despite the UAE's strained political 
relationship with Iran, bilateral trade ties are 
strong and growing.  The number one destination for 
goods transshipped through Dubai is Iran, and the 
UAE is a major destination for Iranian agricultural 
and mass produced consumer products.  Abu Dhabi 
shares production from an off-shore oil field with 
Iran, and monthly consultative meetings proceed 
cordially regardless of political developments. 
Nonetheless, Abu Dhabi's political concerns 
regarding Iran led to the decision to develop the 
multi-billion dollar Dolphin project to pipe 
natural gas to the UAE from Qatar -- despite the 
fact that Iranian gas sources would certainly have 
been cheaper, particularly for the northern 
Emirates (including Dubai).  Business may be 
business, but clearly there are limits (especially 
for Abu Dhabi), and particularly when it comes to 
sensitive national security items like fuel for the 
UAE's massive power and water sector. 
 
IRANIAN MEDDLING IN IRAQ 
------------------------ 
 
6. (S) The Emiratis have also expressed grave 
concern about what they believe is outright Iranian 
meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq.  The 
Emiratis would like to see a democratic process 
unfold in the post-Saddam era, one in which all of 
Iraq's ethnic and religious elements are 
represented.  They fear that Iranian intervention, 
particularly via the Badr Corps, may tip the scales 
in favor of those advocating a Shi'a/Iranian-style 
theocracy. 
 
GETTING TO YES ON AN ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Hamdan is committed to finalizing an Article 
98 agreement with us, preferably via the exchange 
of diplomatic notes.  We have traded suggestions on 
language and are working through the often 
laborious UAE interagency process to schedule a 
video teleconference with PM/B.  While we had hoped 
to have an agreement ready for signature by the end 
of June, it now appears that an early fall signing 
ceremony is more likely.  I recommend that you use 
your meeting with Hamdan to press him on the need 
for an early closure of this issue. 
 
EXPORT CONTROLS 
--------------- 
 
8.  (C) The UAE political leadership is strongly 
committed to working with us on export control 
issues and fully recognizes that this is a top 
bilateral priority.  Internal bureaucratic 
wrangling at the federal level over which Ministry 
should take the lead on this issue has now been 
resolved in favor of the Ministry of Interior.  A 
USG interagency team is visiting the UAE June 14-16 
to relaunch our comprehensive "road map" of export 
controls and border security training programs, and 
has found strong support at the federal level both 
at the MFA and Interior Ministry.  The Dubai Ports 
and Customs Authority (DPA, which runs Jebel Ali 
and Port Rashid, together the 12th largest port in 
the world) has separately indicated its interest in 
working with us directly on EXBS issues, 
particularly enforcement, and DPA is also pursuing 
participation in Homeland Security's Container 
Security Initiative (CSI). 
 
9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Amconsul 
Dubai. 
 
WAHBA