US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1047

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ZI, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA - RECENT EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE UNDERMINE 
LAST MONTH'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT OBASANJO 
AND MBEKI 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS: 
1.5 (B & D). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent surge in political tension 
in Zimbabwe seems to have erased the progress 
President Obasanjo believed was achieved by his May 
visit to Harare.  Obasanjo thought he and President 
Mbeki made headway moving the GOZ and MDC toward 
resuming their political negotiations.  However, the 
crackdown against the MDC and the MDC's call for mass 
action have eclipsed last month's Obasanjo-Mbeki 
intervention.  Curiously, the GON and other visiting 
African leaders reportedly gave President Mugabe the 
cold shoulder during his visit to Nigeria for 
President Obasanjo's May 29 inauguration.  While we 
should not read too much into this apparent brush-off, 
it could signal a possible lessening of Nigeria's 
patience with the recalcitrant Zimbabwean.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) During a May 16 meeting with Ambassador Jeter, 
President Obasanjo stated that his visit to Zimbabwe 
earlier that month was partially successful in drawing 
the GOZ and MDC back to the negotiation table. 
Obasanjo recounted that he and Mbeki had made progress 
shuffling between meetings with Mugabe and Tsvangirai. 
In the first meeting with Mugabe, the Zimbabwean 
expressed willingness for his officials to resume 
talks with the MDC.  However, Mugabe complained the 
MDC's claim that his election and subsequent 
inauguration were illegitimate was a major stumbling 
block.  Eventually, the MDC had to talk to him 
directly or he would have to give his lieutenants 
instructions on how to represent him in talks with the 
MDC, Mugabe posited.  There was no other way the 
process could move forward.  Thus, it was a non 
sequitur for the MDC to characterize him as 
illegitimate since he was the essential cog in the 
machinery of the desired negotiations, Mugabe 
reasoned. 
 
 
3. (C) Obasanjo said he relayed Mugabe's observation 
to Tsvangirai who, surprisingly, was accommodating. 
The MDC leader stated the MDC understood Mugabe was 
the de facto Head of State.  However, the MDC's 
position was that Mugabe's election was occasioned by 
serious irregularities, that Mugabe should honestly 
acknowledge.  The MDC could not simply concede 
victory when it was achieved through electoral fraud. 
The use of the term "illegitimate" was thus the MDC's 
rhetorical tool to galvanize its supporters and to 
remind the GOZ that redress and concessions were in 
order.  However, Tsvangirai promised that the MDC 
would delete the word illegitimate from its vocabulary 
should Mugabe agree to talks. 
 
 
4. (C) Obasanjo and Mbeki returned to Mugabe with the 
MDC position.  Mugabe seemed pleased, but advanced 
another condition.  This time, he insisted that the 
MDC should drop its court case.  Mbeki and Obasanjo 
returned to Tsvangirai with Mugabe's request, and the 
MDC was partially accommodating.  Tsvangirai stated 
that the court case was more a symbolic than a real 
threat to Mugabe.  Given the pliancy of the Zimbabwean 
judiciary and the dilatory tools in the GOZ legal 
arsenal, Tsvangirai was not sanguine about a favorable 
or an early decision.  Although the MDC leader 
insisted on the insuperability of the legal merits of 
his complaint, he also realized that the case could be 
bogged down in the courts well after Mugabe's term 
expired.  While Tsvangirai did not agree to formally 
dismiss the case, he indicated the MDC would be 
willing to let the case recede into inactivity should 
the talks resume and progress be achieved. 
 
 
5. (C) Obasanjo said he had to leave Zimbabwe before a 
third session could be arranged with Mugabe; however, 
Mbeki talked to Mugabe who did not reject the MDC idea 
of informally letting the case run a long course. 
Yet, the Zimbabwean leader seemed to prefer a more 
formal and final disposition of the case. 
 
 
6. (C) Also, Mbeki and Mugabe talked about possible 
inclusion of the MDC in a government of national 
unity.  Mugabe signaled that he was not opposed to the 
idea but asserted the MDC had less than a handful of 
members competent enough for Ministerial or senior 
level appointments.  Mbeki urged him to offer the MDC 
a chance to join as a junior partner in a government 
of national unity and to extend positions to these 
competent MDC representatives. 
 
 
7. (C) Stating that a government of national unity was 
as far as Mugabe could go, Obasanjo recalled a 
conversation with a ZANU-PF leader who told him the 
party would not let Mugabe step down right now.  The 
party was adamant that he should remain until the 2005 
legislative elections.  If he left now, the party 
could fragment because of leadership struggles; this 
would jeopardize ZANU's political future.  Once the 
party's legislative base was reaffirmed in 2005, then 
Mugabe would become expendable, an increasingly 
negative factor as the country again approached its 
Presidential election. 
 
 
8. (C) Comment: Obasanjo believed he had achieved 
headway in Zimbabwe; events in late May and early June 
seem to belie that contradiction.  Confrontation and 
crackdown, with Mugabe in his accustomed role as prime 
culprit, have re-emerged as the dominant themes in 
Zimbabwe.  This gives the joint Obasanjo-Mbeki 
initiative the appearance of a wasted effort. 
However, while Obasanjo put a positive spin on his 
visit, he probably was not as pleased as he wanted us 
to believe.  The scenario he painted shows a Mugabe 
who seemed intent on making one demand after another 
in order to delay real negotiations. 
 
 
9. (C) Mugabe's treatment in Nigeria during President 
Obasanjo's inaugural ceremonies are telling.  The news 
circulating among Nigerian officials was that Mugabe 
was asked to stay home.  However, Mugabe insisted on 
attending.  That may have been a mistake.  According 
to the Canadian Deputy High Commission who said his 
information came from a very reliable source,no other 
Head of State would sit with Mugabe on the bus ride to 
the actual inaugural ceremony. 
 
 
10. (C) Comment Continued: Whatever progress Obasanjo 
and Mbeki made in early May appears to have been 
undone by the events of late May/early June.  From our 
reading of Obasanjo's account of his visit, Mugabe 
seemed more interested in making serial demands that 
would retard progress than in actually moving forward 
to an accommodation with the MDC.  Perhaps, Mugabe's 
less than familial reception in Abuja may also signal 
that Nigeria is losing patience with him.  During the 
Ambassador's next meeting with the President, we will 
seek his views on the recent turn of events in 
Zimbabwe and what he sees as next steps.  END COMMENT. 
JETER