US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1025

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Tigers stick to hard-line stance, essentially rejecting Tokyo's call to re-engage GSL right away

Identifier: 03COLOMBO1025
Wikileaks: View 03COLOMBO1025 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2003-06-12 09:36:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER KPAO CE JA NO LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, SA/PD; NSC FOR 
E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL:  06-12-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KPAO, CE, JA, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Tigers stick to hard-line stance, essentially 
rejecting Tokyo's call to re-engage GSL right away 
 
Refs:  (A) Ops Center/Colombo 06-12-13 telecon 
 
-      (B) Colombo-SA/INS 06/11/03 unclass e-mail 
-      (C) Colombo 1018, and previous 
-      (D) Tokyo 3772, and previous (Notal) 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Reacting with haste to the Tokyo 
donors conference, the Tamil Tigers restated their view 
that the GSL must take quick steps to form an interim 
structure in the north/east.  The Tigers also 
underscored that they did not accept the understandings 
reached at Tokyo.  In spite of the stark message, the 
government has little choice but to keep plugging away 
as it tries to break the deadlock.  Suggested press 
guidance is contained in Para 9.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) TIGER STATEMENT:  Not wasting much time, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization has 
reacted to the Tokyo donors conference.  (Note: Please 
see Refs C-D for reporting on the Tokyo conference, 
which was held June 9-10.)  As is the group's recent 
custom, the LTTE response -- which was relatively terse 
by Tiger standards -- was posted on the pro-LTTE website 
"TamilNet."  (Note:  The statement was issued late June 
11 local time and was passed to SA/INS in Ref B.  We are 
not certain whether the "TamilNet" text contained all of 
the statement, but it seemed to encapsulate the main 
points.  Also, while most LTTE statements are issued in 
the name of its London-based spokesman Anton 
Balasingham, this one was characterized as an "official" 
message from the group's "headquarters" in northern Sri 
Lanka.) 
 
3.  (SBU) In the statement, the LTTE stuck to its recent 
hard-line stance, essentially demanding that the GSL 
take quick steps to give the group interim control of 
the north/east.  (Note:  Since late April when the LTTE 
left the peace talks and said it would not participate 
at Tokyo, the group has been harping on the issue of 
forming an interim structure in the north/east -- see 
Ref C.)  Denigrating the remarks made on the topic by 
Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at Tokyo, 
the LTTE stated: 
 
"We are disappointed to note that the prime minister's 
statement does not offer anything new...The prime 
minister has not responded to our call for a draft 
framework for an innovative and effective political- 
administrative structure.  Contrary to Mr. 
Wickremesinghe's statement to the international donor 
community, we seriously differ in perception in 
connection with what the LTTE leadership proposes and 
what his government offers.  While our leadership has 
proposed an interim administrative framework, a 
political-administrative structure for the northeast 
with wider participation of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan 
government has offered a council with a structure and 
mechanism for the development of the region." 
 
4.  (SBU) Regarding Tokyo, the LTTE made clear that it 
resented the government's interactions with the donors, 
stating: 
 
"The compulsions that arose from severe economic and 
political bankruptcy have compelled the government to 
seek the ultimate refuge in the so-called `international 
safety net' to resolve the economic and political crisis 
of the country.  By seeking this `safety net' the 
Colombo regime has shifted the peace process from third 
party facilitation to the realm of international 
arbitration by formidable external forces that has far- 
reaching consequences for the political and economic 
destiny of the island." 
 
5.  (SBU) Finally, noting that it was not present at 
Tokyo (though not mentioning that this was its own 
choice), the statement underlined that the Tigers did 
not feel bound by understandings reached there, stating: 
 
"The LTTE was not involved in the deliberations or in 
the formulation of these declarations.  We have not been 
consulted on the set of propositions and resolutions 
enunciated in the Tokyo Declaration.  The Colombo 
government, with the active assistance of the 
facilitator and its international `tactical allies' has 
formulated this strategic paper to superimpose its own 
agenda on the LTTE.  This is unacceptable to us." 
 
6.  (C) GSL REVIEWING STATEMENT:  As of late June 12 
(local), the government has not yet responded to this 
latest LTTE message.  Ambassador Nanda Godage, a 
director at the GSL's Peace Secretariat, told us that 
the government was carefully reviewing the message, but 
had not yet decided how to respond.  He said he thought 
any response would take at least several days in coming, 
as the GSL discussed the matter with the Norwegian 
government facilitators and Japanese government 
representatives.  (Note:  Per Refs B-C, there has been 
some talk of Japanese representatives trying to meet 
with the LTTE soon in order to brief the group on Tokyo 
among other items.  It is not clear, however, whether 
these plans have been finalized.) 
 
7.  (C) OTHER REACTION:  No one that Mission has touched 
base with was particularly surprised by the substance of 
the LTTE's June 11 statement.  The general feeling was 
that the group was simply restating its positions.  In 
discussions with contacts, two items that did stand out 
were the following: 
 
-- Speed of the response:  Ambassador Godage told us 
that he was a bit surprised by how quickly the LTTE 
reacted to Tokyo.  He said he had originally thought it 
would take the group at least several days to mull 
things over and get its reaction out.  Instead, the 
group took all of one day to send out a response. 
Godage said he wondered whether the group, embarrassed 
by the success of the Tokyo meeting, had decided to 
react quickly and viscerally in re-emphasizing its hard- 
line position. 
 
-- Blunt tone:  Other contacts flagged what they saw as 
the very blunt tone of the LTTE's statement.  Roman 
Catholic Bishop for Jaffna Thomas Savundranayagam told 
us that he thought the tone of the statement was quite 
telling and indicated just how serious the group was on 
the issue of an interim administration. 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  In spite of the LTTE's stark message, 
the government has little choice but to keep plugging 
away as it tries to break the deadlock.  The LTTE's 
statement, unfortunately, gave the government very, very 
little to work with.  Despite calls at Tokyo for the 
group to re-engage in the peace talks, for example, the 
group gave zero indication that it planned to do this 
soon.  All in all, the latest statement serves to 
highlight how difficult it is to deal with the LTTE, 
especially in light of the group's truculent mood.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
9.  (SBU) SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE:  We recommend that 
Department not comment on the LTTE's statement, allowing 
the Sri Lankan government to have the spotlight.  If 
Department does make a comment, however, we would 
suggest something along the following lines: 
 
Begin text: 
 
We regard the Tigers' reaction as precipitate.  The 
international community at the Tokyo conference 
unanimously agreed that the Tigers should be invited to 
take part in the development of Sri Lanka's north and 
east.  The Tigers should accept this invitation.  The 
details of a provisional arrangement in the north and 
east should be worked out at the negotiating table. 
 
End text. 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS 

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