US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI2798

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 002798 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2 
 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS, GCC, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL FRANKS' 
VALEDICTORY VISIT TO THE UAE 
 
REF: Dubai 2235 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (S) General Franks:  Your Emirati friends and 
the U.S. mission to the UAE are looking forward to 
your valedictory visit.  As always, UAE Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid 
Al-Nahyan (MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince GEN Shaykh 
Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) relish the 
opportunity to meet with you and exchange ideas, 
but they are naturally disappointed that this will 
be your last official visit to the UAE. 
 
3. (S) MbZ visited the U.S. May 18-22, meeting with 
the Vice President, NSA Rice, Secretary Powell, 
Deputy Secretary Armitage, Secretary Rumsfeld, 
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DCI Tenet, General 
Myers, U/S Bolton, A/S Burns, A/S Bloomfield and a 
host of senior senators.  The visit was very 
positive and presented an opportunity for senior 
U.S. policymakers and MbZ to exchange views on 
Iraq, Iran, the peace process, Syria and the future 
of our bilateral military relationship.  From 
Washington, MbZ traveled to Texas where he met with 
Lockheed Martin officials to review the status of 
the F-16 Block 60 program; the first Desert Falcon 
is due to roll out of the assembly plant this 
October and the Emiratis are beginning preparations 
for the December 2004 arrival of the first squadron 
in the UAE. 
 
---------------- 
SUGGESTED THEMES 
---------------- 
 
3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following 
key bilateral military issues, in addition to the 
more general themes outlined below in para four: 
 
-- Provide a "look-ahead" on our likely military 
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the 
region more generally (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Urge finalization of the Memorandum of Reference 
between our armed forces for the deployment of a 
Special Operations unit to Afghanistan (MbZ); 
 
-- Express our appreciation for the superb 
coordination and leadership provided for the 
establishment of the Air Warfare Center.  The 
Center will be a model for multilateral training in 
the region (MbZ); 
 
-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need, 
as part of our commitment to building and 
solidifying our strong military ties, to reengage 
seriously on the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(MbZ, MbR). 
 
4.  (S) More broadly, you may also wish to: 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support 
for U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, namely access to bases, logistical 
support and intelligence coordination (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous 
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed 
Force's establishment of the very successful Shaykh 
Zayid hospital in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to 
resupply with equipment and medicine other Iraqi 
hospitals and the provision of basic foodstuffs to 
the Iraqi people (MbZ); 
 
-- Consult and provide assurances on need to 
maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize 
external influence (Iran) and manage sectarian 
rivalries (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Express concerns about the activities of Iraqi 
Sunni imam Ahmed Al-Kubaysi (MbZ, MbR). 
 
------------------------- 
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
Regional Footprint: 
------------------ 
 
5. (S) We have received informal queries from both 
CENTAF and NAVCENT regarding the deployment of 
assets to the UAE.  If appropriate, I would 
recommend that you outline with the leadership -- 
MbR and MbZ -- what we see in terms of our likely 
regional footprint, and specifically what we have 
in mind for the UAE.  The Emiratis have dropped 
strong hints at being open to a more robust 
presence, including an alternate Air Force command 
center, but we need to prepare them for the 
direction in which we are likely to move here. 
 
Afghanistan:  SOC Deployment 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (S) We are close to finalizing our Memorandum of 
Reference (MOR) with the UAE Armed Forces on the 
deployment of a 40-man Emirati Special Operations 
contingent to Baghram Air Base.  The MOR has become 
mired in the Emirati bureaucracy and it may be 
worthwhile for you to urge MbZ to nudge the process 
forward so that this much anticipated deployment 
does not experience any unnecessary delays.  As you 
know, the UAE continues to play a very helpful role 
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.  The 
UAE Armed Forces provided the Afghan National Army 
with approximately $50 million in assistance in 
kind in 2002 and overall humanitarian assistance 
has crossed the $30 million mark. 
 
Air Warfare Center 
------------------ 
 
7. (S) MbZ provided the leadership to make possible 
the soon-to-be-inaugurated regional Air Warfare 
Center at Al-Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi.  This 
training facility is a joint CENTAF-UAE Air Force 
project that will eventually host trainers, 
students and aircraft from the GCC and the U.S., UK 
and France.  With a range close by that is larger 
than that located at Nellis AFB, the AWC will 
provide an unmatched opportunity for USAF (and 
eventually NAVCENT and MARCENT) pilots to hone 
their skills in theater.  It comes with the added 
benefit of offering the perfect setting for our 
officers to build long-term relationships with 
their Arab and European coalition counterparts. 
The AWC represents the UAE leadership's commitment 
to increasing interoperability with U.S. and 
coalition forces. 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (S) We need to discuss a successor agreement to 
the dormant, unimplemented Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA), which comes up for renewal in 
2006.  This will require heavy lifting on both 
sides and the sooner we agree on a strategy and 
define our "non-negotiable" items, the easier it 
will be to proceed with the Emiratis.  The past two 
years have been quiet on the DCA front, mostly due 
to the fact that there have been almost no major 
carrier visits to Jebel Ali in Dubai.  Fifth Fleet 
has already indicated that they would like to send 
more carriers our way and we thus anticipate the 
potential for future complications relating to the 
unimplemented DCA.  Your visit would provide a good 
opportunity to resurface this important bilateral 
military issue. 
 
ATACMs/Predator Update -- (If Raised) 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A 
deal.  The Emiratis have agreed to the principles 
outlined in what will be a regional Memorandum of 
Understanding governing the use of this system.  We 
are awaiting the provision of P&A and the visit in 
July of an U.S. Army team to meet with the Emiratis 
to discuss their exact needs. 
 
10. (S) MbZ raised his desire to procure the 
Predator B with just about every interlocutor in 
Washington.  He believes this system will provide 
him with the much-needed capability to patrol the 
UAE's long coast and ward off on any potential 
threats before they reach the shores.  MbZ desires 
an answer to the UAE's LOR by year's end. 
 
-------------- 
BROADER ISSUES 
-------------- 
 
Concerns About Ahmed Al-Kubaysi 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) We continue to express our concerns to 
senior Emiratis -- including MbR, MbZ and MFA 
Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid -- about the unhelpful 
statements and activities of Iraqi Sunni imam Ahmed 
Al-Kubaysi.  As you know, the Emiratis had placed 
great hopes in Al-Kubaysi to serve as a bridge 
between Sunnis and Shi'a in order to avert a Shi'a 
majority power grab.  Al-Kubaysi, who is even a 
controversial figure in Iraqi expat circles in the 
UAE, has proven difficult to manage, though our 
interlocutors assure us that he is "controllable." 
Following our latest expressions of concern, MbR 
told Dubai Consul General Olson that he believes 
Al-Kubaysi has a positive role to play in effecting 
a reconciliation among the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish 
populations.  MbR urged us to use Al-Kubaysi to 
counteract what he sees as a creeping Shi'a/Iranian 
takeover of Iraq and, along with MbZ and Hamdan, 
has offered to intercede with the Iraqi imam and 
pass any message the USG would like to have hand- 
delivered.  I would strongly recommend that you use 
this visit to personally raise your concerns about 
Al-Kubaysi with both MbZ and MbR. 
 
Iraq:  UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12. (S) As you know, the Emiratis were among the 
first in the Arab world to step up to the plate in 
providing much-needed humanitarian assistance and 
medical relief to the Iraqi people.  The Embassy, 
the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM worked closely with 
the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move supplies 
into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE 
for treatment.  This cooperation continues though 
thanks to the fine system put in place by CENTCOM 
and the HOC, the Emiratis are now moving assistance 
into Iraq on an almost daily basis using their own 
transportation.  The Shaykh Zayid hospital in 
Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of patients a 
day and the Emiratis are now considering adopting 
yet another hospital.  Since you last visited with 
MbZ, he has traveled to Iraq where he toured the 
Shaykh Zayid hospital and visited with the UAE 
embassy staff in Baghdad. 
 
WAHBA