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| Identifier: | 03RANGOON681 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03RANGOON681 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2003-06-10 11:53:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL PHUM BM NLD ASSK |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000681 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV USPACOM FOR FPA USUN FOR AMBASSADOR TWINING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2012 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM BM, NLD, ASSK SUBJECT: RAZALI SAYS ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH, BUT WHAT ABOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION? Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Razali had a brief meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi this morning (June 10) and reported to diplomats later that she was not injured and was "feisty, as usual." While Razali was quite pleased, with good reason, that he gained access to ASSK, he made no progress on reversing the SPDC's recent crackdown on the opposition. With all NLD leaders under detention, all NLD offices closed, and arrests of members continuing, conditions are now worse than they were in October 2000 when the SE began his mission. Most distressing is that Razali was unable to address the larger objective of focusing the SPDC (particularly Senior General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to make tangible progress on the road to national reconciliation. End Summary. Razali Confirms ASSK Is Okay 2. (C) On June 10, SE Razali told diplomats seeing him off at the airport that he had just met with NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi and that she was in good SIPDIS condition. He said ASSK was outspoken and "feisty, as usual" and she "did not have a scratch on her." The meeting took place at an undisclosed location (Razali told us yesterday that he had agreed with authorities not to disclose the location) and Razali's three assistants, who usually accompany him in meetings with ASSK, were not allowed to attend. Instead, Brigadier General Than Tun, who normally serves as military intelligence's liaison officer with ASSK, was in the room during the meeting. As evidence of ASSK's good health, Razali told the diplomats that she appeared to be giving some terse instructions to BG Than Tun in Burmese periodically during the meeting. 3. (C) Razali would not comment on what he discussed with ASSK but in response to a direct question said he did not raise the issue of the May 30 attack on her party as they traveled in Sagaing Division. (Note: It seems odd that Razali would not raise this issue, since the attack is what precipitated ASSK's detention and international concerns that she was injured. Hopefully, he will provide more information on this in a more private meeting. End Note.) The COM said she hoped Razali had conveyed to ASSK the intense international interest and concern in her well-being. He replied that she was aware of "all this." No Shift Evident In SPDC Position 4. (C) The COM asked Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win, who was presiding over the send-off, whether anyone else would now be able to have access to ASSK. The DFM responded that, "in all honesty, we are not thinking along those lines for the time being." When the COM asked why ASSK continues to be held incommunicado, the DFM said it was "for her own safety and security." 5. (C) While it is a relief that the SE has been able to determine that ASSK is alive and well, Razali's brief and closely monitored meeting with her was the minimum the SPDC could have done to address international criticism generated by the May 30 attack on her convoy and ensuing crackdown on the NLD. The SPDC probably calculated that they might not be able to weather the storm of international protest (and possibly domestic unrest) if Razali left Rangoon empty-handed. Having made this concession to international pressure, we expect the SPDC will now slide back into business as usual, and continue their crackdown on the NLD. (The DFM's remarks on her continued "protective custody" are the handwriting on the wall.) 6. (C) The SPDC's crackdown over the past ten days has produced conditions worse than those when Razali began his mission in October 2000. At that time, at least some NLD offices were still open (none are now) and ASSK was under detention at her residence and could receive some international visitors. Now she and NLD Vice Chairman U Tin Oo are being held incommunicado at undisclosed locations (and his health is still a concern), all other NLD leaders are under house detention, and arrests of NLD members are continuing. 7. (C) Comment: Razali was quite pleased, with good reason, that he gained access to ASSK. In his determination to do this, however, he failed to get any commitment from the SPDC on next steps on reversing their crackdown on the NLD. Razali noted (without apparent irony) that both Secretary One Khin Nyunt and Vice Senior General Maung Aye had assured him that they were still committed to the national reconciliation process. Most distressing is that Razali was unable to address the larger objective of focusing the SPDC (particularly Senior General Than Shwe) on the urgent need to make tangible progress on the road to national reconciliation. Martinez
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