US embassy cable - 03RANGOON696

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000696 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
USMISSION NEW YORK FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BM, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: COM PRESSES HOME MINISTER TO RELEASE DETAINEES AND 
MOVE FORWARD ON RECONCILIATION 
 
REF: RANGOON 665 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  On June 11, COM had a frank meeting with 
Minister of Home Affairs Colonel Tin Hlaing to discuss the 
recent crackdown on the NLD and to deliver an  advance copy 
of this year's Trafficking In Persons report.  On recent NLD 
detentions, Tin Hlaing denied press reports that the 
government told Special Envoy Razali that Aung San Suu Kyi 
would be released in immediately or in two weeks, saying 
there was no timetable for her release.  He assured the COM, 
however, that the International Committee of the Red Cross 
would have access to recent detainees once a police 
investigation of the incident on May 30 is completed 
(although this contradicts what ICRC has been told, see 
septel).  The Minister provided a detailed account of SPDC 
internal security concerns prior to May 30, and a description 
of what occurred the night of the clash.  The COM said that 
allowing Embassy officers to visit the site of the clash was 
a positive approach.  COM then described some of the 
information Emboffs collected which indicated a premeditated 
attack by trained individuals (some disguised as monks) and 
did not support the government's version of events.  She 
stressed the extreme importance the USG placed on a credible 
investigation of the attack and full accounting for the 
people who have been missing or were detained since then. 
She reiterated that the U.S. saw no justification for the 
continued detention of ASSK and other NLD members and called 
for their immediate release.  She urged the Minister to take 
actions to undo the harsh measures taken over the past 12 
days and to use his influence to get the national 
reconciliation process back on track.  She also provided the 
Minister a copy of the Trafficking in Persons report, noting 
that the government's failure to make progress on forced 
labor was the primary reason Burma was still on Tier 3.  The 
Minister said his government "takes U.S. views very much to 
heart," and asked the COM to keep in close communication with 
him.  End Summary. 
 
NLD Crackdown 
 
2. (C)  In a June 11 meeting with Home Minister Tin Hlaing 
(accompanied by the Deputy Home Minister and an interpreter) 
the COM asked for clarification of news reports that Special 
Envoy Razali had said Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) might be 
released immediately or within two weeks.  The Minister said 
there must have been some mistake because there was no 
timetable set for her release.  He said that her protective 
custody is a temporary situation but there has been no 
decision when she might be released.  The Minister said a 
formal police investigation of the incident that occurred on 
May 30 is underway, intimating that the results of the 
investigation will have a bearing on ASSK's release. 
 
3. (C)  The COM expressed the USG's concern regarding those 
missing after the May 30 clash and urged the Minister to 
provide an accurate account of what transpired that night and 
to account for those that are missing, injured, or dead.  She 
asked if any charges had been fixed against those jailed 
after the attack and why 19 of the NLD leaders from the 
convoy were reportedly in protective custody and still 
incommunicado.  The Minister said no charges had been made 
against anyone yet, that 25 of the people detained that night 
were released yesterday, and that others were being held as 
part of the investigation.  He said the 19 NLD leaders were 
still in protective custody because, "The situation is 
confusing, not stable, and not to our liking.  We want the 
dust to settle, then diplomats will be able to visit these 
individuals." 
 
The SPDC's Version of Events 
 
4. (C)  He elaborated that the SPDC had evidence and 
intelligence that the incident was pre-planned (he did not 
elaborate by whom).  He shared the following information, 
which he deemed "very confidential," regarding events leading 
up to the incident: 
 
-- Earlier this year, ASSK and Senior General Than Shwe had 
dinner together and agreed on steps to national 
reconciliation and democratic reform.  Part of the agreement 
was that ASSK could rally her supporters in NLD offices but 
not elsewhere, and she could travel to any part of the 
country.  (Note:  This is the first official confirmation of 
this meeting.  ASSK has always avoided any direct discussion 
or even acknowledgment of meetings with Than Shwe or Khin 
Nyunt when we have met with her.  End Note.) 
 
-- Up until January or February, everything went according to 
plan and there was no tension.  Then, the SPDC received 
information that the NLD was planning a political change in 
June and ASSK started to break the rules established for her 
travels (see reftel, para. 3; this parallels what S-1 said to 
Razali.)  She began to hold roadside meetings and speak to 
crowds gathered to see her at monasteries.  She started 
traveling without keeping military intelligence advised of 
her plans, sometimes traveling through the night.  This 
caused problems for them because they could not provide her 
adequate security.  Military intelligence warned her 
repeatedly to keep them advised of her travel plans, but she 
did not. 
 
-- In Kachin State, the SPDC found that a lot of people did 
not like ASSK and this became a big concern for the 
government.  ASSK continued to cause problems which 
aggravated the people such as not paying tolls at bridge 
crossings, causing traffic jams with her motorcade, and using 
monks as a means of taking advantage of uneducated poor 
people. 
 
-- At the same time, insurgent groups along the Thai border 
began rallying support for ASSK, producing pamphlets, and 
planting explosive devices.  These activities seemed to be 
"in synch" with her activities. 
 
-- Secretary One Khin Nyunt had planned to meet with ASSK in 
May but at the last minute she said she would be traveling, 
and she designated NLD Secretary U Lwin to meet with 
Secretary One. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
5. (C)  Note: It is very unlikely that these "confidential" 
tidbits are original thoughts from the Minister; they are 
most likely the party line on why ASSK's activities could not 
be allowed to continue (the points about people not liking 
her because she did not pay bridge tolls, disrupted traffic, 
etc., have been leveled before and are becoming tiresome). 
The failure to coordinate her travel with authorities, fears 
of links to subversive groups, and the affront to Khin Nyunt 
for proposing a substitute to represent her at a requested 
meeting with him, combined with concerns about her growing 
popularity and independence, sound closer to the mark as to 
why the SPDC was unhappy.  End Note. 
 
6. (C)  The Minister then segued into the events of May 30, 
saying that it was very confusing because it was dark that 
night but, so far, the following information was available. 
ASSK was supposed stay in Mon Ywa that night but instead 
chose to travel toward Depeyin.  At a certain place in the 
road, there were 2,000 (down from the governments previous 
claim of 5,000) people "who were against her" who had blocked 
the road.  Her motorcycle escort turned back when it saw 
these people but her car (with lights switched off) forced 
its way straight through the crowd, fortunately not injuring 
anyone.  The second car, carrying NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo, 
also attempted to force its way through the crowd but it hit 
some people and came to an abrupt halt.  A trailing 
motorcycle ran into it and crashed.  The third car ran over 
the motorcyclist, killing him, and the whole convoy came to a 
halt.  Violence then broke out until security police reached 
the scene, restored order, and took the injured to the 
hospital.  U Tin Oo got out of his car and walked to Depeyin 
where he was put in protective custody; he was uninjured. 
After ASSK made it through the crowd, she also met the police 
and was taken into protective custody. 
 
U.S. Concerns 
7. (C)  The COM said the information was appreciated and that 
the lack of interference with the Embassy officers who 
visited the site of the clash on June 4-5 was a positive 
step.  She said that the information the Emboffs gathered 
from many people in the area, and the items they found at the 
scene, did not support the Minister's account of the 
incident.  She provided a synopsis of the attack as related 
to Emboffs by many sources, which indicated that the convoy 
was blocked by trucks and attacked by an organized and 
trained group of armed individuals who wore white armbands to 
identify themselves.  She said the idea that 2,000 local 
people would congregate in a field at night to attack ASSK 
was not a credible story and she hoped the government 
investigation would provide a more credible account.  The COM 
also reiterated the USG's deep concern for the people missing 
and possibly injured or dead as a result of the attack.  She 
urged the Minister to ensure a full accounting, including 
names of the dead, as soon as possible. 
 
ICRC Access 
 
8. (C)  The COM noted that the ICRC has a standing agreement 
with the government to be notified of new political arrests 
and to have access to these detainees as quickly as possible, 
and asked if ICRC had been given access to those detained on 
May 30 or to other NLD members detained since that night. 
The Minister responded that the ICRC did not have access to 
these detainees yet but that it would be granted access as 
soon as possible.  He said that normally ICRC is not granted 
access to detainees while an investigation is underway.  The 
COM emphasized the importance of granting ICRC access to 
these detainees as quickly as possible.  The Minister 
responded that he was the focal point for the ICRC, he knew 
the importance of their work, and he would make sure they got 
access.  (Note:  According to the head of ICRC in Rangoon, 
Secretary One Khin Nyunt told him on June 10 that ICRC would 
 
SIPDIS 
not get access to detainees taken in at the May 30 incident 
or since.  The Home Minister was present at that meeting but 
perhaps he still hopes to gain access for ICRC.  End Note.) 
 
National Reconciliation Is Top Priority 
 
9. (C)  The COM said that the USG and the world is watching 
and the SPDC needs to not only restore the political climate 
that existed prior to the May 30 clash, but go beyond that in 
order to demonstrate that it is still committed to national 
reconciliation.  She urged the Minister to do everything he 
could to quickly move the process forward and reminded him 
that he once told her "I do not like to keep Burmese people 
in jail".  (Note:  While we do not have any illusions that 
the Minister has the authority to act alone on this, he is 
one of the more approachable Ministers and he has good access 
to Secretary One.  Certainly the COM's comments will be 
reported to at least that level, and hopefully higher.  End 
Note.) 
 
Trafficking in Persons 
 
10. (C)  The COM provided the Minister with a copy of this 
year's Trafficking In Persons report and Poloff provided an 
overview of the Burma section of the report.  TIP falls under 
the Minister's purview and Poloff was able to report on 
several areas in which the Ministry and its partners had made 
progress on TIP during the year.  Poloff noted, however, that 
Burma remained a Tier 3 country on the TIP ranking in large 
part due to its failure to make adequate progress on forced 
labor, which is included in the U.S. definition of TIP.  The 
Minister appeared to appreciate receiving the report and 
feedback on his Ministry's actions (he does not have 
authority on forced issues). 
 
11. (C)  Comment:  Despite the frank and candid nature of the 
COM's message in this one-hour meeting, the Minister was very 
cordial and stated in his closing remarks that he "takes U.S. 
views very much to heart," and asked that the Embassy 
continue to provide him with news releases and information on 
this matter and other issues as it becomes available.  As 
with a handful of other Ministers, we have the impression 
that the Home Minister recognizes the serious problems in his 
government.  End Comment. 
Martinez